Republic

Or even if they do look at them in that way, are you still going to deny that they will change their opinion and answer differently? Or do you think that anyone is ungentle to the gentle or grudging to the ungrudging if he himself is ungrudging[*](A recurrence to etymological meaning. Cf. ἄθυμον 411 B, Laws 888 A, εὐψυχίας Laws 791 C, Thompson on Meno 78 E, Aristot. Topics 112 a 32-38, Eurip. Heracleidae 730 ἀσθαλῶς, Shakes. Rich. III. v. v. 37 reduce these bloody days again.) and mild? I will anticipate you and reply that I think that only in some few and not in the mass of mankind is so ungentle or harsh a temper to be found.And I, you may be assured, he said, concur. And do you not also concur[*](For a similar teasing or playful repetition of a word cf. 517 C, 394 B, 449 C, 470 B-C.) in this very point that the blame for this harsh attitude of the many towards philosophy falls on that riotous crew who have burst in[*](For the figure of the κῶμος or revel rout cf. Theaet. 184A, Aesch. Ag. 1189, Eurip. Ion 1197, and, with a variation of the image, Virgil, Aen. i. 148.) where they do not belong, wrangling with one another,[*](Cf. Adam ad loc. and Wilamowitz, Platon, ii. 121.) filled with spite[*](Isoc. Antid. 260 seems to take this term to himself; Cf. Panath. 249, Peace 65, Lysias xxiv. 24 πολυπράγμων εἰμὶ καὶ θρασὺς καὶ φιλαπεχθήμων Demosth, xxiv, 6.) and always talking about persons,[*](i.e. gossip. cf. Aristot. Eth. Nic. 1125 a 5 οὐδ’ ἀνθρωπολόγος, Epictetus iii. 16. 4. Cf. also Phileb. 59 b, Theaet. 173 D, 174 C.) a thing least befitting philosophy? Least of all, indeed, he said. For surely, Adeimantus, the man whose mind is truly fixed on eternal realities[*](Cf. on 486 A, also Phileb. 58 D, 59 A, Tim. 90 D, and perhaps Tim. 47 A and Phaedo 79. This passage is often supposed to refer to the ideas, and ἐκεῖ in 500 D shows that Plato is in fact there thinking of them, though in Rep. 529 A-B ff. he protests against this identification. And strictly speaking κατὰ ταὐτὰ ἀεὶ ἔχοντα in C would on Platonic principles be true only of the ideas. Nevertheless poets and imitators have rightly felt that the dominating thought of the passage is the effect on the philosopher’s mind of the contemplation of the heavens. This confusion or assimilation is, of course, still more natural to Aristotle, who thought the stars unchanging. Cf. Met. 1063 a 16 ταὐτὰ δ’ αἰεὶ καὶ μεταβολῆς οὐδεμιᾶς κοινωνοῦντα. Cf. also Sophocles, Ajax 669 ff., and Shorey in Sneath, Evolution of Ethics, pp. 261-263, Dio Chrys. xl. (Teubner ii. p. 199), Boethius, Cons. iii. 8 respicite caeli spatium . . . et aliquando desinite vilia mirari.) has no leisure to turn his eyes downward upon the petty affairs of men, and so engaging in strife with them to be filled with envy and hate, but he fixes his gaze upon the things of the eternal and unchanging order, and seeing that they neither wrong nor are wronged by one another, but all abide in harmony as reason bids, he will endeavor to imitate them and, as far as may be, to fashion himself in their likeness and assimilate[*](ἀφομοιοῦσθαι suggests the ὁμοίωσις θέῳ Theaet. 176 B. Cf. What Plato Said, p. 578.) himself to them. Or do you think it possible not to imitate the things to which anyone attaches himself with admiration? Impossible, he said. Then the lover of wisdom associating with the divine order will himself become orderly and divine in the measure permitted to man.[*](Cf. on 493 D, and for the idea 383 C.) But calumny[*](Cf. HamletIII. i. 141 thou shalt not escape calumny, Bacchylides 12 (13). 202-203 βροτῶν δὲ μῶμος πάντεσσι μέν ἐστιν ἐπ’ ἔγοις.) is plentiful everywhere. Yes, truly. If, then, I said, some compulsion[*](The philosopher unwillingly holds office. Cf. on 345 E.) is laid upon him to practise stamping on the plastic matter of human nature in public and private the patterns that he visions there,[*](ἐκεῖ is frequently used in Plato of the world of ideas. Cf. Phaedrus 250 A. Phaedo 109 E.) and not merely to mould[*](For the word πλάττειν used of the lawgiver cf. 377 C, Laws 671 C, 712 B, 746 A, 800 B, Rep. 374 A, 377 c, 420 c, 466 A, 588 C, etc. For the idea that the ruler shapes the state according to the pattern Cf. 540 A-B. Plato apples the language of the theory of ideas to the social tissue here exactly as he apples it to the making of a tool in the Cratylus 389 C. In both cases there is a workman, the ideal pattern and the material in which it is more or less perfectly embodied. Such passages are the source of Aristotle’s doctrine f matter and form. Cf. Met. 1044 a 25 De part. an. 630 b 25-27, 640 b 24 f., 642 a 10 ff., De an. 403 b 3, Seller, Aristot. (Eng.) i. p. 356. Cf. also Gorg. 503 D-E, Polit. 