History of the Peloponnesian War

Thucydides

Thucydides. The history of the Peloponnesian War, Volume 1-2. Dale, Henry, translator. London: Heinemann and Henry G. Bohn, 1851-1852.

But if they had begun with us, while all of them still had their power, and a centre round which to take their stand, they would not have subdued them so easily.

Our fleet, too, caused them a degree of fear, lest by uniting together, and joining either you or any other power, it might some time bring them into danger.

And again, to a certain extent we preserved ourselves by paying court to their commons, and to those who from time to time took the lead of them.

We did not, however, expect to be long able to do so, if this war had not broken out; looking to the examples they had given in their dealings with the rest.

"What then was that alliance of ours, or that freedom to be relied on, in which we received each other contrary to our real sentiments; and they, through fear, courted us in war, while we did the same to them in peace? And whereas in the case of others it is kindness that most secures faith, in our case it was fear that gave this assurance; and we were constrained to be allies by terror more than by affection; and to whichever party security should first give confidence, that party was sure to be the first also to violate the treaty in some way or other.

If therefore we are thought by any one to be wrong in first revolting, because they deferred the evils we dreaded, while we did not wait in return to see whether any of them would be inflicted, he does not view the case aright.

For if we were able on equal terms with them to return their plots against us, and their delay in the execution of them, what reason was there, that being, [according to this view of the case,] on an equal footing, we should [really] be at their mercy? But as it was always in their power to make the attempt, it ought to be in ours to guard against it beforehand.