History of the Peloponnesian War

And so we shall presently have to risk both our money and our lives against each separate state. And if we are successful, by taking possession of a ruined city, you will hereafter be deprived of all. future revenue from it—in which our strength consists; while if we fail, we shall have fresh enemies in addition to those we have already; and during the time that we ought to be opposing our present foes, we shall be engaged in hostilities with our own allies.

You ought not therefore to hold out any hope, either relying on oratory or purchased with money, of their receiving allowance for having erred through human infirmity. For they did not involuntarily hurt you, but wittingly plotted against you; and it is only what is involuntary what can claim allowance.

I, then, both on that first occasion [so advised you], and now contend that you should not rescind your former resolutions, nor err through three things, the most inexpedient for empire, namely, pity delight in oratory, and lenity.

For pity is properly felt towards those of a kindred temper, ad not towards those who will not reel it in return, but are of necessity our enemies for ever. And the orators who delight us with their language will have a field in other subjects of less importance, instead of one in which the state, after being a little pleased, will pay a great penalty; while they themselves from their good speaking will receive good treatment in return. And lenity is shown to those who will be well-disposed in future, rather than to those who remain just what they were, and not at all less hostile. To sum up in one word, if you are persuaded by me, you will do what is just towards the Mytilenaeans, and at the same time expedient;

but if you decide otherwise, you will not oblige them, but will rather pass sentence upon yourselves. For if they were right in revolting you cannot properly maintain your empire. If, however, you determine to do so, even though it is not proper, you must also, overlooking what is right, punish these men from regard to expediency, or else give up your empire, and act the honest man without danger. Resolve, then, to requite them with the same penalty; and not to show yourselves, in escaping their designs, more insensible than those who formed them against you;

considering what they would probably have done, if they had prevailed over you; especially, as they were the first; to begin the wrong. For it is those who do ill to any one without reason, that persecute him most bitterly, [*]( Göller and Poppo follow Hermann in taking ἀπόλλυνται passively, they are killed by living in suspicion of danger, etc.) nay, even to the death, from suspicion of the danger of their enemy's being spared;

since he who has suffered evil without any necessity, [but by provoking it himself,] is more bitter, if he escape, than one who was an enemy on equal terms. Be not therefore traitors to your own cause;