History of the Peloponnesian War

the Chalcidians thinking that the Athenians would in the first place march against them, (and moreover, the cities near to them which had not revolted, secretly joined in the invitation,) and Perdiccas, though not an open enemy, yet being afraid, on his part also, because of his old quarrels with the Athenians, and most of all being desirous of reducing to subjection Arrhibaeus, the king of the Lyncestians.

And what contributed to their getting the army out of the Peloponnese the more easily, was the misfortune of the Lacedaemonians at that time. For as the Athenians were pressing hard upon the Peloponnese, and especially upon their territory, they hoped to divert them from it most effectually, if they annoyed them in return by sending an army to their allies; especially as they were ready to maintain it, and were calling them to their aid, with a view to revolting.

Besides, they were glad to have a pretext for sending away some of the Helots; lest in the present state of affairs, when Pylus was occupied by an enemy, they might attempt some revolution.

Indeed through fear of their youth and great numbers, they even perpetrated the following deed: (for at all times most of the Lacedaemonian institutions were framed particularly with a view to the Helots, to guard against them.) They made proclamation, that as many of them as claimed to have done the state most service against the enemy should be picked out, professing that they would give them their liberty; thus applying a test to them, and thinking that those who severally claimed to be first made free, would also, through their high spirit, be most ready to attack them.

Having thus selected as many as two thousand, the Helots crowned themselves, and went round to the temples, on the strength of having gained their freedom; but the Spartans soon after did away with them, and no one ever knew by what means they were severally dispatched. And on this occasion they eagerly sent away seven hundred of them with Brasidas as heavy-armed troops:

the rest of his army he induced by pay to follow him from the Peloponnese. As for Brasidas himself, it was chiefly at his own desire that the Lacedaemonians sent him out.

But the Chalcidians were also very anxious to have him, as a man who both appeared, while in Sparta, to be active in every thing, and after he had gone from home, proved himself most valuable to the Lacedaemonians.

For at that present time, by showing himself just and moderate towards the cities, he caused their revolt in most instances; while other places he took through their being betrayed to him; so that the Lacedaemonians, if they might wish to conclude peace, (as they did,) had towns to give and receive back, and a respite from the war in the Peloponnese. And at a later period of the war, after what had happened in Sicily, it was the probity and tact of Brasidas at this time, experienced by some and heard of by others, that most raised amongst the allies of Athens a strong inclination towards the Lacedaemonians.

For by going out first, and showing himself to be in all respects a worthy man, he left amongst them an assured hope that the rest also were like him.