History of the Peloponnesian War

Thucydides

Thucydides. The history of the Peloponnesian War, Volume 1-2. Dale, Henry, translator. London: Heinemann and Henry G. Bohn, 1851-1852.

When he arrived at the camp, and Archidamus found that the Athenians would not yet submit at all, he then set out and advanced with his army into their territory.

At the same time, the Boeotians, while they furnished their contingent and their cavalry to join the Peloponnesians in their expedition, went to Plataea with the remainder of their force, and laid waste their land.

While the Peloponnesians were still assembling at the Isthmus, and were on their march, before they invaded Attica, Pericles, son of Xanthippus, who was general of the Athenians with nine colleagues, when he found that the invasion would take place, suspected that either Archidamus, because he happened to be his friend, might frequently pass over his lands, and not ravage them, from a personal wish to oblige him; or that this might be done at the command of the Lacedaemonians for the purpose of raising a slander against him —as it was also with reference to him that they had charged them to drive out the accursed; and therefore he publicly declared to the Athenians in the assembly, that though Archidamus was his friend, he had not been admitted into his friendship for any harm to the state; should, then, the enemy not lay waste his lands and houses, like those of the rest, he gave them up to be public property, and that no suspicion might arise against him on these grounds.

He gave them advice also on their present affairs, the same as he had before given; namely, to prepare for the war, and bring in their property from the country, and not go out against them to battle, but to come in and guard the city, and get ready their fleet, in which they were so strong, and keep the allies tight in hand; reminding them that their main strength was derived from the returns of the money paid by these, and that most of the advantages in war were gained by counsel and abundance of money.

And [on this head] he told them to be of good courage, as the state had, on an average, six hundred talents coming in yearly as tribute from the allies, not reckoning its other sources of income; while there were still at that time in the Acropolis 6000 talents of coined silver;

(for the greatest sum there had ever been was 9700 talents, from which had been taken what was spent on the propylaea of the citadel, and the other buildings, and on Potidaea;) and besides, of uncoined gold and silver in private and public offerings, and all the sacred utensils for the processions and games, and the Median spoils, and every thing else of the kind, there was not less than 500 talents.

Moreover, he added the treasures in the [*]( i.e. besides the temple of Minerva, which was the public treasury.) other temples, to no small amount, which they would use; and, in case of their being absolutely excluded from all resources, even the golden appendages of the goddess herself; explaining to them that the statue contained 40 talents of pure gold, and that it was all removable; and after using it for their preservation they must, he said, restore it to the same amount.

With regard to money, then, he thus encouraged them. And as for heavy-armed troops, he told them that they had thirteen thousand, besides those in garrisons and [*]( Literally, soldiers to line a parapet, i.e. for garrison duty. — Arnold.) on the ramparts to the number of sixteen thousand.