History of the Peloponnesian War

Thucydides

Thucydides. The history of the Peloponnesian War, Volume 1-2. Dale, Henry, translator. London: Heinemann and Henry G. Bohn, 1851-1852.

Ath.

Then you do not think that interest is connected with security, whereas justice and honour are practised with danger; a course on which the Lacedaemonians, generally speaking, least of all men venture.

Mel.

Nay, but we are of opinion that they would even incur dangers for our sake, more than usual, and would regard them as less hazardous than [*](ἐς ἄλλους.] Arnold thinks that perhaps παρακινδυνεῦσαι or παραβαλεῖν may be substituted for the kindred substantive κινδύνους, so as to avoid the harsh construction of κινδύνους ἐς ἀλλους, pericula propter alios suscepta, as Scholefield renders it. But there seems no necessity for any such change, if ἐς be taken in the more general sense of relation, which it frequently admits of. Compare 105. 1, τῆς ἀνθρωπείας τῶν μὲν ἐς τὸ θεῖον νομίσεως τῶν δ᾽ ἐς σφᾶς αὐτοὺς βουλήσεως.—The same sense must, I think, be attributed to the genitive τῆς γνώμης in the last clause of the chapter: though Poppo objects to it, and proposes to substitute either the dative or accusative.) in the case of others; in as much as we he near the Peloponnese, for the execution of their measures; while in feeling we are, through our kindred with them, more to be trusted than another party would be.

Ath.

Ay, but to men going to take part in a quarrel safety does not appear to consist in the good feeling of those who call them to their aid, but in the fact of their being far superior in power for action; and the Lacedaemonians look to this even more than the rest of the world. At any rate, through their mistrusting their own resources, it is only in concert with many allies that they attack those who are near to them; so that it is not likely they will cross over to an island, while we are masters of the sea.

Mel.

But they would have others to send; and the Cretan sea is of wide extent, and to intercept a party in crossing it is more difficult for those who command it, than to escape is for those who wish to elude observation.

Besides, if they should be disappointed in this, they would proceed against your territory, and to the remainder of your allies, such as Brasidas did not reach: and you will have to exert yourselves, not so much for territory which does not belong to you, as for your own confederacy and country.

Ath.

On this point you, as well as others, may learn by actual experience, and not remain ignorant, that from no single siege did the Athenians ever yet retreat through fear of others.

But it strikes us, that though you said you would consult for the safety of your country, you have in all this long discussion advanced nothing which men might trust to for thinking that they would be saved; but your strongest points depend on hope and futurity, while your present resources are too scanty, compared with those at present opposed to you, to give you a chance of escape. And so you afford proof of great folly in your views, if you do not even yet, after allowing us to retire, adopt some counsel more prudent than this.