History of the Peloponnesian War

And men who till the land themselves are more ready to wage war with their persons than with their money: feeling confident, with regard to the former, that they will escape from dangers; but not being sure, with regard to the latter, that they will not spend it before they have done; especially should the war be prolonged beyond their expectation, as [in this case] it probably may. For in one battle the Peloponnesians and their allies might cope with all the Greeks together;

but they could not carry on a war against resources of a different description to their own; since they have no one board of council, so as to execute any measure with vigour; and all having equal votes, and not being of the same races, each forwards his own interest; for which reasons nothing generally is brought to completion. For some of them wish to avenge themselves as much as possible on some particular party;

while others wish as little as possible to waste their own property. And after being slow in coming together, it is but during a small part of the time that they look to any of the general interests, while during the greater part they are contriving for their own. And each individual does not imagine that he will do any harm by his own neglect, but thinks that it is the business of every one else too to look out for himself; so that through the same idea being individually entertained by all, the common cause is collectively sacrificed without their observing it.

" Most of all will they be impeded by scarcity of money, while, through their slowness in providing it, they continue to delay their operations;

whereas the opportunities of war wait for no one. Neither, again, is their raising works against us worth fearing, or their fleet.

With regard to the former, it were difficult even in time of peace to set up a rival city; much more in a hostile country, and when we should have raised works no less against them:

and if they build [only] a fort, they might perhaps hurt some part of our land by incursions and [*]( i.e. by harbouring the slaves and others who might go over to them.) desertions; it will not, however, be possible for them to prevent our sailing to their country and raising forts, and retaliating with our ships, in which we are so strong.

For we have more advantage for land-service from our naval skill, than they have for naval matters from their skill by land.