History of the Peloponnesian War

The main body, both of the unarmed and the armed, he posted at the most fortified and secure points of the place, facing the interior, with orders to repel the land-forces, should they make an assault; while lie himself, having picked from the whole force sixty heavy-armed and a few bowmen, proceeded outside the wall to the sea, where he most expected that they would attempt a landing, on ground which was difficult, indeed, and rocky, looking as it did to the open sea, but still, as their wall was weakest at that point, [*]( I have followed the usual interpretation of this sentence, though the sense cannot fairly be drawn from the words as they now stand. Either ἂν must be supplied with ἐπισπάσασθαι, or it must be changed into the future, as Dobree proposes, even allowing Göller's explanation of the following verb being put in the future: Futuro προθυμήσεσθαι usus est, quia in totâ sententià futureae rei significatio inest. Would it be possible to avoid the difficulty by taking ἐπισπάσασθαι in one of its other senses, to win or carry the wall? The general usage of Thucydides, I confess, is against this interpretation; but, on the other hand, there is in all the MSS. but one various reading of the passage, and that would not remedy the fault in the tense, if the ordinary force of the verb be retained.) he thought that this would tempt them to be eager in attacking it.

For they built it of no great strength just there, expecting never to be beaten at sea themselves; and also thinking that if the enemy once forced a landing, the place then became easy to take.

At this point then he went down to the very sea, and posted his heavy-armed, to prevent a landing, if possible; while he encouraged them with these words:

Soldiers, who have shared with me this adventure, let none of you in such an emergency wish to show himself clever by calculating the whole amount of the danger that surrounds us, but rather to charge the enemy with reckless confidence, and with the probability of escaping by these means. For circumstances which are as pressing as ours by no means admit of calculation, but require the danger to be faced as quickly as possible.

But indeed I see the greater part of them favourable to us, if we will but stand our ground, and not, through being alarmed at the enemy's numbers, throw away the advantages we have. For the difficulty of landing which the place presents I consider to be in our favour:

for while we remain where we are, this assists us in the struggle; but if we retreat, we shall find that though [naturally] difficult, it will be easy when there is no one to offer resistance. And in that case we shall find the enemy the more formidable on this very account, because his retreat will not be easily effected, even though he may be driven back by us. For while on board their ships, they are most easy to repel; but when they have once landed, they are then on equal terms with us.

Nor should you be very much alarmed at their numbers; for though great, they will engage in small detachments, through the impossibility of bringing to: and it is not an army on the land, fighting on equal ground, while superior in numbers; but one on board a fleet, for which, when at sea, many lucky chances are required [to make it effective]. So that I consider their difficulties a fair equivalent for our [*]( With the use of πλῆθος in this passage, to signify inferior numbers, compare the frequent use of τοσοῦτος and τηλικοῦτος with the same indefinite meaning, applying to small quantities or numbers, as well as to great; e. g Demosth. Philipp. I. 23,τοσαύτην μὲν, ὦ ἄνδρες ʼαθηναῖοι, διὰ ταῦτα, ὅτ᾽ οὐκ ἔνι νῦν ἡμῖν πορίσασθαι δύναμιν τὴν ἐκείνω παραταξομένην. Only So large a force. So also Soph. Aj. 747, and Eur. Hipp. 804.) numbers;

and at the same time I call on you, Athenians as you are, and knowing from experience as you do the nature of a naval descent on the coast of others, namely, that if a man should stand his ground, and not retreat for fear of the roaring surf and the terrors of the ships sailing to shore, he would never be driven back; [I call on you, I say,] now in your own case to stand your ground, and by resisting them along the very beach to save both yourselves and the place.

When Demosthenes had thus encouraged them, they were more inspirited, and went down against them, and ranged themselves close along the sea.

The Lacedaemonians, moved from their position, and assaulted the fort at the same time both with their army by land and with their ships, of which there were forty-three; the admiral on board being Thrasymelidas son of Cratesicles, a Spartan. And he assaulted it just where Demosthenes was expecting him.

So the Athenians defended themselves on both sides, landward and seaward; while their opponents, divided into detachments of a few ships, because it was not possible for more to bring to, and relieving each other in turn, were sailing up against them with all eagerness and mutual exhortation, if by any means they might force their passage and take the place.

The most distinguished of all, however, was Brasidas. For being captain of a trireme, and seeing that, in consequence of the difficulty of the position, the captains and steersmen, even where it did seem possible to land, shrunk back and were cautious of wrecking their vessels, he shouted out, and said, that it was not right to be chary of timbers, and put up with the enemy's having built a fort in their country; but he bade them shiver their vessels to force a landing, and told the allies not to shrink, in return for great benefits received, to sacrifice their ships for the Lacedaemonians on the present occasion, but to run them ashore, and land by any means, and secure both the men and the place.