306 C, 309 D and Unity of Plato’s Thought, pp. 31-32. Cf. Alcinous, Εἰσαγωγή ii. (Teubner vi. p. 153) ἃ κατὰ τὸν θεωρητικὸν βίον ὁρᾶται, μελετῆσαι εἰς ἀνθρώπων ἤθη.) and fashion himself, do you think he will prove a poor craftsman[*](Cf. Aristot. Pol. 1329 a 21 ἀρετῆς δημιουργόν. Cf. also 1275 b 29 with Newman, Introd. Aristot. Pol. p. 229. Cf. 395 C δημιουργοὺς ἐλευθερίας, Theages 125 A δημιουργὸν . . . τῆς σοφίας.) of sobriety and justice and all forms of ordinary civic virtue[*](Cf. Laws 968 A πρὸς ταῖς δημοσίαις ἀρεταῖς, Phaedo 82 A and ibid, Vol. I. on 430 C. Brochard, La Morale de Platon, L’Année Philosophique, xvi. (1905) p. 12 La justice est appelée une vertu populaire. This is a little misleading, if he means that justice itself is une vertu populaire.)? By no means, he said. But if the multitude become aware that what we are saying of the philosopher is true, will they still be harsh with philosophers, and will they distrust our statement that no city could ever be blessed unless its lineaments were traced[*](For διαγράψειαν cf. 387 B and Laws 778 A. See also Stallbaum ad loc.) by artists who used the heavenly model? They will not be harsh, he said, if they perceive that.

But tell me, what is the manner of that sketch you have in mind?They will take the city and the characters of men, as they might a tablet, and first wipe it clean—[*](Cf. Vol. I. on 426 B. This is one of the passages that may be used or misused to class Plato with the radicaIs. Cf. Laws 736 A-B, Polit. 293 D, Euthyphro 2 D-3 A. H. W. Schneider, The Puritan Mind, p. 36, says, Plato claimed that before his Republic could be established the adult population must be killed off. Cf. however Vol. I. Introd. p. xxxix, What Plato Said, p. 83, and infra, p. 76, note a on 502 B.) no easy task. But at any rate you know that this would be their first point of difference from ordinary reformers, that they would refuse to take in hand either individual or state or to legislate before they either received a clean slate or themselves made it clean.And they would be right, he said. And thereafter, do you not think that they would sketch the figure of the constitution? Surely. And then, I take it, in the course of the work they would glance[*](The theory of ideas frequently employs this image of the artist looking off to his model and back again to his work. Cf. on 484 C, and What Plato Said, p. 458, Unity of Plato’s Thought, p. 37.) frequently in either direction, at justice, beauty, sobriety and the like as they are in the nature of things,[*](i.e. the idea of justice. For φύσις and the theory of ideas Cf. 597 C, Phaedo 103 b, Parmen. 132 D, Cratyl. 389 C-D, 390 E.) and alternately at that which they were trying to reproduce in mankind, mingling and blending from various pursuits that hue of the flesh, so to speak, deriving their judgement from that likeness of humanity[*](For ἀνδρείκελον Cf. Cratyl. 424 E.) which Homer too called when it appeared in men the image and likeness of God.[*](Il. i. 131, Od. iii. 416. Cf. 589 D, 500 C-D, Laws 818 B-C, and What Plato Said, p. 578 on Theaet. 176 B, Cic. Tusc. i. 26. 65 divina mallem ad not. Cf. also Tim. 90 A, Phaedr. 249 C. The modern reader may think of Tennyson, In Mem. cviii. What find I in place But mine own phantom chanting hymns? Cf. also Adam ad loc.) Right, he said. And they would erase one touch or stroke and paint in another until in the measure of the possible[*](Cf. 500 D and on 493 D.) they had made the characters of men pleasing and dear to God as may be. That at any rate[*](For γοῦν cf. ibid, vol. I. on 334 A.) would be the fairest painting. Are we then making any impression on those who you said[*](Cf. 474 A.) were advancing to attack us with might and main? Can we convince them that such a political artist of character and such a painter exists as the one we then were praising when our proposal to entrust the state to him angered them, and are they now in a gentler mood when they hear what we are now saying? Much gentler, he said, if they are reasonable. How can they controvert it[*](Cf. 591 A. This affirmation of the impossibility of denial or controversy is a motif frequent in the attic orators. Cf. Lysias xxx. 26, xxxi. 24, xiii. 49, vi. 46, etc.)