History of the Peloponnesian War

Thucydides

Thucydides. The history of the Peloponnesian War, Volume 1-2. Dale, Henry, translator. London: Heinemann and Henry G. Bohn, 1851-1852.

The following summer, after the Peloponnesians had despatched Alcidas, who was their high-admiral, (for they had conferred that office upon him,) with the [*]( As only forty are mentioned before, c. 16. 3, and 25. 2, Arnold thinks it possible that the additional two formed the contingent of Lacedaemon itself. They are again spoken of as forty, c. 29. 1, and 69. 1; in which places he may refer to them merely in round numbers. In the words that follow, Arnold agrees with Göller that either ἔχοντα or προστάξαντες is superfluous; but see note on c 16. 3.) two and forty ships to Mytilene, they themselves and their allies made an irruption into Attica; that the Athenians, being harassed both ways, might be the less able to send succours against the slips that were sailing to Mytilene.

The commander in this irruption was Cleomenes, as representative of Pausanias, the son of Pleistoanax, who was king, and still a minor, and Cleomenes was his father's brother.

They ravaged therefore both the parts which had been devastated before, if there were any thing that had shot up again, and all that had been passed over in their previous irruptions. And this invasion was most severely felt by the Athenians, next to the second;

for continually expecting to hear from Lesbos of some achievement performed by their ships, which they thought had by this time made their passage, they went on committing general devastation. When, however, none of the results which they expected was obtained, and when their provisions had failed, they returned, and were dispersed through their several countries.

The Mytilenaeans, meanwhile, as the ships from the Peloponnese had not come to them, but were wasting the time, and as their provisions had failed, were compelled to come to terms with the Athenians, by the following circumstances.

Since even Salaethus himself no longer expected the arrival of the fleet, he equipped as heavy-armed soldiers the commons who had before been only light-armed, with a view to sallying out against the Athenians;

but as soon as they were in possession of arms, they no longer obeyed their commanders, but collecting in groups, ordered those in power to bring the provision-stores into public view, and divide them amongst all; or they would themselves make terms with the Athenians, and deliver up the city.

The members of the government, knowing that they would not be able to prevent them, and that they would themselves be exposed to danger if excluded from the arrangement, made a general agreement with Paches and the army, that the Athenians should be at liberty to adopt what measures they chose respecting the Mytilenaeans; that they should receive the army into the city, and send ambassadors to Athens to plead their cause; and that until they returned, Paches should neither throw into prison, nor reduce to slavery, nor put to death, any of the Mytilenaeans. This was the nature of the agreement: