History of the Peloponnesian War

Thucydides

Thucydides. The history of the Peloponnesian War, Volume 1-2. Dale, Henry, translator. London: Heinemann and Henry G. Bohn, 1851-1852.

and as for their venturing to do it openly and deliberately, they supposed that either they would not think of it, or themselves would not fail to be aware beforehand, if they should. Having adopted this resolution, they proceeded immediately [to execute it];

and when they had arrived by night, and launched the vessels from Nisaea, they sailed, not against Athens as they had intended, for they were afraid of the risk, ( [*](τις is here used, I think, with that signification of contempt which it sometimes conveys; to mark the writer's utter disbelief of the report alluded to.) some wind or other was also said to have prevented them,) but to the headland of Salamis looking towards Megara; where there was a fort, and a guard of three ships to prevent any thing from being taken in or out of Megara. So they assaulted the fort, and towed off the triremes empty; and making a sudden attack on the rest of Salamis, they laid it waste.

Now fire-signals of an enemy's approach were raised towards Athens, and a consternation was caused by them not exceeded by any during the whole war. For those in the city imagined that the enemy had already sailed into Piraeus; while those in Piraeus thought that Salamis had been taken, and that they were all but sailing into their harbours: which indeed, if they would but have not been afraid of it, might easily have been done; and it was not a wind that would have prevented it.