History of the Peloponnesian War

Thucydides

Thucydides. The history of the Peloponnesian War, Volume 1-2. Dale, Henry, translator. London: Heinemann and Henry G. Bohn, 1851-1852.

Now the Argives were intercepted in the midst of their enemies; for on the side of the plain the Lacedaemonians and those with them excluded them from their city; above them were the Corinthians, Phliasians, and Pellenians; and in the direction of Nemea the Boeotians, Sicyonians, and Megareans. They had no cavalry with them; [*]( Implying, of course, that the Athenians were the only people amongst he confederates who had any cavalry.) for the Athenians alone of all the allies had not yet joined them.

Now the mass of the Argives and their allies did not consider their present position so formidable; but fancied that the battle would be fought on favourable terms, and that they had intercepted the Lacedaemonians in their own country, and close by their city.

But two individuals of the Argives, Thrasyllus, one of the five generals, and Alciphron, the proxenus of the Lacedaemonians, when the armies were now on the very point of engaging, went to Agis, and in a conference urged him not to bring on a battle; since the Argives were prepared to give and accept fair and equal arbitration for whatever complaints the Lacedaemonians had against them, and to make a treaty and live in peace for the future.

Those of the Argives who made these statements did so on their own authority, and not by order of the people; and Agis on his own discretion received their proposals; and without consulting, any more than they had, with the majority, but only communicating them to one of the officers who joined the expedition, granted a truce for four months, during which they were to fulfil their agreement. And so he immediately led back the army, without explaining the matter to any of the other confederates.

The Lacedaemonians and allies followed, indeed, as he led them, out of respect for the law; but amongst each other they blamed him exceedingly, considering that when they had had an opportunity of fighting on favourable terms, and their enemies were hemmed in on all sides, both by infantry and cavalry, they were returning without having achieved any thing worthy of their preparations.