History of the Peloponnesian War

For they thought they might do it with security; their mistake in the estimate of the Athenian power being as great as power afterwards showed itself, and their judgment resting on blind desire, rather than on safe forethought: since men are accustomed to grant to inconsiderate hope whatever they;

but to thrust aside with despotic reasoning whatever they do not like. Besides, as the Athenians had lately met with a heavy blow in Boeotia, and Brasidas asserted what was attractive, but not true, that the Athenians had been unwilling to fight him at Nisaea with his own force alone, they were full of confidence, and believed that no one would come against them.

Above all, from regard to what was agreeable at the moment, and because they would be likely to find the Lacedaemonians zealous in their behalf at first, they were ready on all accounts to run the risk. The Athenians perceiving this, distributed guards in the different states as well as they could in a short time, and in the winter season; while Brasidas sent despatches to Lacedaemon, begging them to send him additional forces, and himself prepared for building triremes in the Strymon.