History of the Peloponnesian War

Thucydides

Thucydides. The history of the Peloponnesian War, Volume 1-2. Dale, Henry, translator. London: Heinemann and Henry G. Bohn, 1851-1852.

and that the Athenians themselves should garrison it, if they would. So when conferences had been held, many and often, during this summer, they prevailed on the Athenians to withdraw from Pylus the Messenians, and the rest of the helots, and all who had deserted from Laconia; and they settled them at Cranii in Cephallenia.

During this summer, then, there was peace and free intercourse with each other.

But the following winter, (different ephors happening now to be in office, and not those under whom the treaty had been made, and some of them being even opposed to it,) when embassies had come from their confederacy, and the Athenians, Boeotians, and Corinthians were there, and they had held many discussions with one another, and come to no agreement; on their departing homeward, Cleobulus and Xenares—those of the ephors who most wished to break up the treaty—held a private conference with the Boeotians and Corinthians, advising them to pursue as far as possible the same policy; and that the Boeotians, after first entering into alliance with Argos themselves, should then endeavour to bring the Argives together with themselves into alliance with the Lacedaemonians. For in this way the Boeotians were least likely to be forced to accede to the Attic treaty; since the Lacedaemonians would prefer gaining the friendship and alliance of the Argives even [*](πρό.] More literally, in the face of. Poppo adopts Dobree's explanation: Pluris enim facturos Lacedaemonians Argivorum amicitiam et societatem quam Atheniensium inimicitiam ac foederum cum ipsis junctorum violationem: i.e. magis illam cupere quam hanc metuere. For the force of καλῶς, in the next sentence, see Arnold's note.) at the risk of the enmity of the Athenians and the dissolution of the treaty. For they knew that the Lacedaemonians were always desirous that Argos should be their friend on fair terms; thinking that so the war out of the Peloponnese would be more easily conducted by them.

They begged the Boeotians, however, to put Panactum into the hands of the Lacedaemonians; that by getting back Pylus, if they could, in exchange for it, they might more easily proceed to hostilities with the Athenians.

The Boeotians and Corinthians, having received from Xenares and Cleobulus, and such of the Lacedaemonians as were friendly towards [*](αὐτοῖς.] i.e. to the Boeotians and Corinthians, not to Xenares and Cloobulus, as Bloomfield supposes. Compare sec. 3.) them, these instructions to carry to their governments, went each their way.

But two persons of the Argives, who held the highest office in their country, watched for them by the way, as they were returning; and having met them, entered into conversation with them on the possibility of the Boeotians becoming their allies, as the Corinthians, Eleans, and Mantineans had done; for if that could be well arranged, they thought they might then, on advantageous terms, both carry on war and make peace, both with the Lacedaemonians, if they should wish it—holding the same language all together—and with whomever else it might be necessary.

The Boeotian envoys were pleased at hearing this; for they happened to ask the same things as their friends in Lacedaemon had instructed them to propose. So when the men from Argos perceived that they listened to their suggestions, they said they would send ambassadors to the Boeotians, and went away.

The Boeotians, on their arrival, reported to the Boeotarchs what had been said to them, both at Lacedaemon, and by the Argives who had met them: and the Boeotarchs were pleased, and were much more eager in the business, since it had turned out so luckily for them in both quarters, that their friends amongst the Lacedaemonians requested the same things as the Argives were anxiously wishing.

Not long after, ambassadors came from Argos with the proposals that have been mentioned; whom the Boeotarchs sent back after assenting to their terms, and promising to send envoys to Argos on the question of the alliance.

In the mean time it was determined by the Boeotarchs, the Corinthians, the Megareans, and the ambassadors from Thrace, in the first place, to bind themselves by oaths to each other, that assuredly, when occasion offered, they would assist the party which needed it; and that they would carry on war with none, or make peace, without common assent; and that so the Boeotians and Megareans (for they had the same object before them) should then enter into treaty with the Argives.

But before the oaths were taken, the Boeotarchs communicated these resolutions to the four councils of the Boeotians, which have the sole power of ratifying measures; and recommended to them that oaths should be exchanged with such cities as wished to league with them for mutual assistance.

However, the members of the Boeotian councils did not accede to the plan, fearing that they should do what was displeasing to the Lacedaemonians, if they leagued with the Corinthians, who had separated from them. For the Boeotarchs did not tell them of what had taken place at Lacedaemon, namely, that Cleobulus and Xenares, amongst the ephors, and their friends, advised them first to enter into alliance with the Argives and Corinthians, and then to join the Lacedaemonians; as they imagined, that though they should not mention it, the council would decree nothing different from what they had [*](σφίσι προδιαγνόντες παραινοῦσιν.] Arnold is followed by Poppo and Bloomfield in supposing that σφίσι refers to the subject of ψηφιεῖσθαι; but as his explanation does not, I think, remove the extreme harshness of such a construction, Göller seems to be right in referring it to the Boeotarchs: except that I would not confine it, as he does, to Xenares and Cleobulus, but extend it to the whole number of them; and suppose that it is either governed by προδιαγνόντες, meaning, the plan which they had already decided on for themselves, and now recommended to the councils; or that it signifies their countrymen; the executive being identified with the people at large, as it appears to be sec. 3. οἱ βοιωτάρχαι ... παρήνουν γενές βαι ὅρκους ταῖς πόλεσιν, ὅσαι βόυλονται ἐπ᾽ ὠφελέια σφίσι ξυνομνύναι. If the former construction is preferred, σφίσι may be considered as a datives commodi. See Jelf, Gr. Gr. 59. 8.) previously determined on, and now recommended to their country.