History of the Peloponnesian War

Thucydides

Thucydides. The history of the Peloponnesian War, Volume 1-2. Dale, Henry, translator. London: Heinemann and Henry G. Bohn, 1851-1852.

and that then would be the best time for making it. So when the wind came down upon them, and their ships, being now brought into a narrow compass, were thrown into confusion by the operation of both causes—the violence of the wind, and the small craft dashing against them—and when ship was falling foul of ship, and the crews were pushing them off with poles, and in their shouting, and trying to keep clear, and abusing each other, did not hear a word either of their orders or the boatswains' directions; while, through inexperience, they could not lift their oars in the swell of the sea, and so rendered the vessels less obedient to the helmsmen; just then, at that favourable moment, he gave the signal. And the Athenians attacked them, and first of all sunk one of the admiral-ships, then destroyed all wherever they went, and reduced them to such a condition, that owing to their confusion none of them thought of resistance, but they fled to Patrae and Dyme, in Achaia.

The Athenians having closely pursued them, and taken twelve ships, picking up most of the men from them, and putting them on board their own vessels, sailed off to Molycrium;

and after erecting a trophy at Rhium, and dedicating a ship to Neptune, they returned to Naupactus. The Peloponnesians also immediately coasted along with their remaining ships from Dyme and Patrae to Cyllene, the arsenal of the Eleans; and Cnemus and the ships that were at Leucas, which were to have formed a junction with these, came thence, after the battle at Stratus, to the same port.

Then the Lacedaemonians sent to the fleet, as counsellors to Cnemus, Timocrates, Brasidas, and Lycophron; commanding him to make preparations for a second engagement more successful than the former, and not to be driven off the sea by a few ships. For the result appeared very different from what they might have expected;

(particularly as it was the first sea-fight they had attempted;) and they thought that it was not so much their fleet that was inferior, but that there had been some cowardice [on the part of the admiral]; for they did not weigh the long experience of the Athenians against their own short practice of naval matters. They despatched them therefore in anger;

and on their arrival they sent round, in conjunction with Cnemus, orders for ships to be furnished by the different states, while they refitted those they already had, with a view to an engagement.

Phormio too, on the other hand, sent messengers to Athens to acquaint them with their preparations, and to tell them of the victory they had [themselves] gained; at the same time desiring them to send him quickly the largest possible number of ships, for lie was in daily expectation of an immediate engagement. They despatched to him twenty;

but gave additional orders to the commander of them to go first to Crete. For Nicias, a Cretan of Gortys, who was their proxenus, persuaded them to sail against Cydonia, telling them that he would reduce it under their power; for it was at present hostile to them. His object, however, in calling them in was, that he might oblige the Polichnitae, who bordered on the Cydonians.