? Will they deny that the lovers of wisdom are lovers of reality and truth? That would be monstrous, he said. Or that their nature as we have portrayed it is akin to the highest and best? Not that either. Well, then, can they deny that such a nature bred in the pursuits that befit it will be perfectly good and philosophic so far as that can be said of anyone? Or will they rather say it of those whom we have excluded? Surely not. Will they, then, any longer be fierce with us when we declare that, until the philosophic class wins control, there will be no surcease of trouble for city or citizens nor will the polity which we fable[*](Cf. 376 D, Laws 632 E, 841 C, Phaedr. 276 E. Frutiger, Les Mythes de Platon, p. 13, says Plato uses the word μῦθος only once of his own myths, Polit. 268 E.) in words be brought to pass in deed? They will perhaps be less so, he said.

Instead of less so, may we not say that they have been altogether tamed and convinced, so that for very shame, if for no other reason, they may assent?Certainly, said he. Let us assume, then, said I, that they are won over to this view. Will anyone contend that there is no chance that the offspring of kings and rulers should be born with the philosophic nature? Not one, he said. And can anyone prove that if so born they must necessarily be corrupted? The difficulty[*](Cf. Laws 711 D τὸ χαλεπόν, and 495 A-B.) of their salvation we too concede; but that in all the course of time not one of all could be saved,[*](Cf. 494 A.) will anyone maintain that? How could he? But surely, said I, the occurrence of one such is enough,[*](Cf. Epist. vii. 328 C and Novotny, Plato’s Epistles, p. 170 Plato’s apparent radicalism again. Cf. on 501 A. Cf. also Laws 709 E, but note the qualification in 875 C, 713 E-714 A. 691 C-D. Wilamowitz, Platon, ii. pp. 381-383 seems to say that the εἷς ἱκανός is the philosopher—Plato.) if he has a state which obeys him,[*](Note the different tone of 565 E λαβὼν σφόδρα πειθόμενον ὄχλον. Cf. Phaedr. 260 C λαβὼν πόλιν ὡσαύτως ἔχουσαν πείθῃ.) to realize[*](Cf. on 499 D, and Frutiger, Mythes de Platon, p. 43.) all that now seems so incredible. Yes, one is enough, he said. For if such a ruler, I said, ordains the laws and institutions that we have described it is surely not impossible that the citizens should be content to carry them out. By no means. Would it, then, be at all strange or impossible for others to come to the opinion to which we have come[*](Cf. Epist. vii. 327 B-C, viii. 357 B ff.)? I think not, said he. And further that these things are best, if possible, has already, I take it, been sufficiently shown. Yes, sufficiently. Our present opinion, then, about this legislation is that our plan would be best if it could be realized and that this realization is difficult[*](Cf. 502 A, Campbell’s not on Theaet. 144 A, and Wilamowitz, Platon, ii. p. 208.) yet not impossible. That is the conclusion, he said. This difficulty disposed of, we have next to speak of what remains, in what way, namely, and as a result of what studies and pursuits, these preservers[*](Cf. on 412 A-B and 497 C-D, Laws 960 B. 463 B is not quite relevant.) of the constitution will form a part of our state, and at what ages they will severally take up each study. Yes, we have to speak of that, he said. I gained nothing, I said, by my cunning[*](For τὸ σοφόν Cf. Euthydem. 293 D, 297 D, Gorg. 493 A, Herod. v. 18 τοῦτο οὐδὲν εἶναι σοφόν, Symp. 214 A τὸ σύφισμα, Laches 183 D.) in omitting heretofore[*](Cf. 423 E.) the distasteful topic of the possession of women and procreation of children and the appointment of rulers, because I knew that the absolutely true and right way would provoke censure and is difficult of realization; for now I am none the less compelled to discuss them. The matter of the women and children has been disposed of,[*](In Bk. V.) but the education of the rulers has to be examined again, I may say, from the starting-point.

