History of the Peloponnesian War
Thucydides
Thucydides. The history of the Peloponnesian War, Volume 1-2. Dale, Henry, translator. London: Heinemann and Henry G. Bohn, 1851-1852.
And many dreadful things befell the cities through this sedition, which occur, and will always do so, as long as human nature is the same, but [*]( For a similar use of μᾶλλον compare IV. 19. 7, εἴτε καὶ ἐκπολιορκηθέντες μᾶλλον ἂν χειρωθεῖεν) in a more violent or milder form, and varying in their phenomena, as the several variations of circumstances may in each case present themselves. For in peace and prosperity both communities and individuals have better feelings, through not falling into [*]( Literally compulsory, i. e. which compells a man to do what he would otherwise not think of.) urgent needs; whereas war, by taking away the free supply of daily wants is a violent master, and assimilates most men's tempers to their present condition, The states ten were thus torn by sedition, and the later instances of it in any part, from having heard what had been done before, exhibited largely an excessive refinement of ideas, both in the eminent cunning of their plans, and the monstrous cruelty of their vengeance.
The ordinary meaning of words was chanced by them as they thought proper. For reckless daring was regarded as courage tat was true to its friends; prudent delay, as specious cowardice; moderation, as a cloak for unmanliness; being intelligent in every thing, as being useful for nothing.
Frantic violence was assigned to the manly character; cautious plotting was considered a specious excuse for declining the contest. The advocate for cruel measures was always trusted; while his opponent was suspected. He that plotted against another, if successful, was reckoned clever; he that suspected a plot, still cleverer; but he that forecasted for escaping the necessity of all such things, was regarded as one who broke up his party, and was afraid of his adversaries.