History of the Peloponnesian War

Thucydides

Thucydides. The history of the Peloponnesian War, Volume 1-2. Dale, Henry, translator. London: Heinemann and Henry G. Bohn, 1851-1852.

But Demosthenes was persuaded at the same time by the Messenians that it was a fine opportunity for him, with so large an army collected together, to attack the Aetolians, who were hostile to Naupactus, and by reducing whom he would easily win for Athens the rest of the continent in these parts.

For they represented to him that the nation of the Aetolians, though numerous and warlike, were yet not difficult to subdue before succours reached them, as they lived in unfortified villages, and those far apart, and used but light armour.

And they advised him to attack in the first place the Apodotians, next the Ophioneans, and after them the Eurytanians, which are the largest division of the nation, speaking, it is said, the most unintelligible language, and being cannibals; for if these were subdued, the rest would readily surrender.

He consented to do so, out of regard for the Messenians, and still more because he thought, that without employing the forces of Athens, with only continental tribes as his allies, and with the Aetolians, he would be able to go by land against the Boeotians, through the Locri Ozolae to Cytinium in Doris, keeping Parnassus on his right hand till he reached the Phocians, who, he thought, would eagerly join him, for the friendship they had always borne the Athenians, or might be brought over by force; and to Phocis Boeotia is at once the bordering state. Starting therefore with all his armament from Leucas, in opposition to the wishes of the Acarnanians, lie coasted along to Sollium.