We were saying, if you recollect, that they must approve themselves lovers of the state when tested[*](Cf. 412 D-E, 413 C-414 A, 430 A-B, 537, 540 A, Laws 751 C.) in pleasures and pains, and make it apparent that they do not abandon[*](Cf. on 412 E, 513 C, Soph. 230 B.) this fixed faith[*](τὸ δόγμα τοῦτο is an illogical idiom. The antecedent is only implied. Cf. 373 C, 598 C. See my article in Transactions of the American Phil. Assoc. xlvii., (1916) pp. 205-236.) under stress of labors or fears or any other vicissitude, and that anyone who could not keep that faith must he rejected, while he who always issued from the test pure and intact, like gold tried in the fire,[*](Cf. Theognis 417-318 παρατρίβομαι ὥστε μολίβδῳ χρυσός, ibid., 447-452, 1105-1106, Herod. vii. 10, Eurip. fr. 955 (N.). Cf. Zechariah xii. 9 . . . will try them as gold is tried, Job xxiii. 10 When he hath tried me I shall come forth as Gold. Cf. also 1 Peter i. 7, Psalm xii. 6, lxvi. 10, Isaiah xlviii. 10.) is to be established as ruler and to receive honors in life and after death and prizes as well.[*](The translation preserves the intentional order of the Greek. For the idea cf. 414 A and 465 D-E and for ἆθλα cf. 460 B. Cobet rejects καὶ ἆθλα, but emendations are needless.) Something of this sort we said while the argument slipped by with veiled face[*](Cf. Phaedr. 237 A, Epist. vii. 340 A. For the personification of the λόγος Cf. What Plato Said, 500 on Protag. 361 A-B. So too Cic. Tusc. i. 45. 108 se ita tetra sunt quaedam, ut ea fugiat et reformidet oratio.) in fear[*](Cf. 387 B.) of starting[*](Cf. the proverbial μὴ κινεῖν τὰ ἀκίνητα, do not move the immovable, let sleeping dogs lie, in Laws 684 D-E, 913 B. Cf. also Phileb. 16 C, and the American idiom start something.) our present debate.Most true, he said; I remember. We shrank, my friend, I said, from uttering the audacities which have now been hazarded. But now let us find courage for the definitive pronouncement that as the most perfect[*](Cf. 503 D. 341 B, 340 E, 342 D.) guardians we must establish philosophers. Yes, assume it to have been said, said he. Note, then, that they will naturally be few,[*](Cf. on 494 A.) for the different components of the nature which we said their education presupposed rarely consent to grow in one; but for the most part these qualities are found apart. What do you mean? he said. Facility in learning, memory, sagacity, quickness of apprehension and their accompaniments, and youthful spirit and magnificence in soul are qualities, you know, that are rarely combined in human nature with a disposition to live orderly, quiet, and stable lives;[*](The translation is correct. In the Greek the anacoluthon is for right emphasis, and the separation of νεανικοί τε καὶ μεγαλοπρεπεῖς from the other members of the list is also an intentional feature of Plato’s style to avoid the monotony of too long an enumeration. The two things that rarely combine are Plato’s two temperaments. The description of the orderly temperament begins with οἷοι and οἱ τοιοῦτοι refers to the preceding description of the active temperament. The MSS. have καὶ before νεανικοί; Heindorf, followed by Wilamowitz, and Adam’s minor edition, put it before οἷοι. Burnet follows the MSS. Adam’s larger edition puts καὶ νεανικοὶ τε after ἕπεται. The right meaning can be got from any of the texts in a good viva voce reading. Plato’s contrast of the two temperaments disregards the possible objection of a psychologist that the adventurous temperament is not necessarily intellectual. Cf. on 375 C, and What Plato Said, p. 573 on Theaet. 144 A-B, Cic. Tusc. v. 24.) but such men, by reason of their quickness,[*](Cf. Theaet. 144 A ff.) are driven about just as chance directs, and all steadfastness is gone out of them. You speak truly, he said. And on the other hand, the steadfast and stable temperaments, whom one could rather trust in use, and who in war are not easily moved and aroused to fear, are apt to act in the same way[*](A tough of humor in a teacher) when confronted with studies. They are not easily aroused, learn with difficulty, as if benumbed,[*](For the figure Cf. Meno 80 A, 84 B and C.) and are filled with sleep and yawning when an intellectual task is set them. It is so, he said. But we affirmed that a man must partake of both temperaments in due and fair combination or else participate in neither the highest[*](Lit. most precise. Cf. Laws 965 B ἀκριβεστέραν παιδείαν.) education nor in honors nor in rule. And rightly, he said. Do you not think, then, that such a blend will be a rare thing? Of course. They must, then, be tested in the toils and fears and pleasures of which we then spoke,[*](In 412 C ff.) and we have also now to speak of a point we then passed by, that we must exercise them in many studies, watching them to see whether their nature is capable of enduring the greatest and most difficult studies or whether it will faint and flinch[*](Cf. 535 B, Protag. 326 C.) as men flinch in the trials and contests of the body.

