History of the Peloponnesian War

Thucydides

Thucydides. The history of the Peloponnesian War, Volume 1-2. Dale, Henry, translator. London: Heinemann and Henry G. Bohn, 1851-1852.

And how can it fail to be injurious for us to be put to expense by sitting down before it, because it will not surrender; and if we take the city, to recover it in a ruined condition, and be deprived of the revenue from it in future?

For our strength against the enemy lies in this. So then we must not hurt ourselves, by being strict judges of the offenders, but rather see how, by punishing them moderately, we may be able in future to avail ourselves of the cities with unimpaired mean the score of money; and we must resolve to derive our protection not from severity of laws, but from attention to deeds. The very contrary of which we do at present;

and we have subdued any power that was [once] free, and, when harshly governed, naturally revolted for its independence, we fancy that we are bound to avenge ourselves with severity.

But in dealing wit freemen, we must not punish them rigorously when revolt, but watch them rigorously before they revolt and prevent their even coming to the thought of it; and when we have mastery of them, we should attach the guilt to as few as possible.

"Now consider what an error you would commit in this also, if persuaded by Cleon.

For at present the commons in all the states are well disposed towards you, and either do not revolt with the aristocratical party, or if compelled to do so, are straightway hostile to those who made them; and you have the mass of the city opposed to you on your side, when you proceed to war.

But if you butcher the commons of Mytilene, who took no part in the revolt, and when they had got possession of arms, voluntarily gave up the city; in the first place you will act unjustly by slaying your benefactors; and in the next you will produce for the higher classes of men a result which they most desire; for when they lead their cities to revolt, they will immediately have the commons on their side, because you had shown them beforehand that the same penalty is appointed for those who are guilty and those who are not.

On the contrary, even if they were guilty, you ought to pretend not to notice it; that the only class still allied with us may not become hostile to us.