History of the Peloponnesian War

"What then was that alliance of ours, or that freedom to be relied on, in which we received each other contrary to our real sentiments; and they, through fear, courted us in war, while we did the same to them in peace? And whereas in the case of others it is kindness that most secures faith, in our case it was fear that gave this assurance; and we were constrained to be allies by terror more than by affection; and to whichever party security should first give confidence, that party was sure to be the first also to violate the treaty in some way or other.

If therefore we are thought by any one to be wrong in first revolting, because they deferred the evils we dreaded, while we did not wait in return to see whether any of them would be inflicted, he does not view the case aright.

For if we were able on equal terms with them to return their plots against us, and their delay in the execution of them, what reason was there, that being, [according to this view of the case,] on an equal footing, we should [really] be at their mercy? But as it was always in their power to make the attempt, it ought to be in ours to guard against it beforehand.

"It was on such grounds and with such reasons, Lacedaemonians and allies, that we revolted; sufficiently clear ones for those who hear them to judge that we acted rightly; and sufficiently strong ones to alarm us, and make us betake ourselves to some means of safety: which indeed we wished to do long ago, when we sent to you, while the peace yet lasted, on the subject of our revolting, but were prevented by your not receiving us into alliance. But now, when the Boeotians invited us, we immediately listened to their proposals; and thought that we should withdraw ourselves in a twofold manner; front the Greeks, so as not to join in injuring them in company with the Athenians, but to join in giving them liberty;

and from the Athenians, so as not to be ruined by them ourselves after the rest, but to be beforehand in acting [against them [*]( In other words, the fact of their being always at the mercy of the Athenians proved the falsity of the hypothesis of their being on equal terms with them, and therefore the reasonableness of their anticipating the attack which night at any time be made upon them, instead of waiting till it had actually been made. Such I think is the meaning of this very difficult passage.) Our revolt, however, has taken place prematurely, and without due preparations; for which reason also it is the more incumbent on you to receive us as allies, and send us succour speedily;

that you may be seen both assisting those whom you ought, and at the same time hurting your enemies. And there is an opportunity for doing that, such as there never was before; for the Athenians have been wasted both by disease and pecuniary expenditure; and their ships are either cruising round your coasts, or stationed against us;

so that it is not likely they should have any to spare, if in the course of this summer you should invade them a second time both by sea and land; but they will either offer no resistance to your naval attack, or withdraw their forces from both our shores.

And let no one deem that he would thus be incurring peril to himself in defence of another man's country. For whoever thinks Lesbos far off, will find it close at hand for assisting him. For it is not in Attica that the war will be decided, as men imagine, but in that quarter from which Attica derives its succours.