History of the Peloponnesian War

In the one which was held next day, although the Lacedaemonians had been outwitted, and he himself utterly deceived with regard to their confessing not to have come with full powers, Nicias nevertheless maintained that they ought rather to become friends of the Lacedaemonians, and, deferring their measures with the Argives, to send once more to them, and ascertain their intentions. He [*]( Or, as Arnold, Poppo, and others explain it, advising that hostilities should be deferred. For a very similar use of ἐν with an adjective, com pare I. 137. 6, ἐπειδὴ ἐν τῷ ἀσφαλεῖ μὲν ἐμοί, ἐκείνῳ δὲ ἐν ἐπικινδύνω πάλιν ἡ ἀποκομιδή ἐγίγνετο.) represented that it was to their own honour, but to their rivals' discredit, for the war to be put off: for since their own affairs were in so good a condition, it was best to preserve their prosperity as long as possible; whereas to the Lacedaemonians, in their present misfortunes, it would be gain to run all hazards as quickly as possible.

So he prevailed on them to send ambassadors, of whom he was himself one, to bid the Lacedaemonians, if they had any just intentions, to restore Panactum standing, with Amphipolis, and to give up their alliance with the Boeotians, if they refused to accede to the treaty; as it had been stipulated that they should make peace with none but by mutual consent.

They told them also to say, that they too, if they had wished to act unjustly, might have already taken the Argives for their allies, since they were come to them for that very purpose.