That is certainly the right way of looking at it, he said. But what do you understand by the greatest studies? You remember, I presume, said I, that after distinguishing three kinds[*](For the tripartite soul cf. Vol. I. on 435 A and 436 B, Unity of Plato’s Thought, p. 42, What Plato Said, p. 526 on Phaedo 68 C, p. 552 on Phaedr. 246 B, and p. 563 on Rep. 435 B-C.) in the soul, we established definitions of justice, sobriety, bravery and wisdom severally. If I did not remember, he said, I should not deserve to hear the rest. Do you also remember what was said before this? What? We were saying, I believe, that for the most perfect discernment of these things another longer way[*](Cf. Vol. I. on 435 C, Phaedr. 274 A, Friedländer, Platon, ii. pp. 376-377, Jowett and Campbell, p. 300 Frutiger, Mythes de Platon, pp. 81 ff., and my Idea of Good in Plato’s Republic(Univ. of Chicago Studies in Class. Phil. vol. i. p. 190). There is no mysticism and no obscurity. The longer way is the higher education, which will enable the philosopher not only like ordinary citizens to do the right from habit and training, but to understand the reasons for it. The outcome of such an education is described as the vision of the idea of good, which for ethics and politics means a restatement of the provisional psychological definition of the cardinal virtues in terms of the ultimate elements of human welfare. For metaphysics and cosmogony the vision of the idea of good may means teleological interpretation of the universe and the interpretation of all things in terms of benevolent design. That is reserved for poetical and mythical treatment in the Timaeus. The Republic merely glances at the thought from time to time and returns to its own theme. Cf.also Introd. p. xxxv.) was requisite which would make them plain to one who took it, but that it was possible to add proofs on a par with the preceding discussion. And you said that that was sufficient, and it was on this understanding that what we then said was said, falling short of ultimate precision as it appeared to me, but if it contented you it is for you to say. Well, he said, it was measurably satisfactory to me, and apparently to the rest of the company. Nay, my friend, said I, a measure of such things that in the least degree falls short of reality proves no measure at all. For nothing that is imperfect is the measure of anything,[*](Cf. Cic. De fin. i. 1 nec modus est ullus investigandi veri nisi inveneris. Note not only the edifying tone and the unction of the style but the definite suggestion of Plato’s distaste for relativity and imperfection which finds expression in the criticism of the homo mensura in the Theaetetus, in the statement of the Laws 716 C, that God is the measure of all things (What Plato Said, p. 631), and in the contrast in the Politicus 283-294 between measuring things against one another and measuring them by an idea. Cf. 531 A.) though some people sometimes think that they have already done enough[*](Cf. Menex. 234 A, Charm. 158 C, Symp. 204 A, Epist. vii. 341 A. From here to the end of this Book the notes are to be used in connection with the Introduction, pp. xxiii-xxxvi, where the idea of good and the divided line are discussed.) and that there is no need of further inquiry. Yes, indeed, he said, many experience this because of their sloth. An experience, said I, that least of all befits the guardians of a state and of its laws. That seems likely, he said. Then, said I, such a one must go around[*](Cf. Phaedr. 274 A.) the longer way and must labor no less in studies than in the exercises of the body or else, as we were just saying, he will never come to the end of the greatest study and that which most properly belongs to him. Why, are not these things the greatest? said he; but is there still something greater than justice and the other virtues we described? There is not only something greater, I said, but of these very things we need not merely to contemplate an outline[*](i.e. sketch, adumbration. The ὑπογραφή is the account of the cardinal virtues in Bk. iv. 428-433.) as now, but we must omit nothing of their most exact elaboration. Or would it not be absurd to strain every nerve[*](For πᾶν ποιεῖν cf. on 488 C, for συντεινομένους Euthydem. 288 D.) to attain to the utmost precision and clarity of knowledge about other things of trifling moment and not to demand the greatest precision for the greatest[*](Such juxtaposition of forms of the same word is one of the most common features of Plato’s style. Cf. 453 B ἑνα ἕν, 466 D πάντα πάντῃ, 467 D πολλὰ πολλοῖς, 496 C οὐδεὶς οὐδέν, Laws 835 C μόνῳ μόνος, 958 B ἑκόντα ἑκών. Cf. also Protag. 327 B, Gorg. 523 B, Symp. 217 B, Tim. 92 b, Phaedo 109 B, Apol. 232 C, and Laws passim.) matters? It would indeed,[*](The answer is to the sense. Cf. 346 E, Crito 47 C, and D, Laches 195 D, Gorg. 467 E. See critical note.) he said; but do you suppose that anyone will let you go without asking what is the greatest study and with what you think it is concerned? By no means, said I; but do you ask the question.

