History of the Peloponnesian War

If, again, we shall attempt to make their allies revolt from them, we shall have to assist these also with ships, as they are generally islanders.

What then will be the character of our war? For if we do not either conquer them by sea, or take away the revenues with which they maintain their fleet, we shall receive the greater damage;

and at such a time it will no longer even be honourable to make peace; especially if we are thought to have begun the quarrel more than they.

For let us now not be buoyed up with this hope, at any rate, that the war will soon be ended, if we ravage their land. Rather it even to our children: so probable is it that the Athenians would neither be enslaved [*]( Compare II. 61. 3. δουλοῖ γὰρ φρόνημα τὸ αἰφνίδιον. κ. τ. λ.) in spirit to their land, nor, like inexperienced men, be panic-stricken by the war.

"I do not however, on the other hand, tell you to permit them, without noticing it, to harm our allies, and not to detect them in plotting against us; but I tell you not to take up arms at present, but to send and remonstrate; neither showing too violent signs of war, nor yet that we will put up with their conduct; and in the mean time to complete our own preparations also, both by bringing over allies whether Greeks or barbarians, from whatever source we shall receive additional strength, either in ships or in money; (for all who. like us are plotted against by the Athenians. may without (odium save themselves by accepting the aid not only of Greeks, but of barbarians also;) and at the same time let us bring out our own resources.

And if they listen at all to our ambassadors. that is the best conclusion; but if not. after an interval of two or three years, we shall then go against them, if we think tit, in a better state of defence.

And perhaps when they then saw our preparation, and our language speaking in accordance with it, they might be more disposed to yield, while they had their land as yet unravaged, and were deliberating about good things still enjoyed by them, and not yet sacrificed.

For in their land consider that you have nothing else but a hostage; and the more so, the better it is cultivated. You should therefore spare it as long as possible, and not, through having reduced them to desperation, find them the more difficult to subdue.

For if we are hurried on by the complaints of our allies, and ravage it while we are unprepared, see that we do not come off in a manner more disgraceful and perplexing to the Peloponnese [than we should wish [*]( Or the comparative may perhaps be used for the positive.) ].