History of the Peloponnesian War

For us who are in peril, and not actuated by any hostile feeling, you will reject; while these men who are thus actuated, and have made the attack, you will be so far from restraining, that you will even overlook their gaining additional power from your dominions; which you should not do; but should either stop their mercenaries drawn from your country, or send succour to us also, in what ever way you may be persuaded; but it were best of all to receive us openly, and assist us.

And many, as we hinted at the beginning, are the advantages we hold forth to you; bat the greatest of them is, that we both have the same enemies, [*]( Göller observes that we should have expected εἰσίν here, rather than ἦσαν; but the construction is confused, and the imperfect ἦσαν is to be referred to ὑπείπομεν rather than to ἀποδείκνυμεν. We say, what we said before, namely, that we had both the same enemies. —Arnold.) (which is the surest bond,) and those not weak, but able to harm such as have stood aloof from them. And as it is a naval, and not a land alliance that is offered you, the loss of it is not the same; but it were best, if possible, [*]( Arnold says that the infinitive moods ἐᾶν and ἔχειν depend upon a verb understood, which is to be borrowed from the preceding clause: for οὐκ ὁμοία is the same thing in sense as οὐκ ὁμοίως ξυμφέρει; from whence the verb ξυμφέρει is to be tacitly repeated with what follows. —That some such impersonal verb is understood is very probable: but is not οὐκ ὁμοία rather equivalent to οὐκ ὁμοίως ἀξύμφορόν ἐστι? Not merely the same as it would be in the ease of a land alliance, but much greater. Compare two expressions in I. 143. 3, 4, καὶ ἄλλα οὐκ ἀπὸ τοῦ ἴσου μεγάλα ἐχειν ... καὶ οὐκέτι ἐκ τοῦ ὁμοίου ἔσται πελοποννήσου μέρος τι τμηθῆναι καὶ τὴν ʼαττικὴν ἅπασαν κ. τ. λ.) to allow no one else to possess ships; but if not, whoever is strongest in them, to have him for your friend.

And whoever thinks that these things which we have urged are indeed expedient, but is afraid that through being persuaded by them he would break the treaty; let him know that his fear, being attended by strength, will cause greater alarm to his enemies; but that his confidence in not having received us, being powerless will be less formidable to his foes who are strong; and also, that it is not about Corcyra more than about Athens too that he is deliberating; and that he is not providing the best for her, when for the war that is coming, and all but here, he hesitates, from present considerations, to receive a country which is made either a friend or a foe, with the greatest opportunities [for good or evil].