You certainly have heard it often, but now you either do not apprehend or again you are minded to make trouble for me by attacking the argument. I suspect it is rather the latter. For you have often heard[*](Plato assumed that the reader will understand that the unavailing quest for the good in the earlier dialogues is an anticipation of the idea of good. Cf. Vol. I. on 476 A and What Plato Said, p. 71. Wilamowitz, Platon, i. p. 567, does not understand.) that the greatest thing to learn is the idea of good[*](Cf. 508 E, 517 C, Cratyl. 418 E. Cf. Phileb. 64 E and What Plato Said, p. 534, on Phaedo 99 A. Plato is unwilling to confine his idea of good to a formula and so seems to speak of it as a mystery. It was so regarded throughout antiquity (cf. Diog. Laert. iii. 27), and by a majority of modern scholars. Cf. my Idea of Good in Plato’s Republic, pp. 188-189, What Plato Said, pp. 72, 230-231, Introd. Vol. I. pp. xl-xli, and Vol. II. pp. xxvii, xxxiv.) by reference to which[*](Lit. the use of which, i.e. a theory of the cardinal virtues is scientific only if deduced from an ultimate sanction or ideal.) just things[*](The omission of the article merely gives a vaguely generalizing color. It makes no difference.) and all the rest become useful and beneficial. And now I am almost sure you know that this is what I am going to speak of and to say further that we have no adequate knowledge of it. And if we do not know it, then, even if without the knowledge of this we should know all other things never so well, you are aware that it would avail us nothing, just as no possession either is of any avail[*](For the idiom οὐδὲν ὄφελος Cf. Euthyph. 4 E, Lysis 208 E, 365 B, Charm. 155 E, etc.) without the possession of the good. Or do you think there is any profit[*](Cf. 427 A, Phaedr. 275 C, Cratyl. 387 A, Euthyd. 288 E, Laws 751 B, 944 C, etc.) in possessing everything except that which is good, or in understanding all things else apart from the good while understanding and knowing nothing that is fair and good[*](καλὸν δὲ καὶ ἀγαθόν suggests but does not mean καλοκἀγαθόν in its half-technical sense. The two words fill out the rhythm with Platonic fulness and are virtual synonyms. Cf. Phileb. 65 A and Symp. 210-211 where because of the subject the καλόν is substituted for the ἀγαθόν.)?No, by Zeus, I do not, he said. But, furthermore, you know this too, that the multitude believe pleasure[*](So Polus and Callicles in the Gorgias and later the Epicureans and Cyrenaics. Cf. also What Plato Said, p. 131; Eurip. Hippol. 382 οἱ δ’ ἡδονὴν προθέντες ἀντὶ τοῦ καλοῦ, and on 329 A-B. There is no contradiction here with the Philebus. Plato does not himself say that either pleasure or knowledge is the good.) to be the good, and the finer[*](κομψοτέροις is very slightly if at all ironical here. Cf. the American sophisticated in recent use. See too Theaet. 156 A, Aristot. Eth. Nic 1905 a 18 οἱ χαρίεντες.) spirits intelligence or knowledge.[*](Plato does not distinguish synonyms in the style of Prodicus (Cf. Protag. 337 A ff.) and Aristotle (Cf. Eth. Nic. 1140-1141) when the distinction is irrelevant to his purpose.) Certainly. And you are also aware, my friend, that those who hold this latter view are not able to point out what knowledge[*](Cf. Euthyd. 281 D, Theaet. 288 D f., Laws 961 E ὁ περὶ τί νοῦς. See Unity of Plato’s Thought, n. 650. The demand for specification is frequent in the dialogues. Cf. Euthyph. 13 D, Laches 192 E, Gorg. 451 A, Charm. 165 C-E, Alc. I. 124 E ff.) it is but are finally compelled to say that it is the knowledge of the good. Most absurdly, he said. Is it not absurd, said I, if while taunting us with our ignorance of the good they turn about and talk to us as if we knew it? For they say it is the knowledge of the good,[*](There is no the in the Greek. Emendations are idle. Plato is supremely indifferent to logical precision when it makes no difference for a reasonably intelligent reader. Cf. my note on Phileb. 