History of the Peloponnesian War

All these things that the Greeks performed against one another and the barbarian, occurred in about fifty years, between the retreat of Xerxes and the beginning of this war: in the course of which the Athenians established their empire on a firmer footing, and themselves advanced to a great pitch of power; while the Lacedaemonians, though they perceived it, did not try to stop them, except for a short time, but remained quiet the greater part of the period. For even before this they were not quick in proceeding to hostilities, unless they were compelled; and to a certain extent also they were hindered by intestine wars; [*]( He seems to refer especially to the revolt of the Helots.) until the power of the Athenians was clearly rising to a dangerous height, and they were encroaching on their confederacy. Then, however, they considered it no longer endurable, but were of opinion that they ought with the greatest resolution to attack their power, and overthrow it, if they could, by commencing this war. Now the Lacedaemonians themselves had decided that the treaty had been broken, and that the Athenians were guilty;

but they sent to Delphi and inquired of the god, whether it would be better for them if they went to war : and he answered them, as it is reported, that if they carried on the war with all their might, they would gain the victory; and said that he would himself take part with them, whether called upon or not.

Still they wished to summon the allies again, and put it to the vote, whether they should go to war. When the ambassadors had come from the confederates, and an assembly had been held, the others said what they wished, most of them accusing the Athenians, and demanding that war should be declared; and the Corinthians, who had even before begged them each separately, state by state, to vote for the war—being afraid for Potidaea, lest it should be destroyed first—and who were present then also, came forward last, and spoke as follows:

"We can no longer, allies, find fault with the Lacedaemonians, as not having both themselves voted for war, and now brought us together for this purpose: [*]( The γὰρ in the succeeding words, χρὴ γὰρ τοὺς ἡγεμόνας, refers to a suppressed sentence: "We cannot now blame them; but had they acted differently, we should have had a right to blame them; for those who command others should provide for the welfare of others:—Arnold.) [though we should have blamed them if they had not done so]. For it is the duty of leaders, while they conduct their private affairs on a footing of equality, to provide for the interests of all; as they are also in other respects honoured above all.

Now as many of us as have already had any dealings with the Athenians require no warning to beware of them; but those who live more in the interior, and not in the high way of communication, ought to know, that if they do not defend those on the coast, they will find the carrying down of their produce [for exportation] more difficult, and the procuring again of those things which the sea affords to the mainland; and they ought not to be indifferent judges of what is now said, as though it did not affect them, but to consider that some time or other, if they should sacrifice the towns on the coast, the danger would reach even to them; and that they are now consulting for themselves no less [than for others].

And for this reason they ought not to shrink from passing to war instead of pence For it is the part of prudent men, indeed, to remain quiet, should they not be injured; but of brave men, when injured, to go from peace to war; and when a good opportunity offers, to come to an understanding again from hostilities; and neither to be elated by their success in war, nor to brook injury through being charmed with the quiet of peace.

For he who shrinks from this course for love of pleasure, would most quickly be deprived of the delights of indolence, for which he shrinks from it, should he remain quiet; and he who in war becomes grasping through success, does not reflect that he is buoyed up by a confidence that cannot be trusted.

For many measures, though badly planned, have yet succeeded, through [*]( See note on I. 32. 3.) the adversary being still worse advised; and still more have there been which, though seeming to be well arranged, have on the contrary come to a disgraceful issue. For no one [*]( I have followed Göller's reading of ὁμοία; Arnold prefers ὁμοῖα considering it as dependent on the two verbs ἐνθυμεῖται and ἐπεξέρχεται. What we speculate on in our expectations, and what we accomplish in our practice, are wholly different from each other. My chief reason for preferring the former interpretation is, that the article is only used with πίστει, and not with both nouns, as I think it usually is in other passages, where there is so marked an opposition between them: e. g. I. 71. 1. οἵι ἄν τῇ μὲν παρασκευῇ δίκαια πράσσωσι, τῇ δὲ γνώμῃ κ. τ. λ. II. 11. 6. τῇ δὲ ἀεὶ ἐν τῇ πολεμία, τῇ μὲν γνώμῃ θαρσαλέους στρατεύειν, τῷ δὲ ἔργῳ δεδιότας παρασκευάζεσθαι. Unless it is omitted in both cases, as I. 85. 5. τὰς τῶν πολεμίων παρασκευὰς λόγῳ καλῶς μεμφόμενοι ἀνομοίως ἔργῳ επεξιέναι. For other instances of ὁμοῖος with the force here given to it, see note on ch. 30. 5.) conceives his plans with [only] the same degree of confidence as he carries them out in action; but we form our opinions in security, [and therefore with assurance;] whereas we fail in action through fear.

"Now as for ourselves, we are at the present time preparing for war because we are injured, and have sufficient grounds of complaint;

and when we have avenged ourselves on the Athenians, we will lay it down again in good time. And for many reasons it is likely that we should have the advantage; first, as we are superior in numbers and military experience;

and secondly, as we all proceed with equal obedience to do what we are ordered. And for a fleet, in which they are so strong, we will equip one from the property we severally possess, and from the money at Delphi and Olympia; for by contracting a loan of that we shall be able, by means of higher pay, to rob them of their foreign sailors. For the power of the Athenians is mercenary, rather than native: but ours would be less exposed to this, as it is strong in men more than in money.

And by one victory [gained by us] in a sea-fight, in all probability they are ruined; but should they hold out, we too shall have more time for studying naval matters; and when we have put our skill on an equal footing with theirs, in courage we shall most certainly excel them. For the advantage which we possess by nature cannot be acquired by them through learning;