History of the Peloponnesian War

Thucydides

Thucydides. The history of the Peloponnesian War, Volume 1-2. Dale, Henry, translator. London: Heinemann and Henry G. Bohn, 1851-1852.

For he said that if they kept quiet and attended to their navy, and did not gain additional dominion during the war, nor expose the city to hazard, they would have the advantage in the struggle. But they did the very contrary of all this, and in other things which seemed to have to do with the war, through their private ambition and private gain, they adopted evil measures both towards themselves and their allies; which, if successful, conducted the honour and benefit of individuals; but if they failed, proved detrimental to the state with regard to the war.

And the reason was, that he, being powerful by means of his high rank and talents, and manifestly proof against bribery, controlled the multiude with an independent spirit, and was not led by them so much as he himself led them; for he did not say any thing to humour them, for the acquisition of power by improper means; but was able on the strength of his character to contradict them even at the risk of their displeasure.

Whenever, for instance, he perceived them unseasonably and insolently confident, by his language he would dash them down to alarm; and, on the other hand, when they were unreasonably alarmed, he would raise them again to confidence. And so, though in name it was democracy, in fact it was a government administered by he first man.