11 B-C in Class. Phil. vol. iii. (1908) pp. 343-345.) as if we understood their meaning when they utter[*](φθέγξωνται logically of mere physical utterance (Cf. Theaet. 157 B), not, I think, as Adam says, of high-sounding oracular utterance.) the word good. Most true, he said. Well, are those who define the good as pleasure infected with any less confusion[*](Lit. wandering, the mark of error. Cf. 484 B, Lysis 213 E, Phaedo 79 C, Soph. 230 B, Phaedr. 263 B, Parmen. 135 E, Laws 962 D.) of thought than the others? Or are not they in like manner[*](καὶ οὗτοι is an illogical idiom of over-particularization. The sentence begins generally and ends specifically. Plato does not care, since the meaning is clear. Cf. Protag. 336 C, Gorg. 456 C-D, Phaedo 62 A.) compelled to admit that there are bad pleasures[*](A distinct reference to Callicles’ admission in Gorgias 499 B τὰς μὲν βελτίους ἡδονάς, τὰς δὲ χείρους cf. 499 C, Rep. 561 C, and Phileb. 13 C πάσας ὁμοίας εἶναι. Stenzel’s notion (Studien zur Entw. d. Plat. Dialektik, p. 98) that in the Philebus Plato ist von dem Standpunkt des Staates 503 C weit entfernt is uncritical. The Republic merely refers to the Gorgias to show that the question is disputed and the disputants contradict themselves.)? Most assuredly. The outcome is, I take it, that they are admitting the same things to be both good and bad, are they not? Certainly. Then is it not apparent that there are many and violent disputes[*](ἀμφισβητήσεις is slightly disparaging, Cf. Theaet. 163 C, 158 C, 198 C, Sophist 233 B, 225 B, but less so than ἐρίζειν in Protag. 337 A.) about it? Of course. And again, is it not apparent that while in the case of the just and the honorable many would prefer the semblance[*](Men may deny the reality of the conventional virtues but not of the ultimate sanction, whatever it is. Cf. Theaet. 167 C, 172 A-B, and Shorey in Class. Phil. xvi (1921) pp. 164-168.) without the reality in action, possession, and opinion, yet when it comes to the good nobody is content with the possession of the appearance but all men seek the reality, and the semblance satisfies nobody here? Quite so, he said. That, then, which every soul pursues[*](Cf. Gorg. 468 B τὸ ἀγαθὸν ἄρα διώκοντες, 505 A-B, Phileb. 20 D, Symp. 206 A, Euthyd. 278 E, Aristot. Eth. Nic. 1173 a, 1094 a οὗ πάντα ἐφίεται, Zeller, Aristot. i. pp. 344-345, 379, Boethius iii. 10, Dante, Purg. xvii. 127-129.) and for its sake does all that it does, with an intuition[*](Cf. Phileb. 64 A μαντευτέον. Cf. Arnold’s phrase, God and the Bible, chap. i. p. 23 approximate language thrown out as it were at certain great objects which the human mind augurs and feels after.) of its reality, but yet baffled[*](As throughout the minor dialogues. Cf. What Plato Said, p. 71.) and unable to apprehend its nature adequately, or to attain to any stable belief about it as about other things,[*](Because, in the language of Platonic metaphysics, it is the παρουσία τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ that makes them good; but for the practical purpose of ethical theory, because they need the sanction. Cf. Introd. p. xxvii, and Montaigne i. 24 Toute aultre science est dommageable à celuy qui n’a Ia science de la bonté.) and for that reason failing of any possible benefit from other things,— in a matter of this quality and moment, can we, I ask you, allow a like blindness and obscurity in those best citizens[*](As in the longer way Plato is careful not to commit himself to a definition of the ideal or the sanction, but postulates it for his guardians.) to whose hands we are to entrust all things?

Least of all, he said. I fancy, at any rate, said I, that the just and the honorable, if their relation and reference to the good is not known,[*](The personal or ab urbe condita construction. Cf. Theaet. 169 E.) will not have secured a guardian[*](the guardians must be able to give a reason, which they can do only by reference to the sanction. For the idea that the statesman must know better than other men. Cf. Laws 968 A, 964 C, 858 C-E, 817 C, Xen Mem. iii. 6. 8.) of much worth in the man thus ignorant, and my surmise is that no one will understand them adequately before he knows this. You surmise well, he said. Then our constitution will have its perfect and definitive organization[*](For the effect of the future perfect cf. 457 B λελέξεται465 A προστετάξεται, Eurip. Heracleidae 980 πεπράξεται.) only when such a guardian, who knows these things, oversees it. Necessarily, he said. But you yourself, Socrates, do you think that knowledge is the good or pleasure or something else and different? What a man it is, said I; you made it very plain[*](For the personal construction 348 E, Isoc. To Nic. I. καταφανής is a variation in this idiom for δῆλος. Cf. also Theaet. 189 C, Symp. 221 B, Charm. 162 C, etc.) long ago that you would not be satisfied with what others think about it. Why, it does not seem right to me either, Socrates, he said, to be ready to state the opinions of others but not one’s own when one has occupied himself with the matter so long.[*](Cf. 367 D-E.) But then, said I, do you think it right to speak as having knowledge about things one does not know? By no means, he said, as having knowledge, but one ought to be willing to tell as his opinion what he opines. Nay, said I, have you not observed that opinions divorced from knowledge[*](This is not a contradiction of Meno 97 B, Theaet. 201 B-C and Phileb. 62 A-B, but simply a different context and emphasis. Cf. Unity of Plato’s Thought, p. 47, nn. 338 and 339.) are ugly things? The best of them are blind.[*](Cf. on 484 C, Phaedr. 270 E.) Or do you think that those who hold some true opinion without intelligence differ appreciably from blind men who go the right way? They do not differ at all, he said. Is it, then, ugly things that you prefer to contemplate, things blind and crooked, when you might hear from others what is luminous[*](Probably an allusion to the revelation of the mysteries. Cf. Phaedr. 250 C, Phileb. 16 C, Rep. 518 C, 478 C, 479 D, 518 A. It is fantastic to see in it a reference to what Cicero calls the lumina orationis of Isocratean style. The rhetoric and synonyms of this passage are not to be pressed.) and fair? Nay, in heaven’s name, Socrates, said Glaucon, do not draw back, as it were, at the very goal.[*](Cf. Phileb. 64 C ἐπὶ μὲν τοῖς τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ ἤδη προθύροις, we are now in the vestibule of the good.) For it will content us if you explain the good even as you set forth the nature of justice, sobriety, and the other virtues. It will right well[*](καὶ μάλα, jolly well, humorous emphasis on the point that it is much easier to define the conventional virtues than to explain the sanction. Cf. Symp. 189 A, Euthydem. 298 D-E, Herod. viii. 66. It is frequent in the Republic. Ritter gives forty-seven cases. I have fifty-four! But the point that matters is the humorous tone. Cf. e.g. 610 E.) content me, my dear fellow, I said, but I fear that my powers may fail and that in my eagerness I may cut a sorry figure and become a laughing-stock.[*](Excess of Zeal, προθυμία, seemed laughable to the Greeks. Cf. my interpretation of Iliad i. in fine, Class. Phil. xxii. (1927) pp. 222-223.) Nay, my beloved, let us dismiss for the time being the nature of the good in itself;[*](Cf. More, Principia Ethica, p. 17 Good, then, is indefinable; and yet, so far as I know, there is only one ethical writer, Professor Henry Sidgwick, who has clearly recognized and stated this fact.) for to attain to my present surmise of that seems a pitch above the impulse that wings my flight today.[*](This is not superstitious mysticism but a deliberate refusal to confine in a formula what requires either a volume or a symbol. See Introd. p. xxvii, and my Idea of Good in Plato’s Republic, p. 212. τὰ νῦν repeats τὸ νῦν εἶναι (Cf. Tim. 48 C), as the evasive phrase εἰσαῦθις below sometimes lays the topic on the table, never to be taken up again. Cf. 347 E and 430 C.) But of what seems to be the offspring of the good and most nearly made in its likeness[*](Cf. Laws 897 D-E, Phaedr. 246 A.) I am willing to speak if you too wish it, and otherwise to let the matter drop. Well, speak on, he said, for you will duly pay me the tale of the parent another time.

I could wish, I said, that I were able to make and you to receive the payment and not merely as now the interest. But at any rate receive this interest[*](This playful interlude relieves the monotony of the argument and is a transition to the symbolism. τόκος means both interest and offspring. Cf. 555 E, Polit. 267 A, Aristoph. Clouds 34, Thesm. 845, Pindar, Ol. x. 12. the equivocation, which in other languages became a metaphor, has played a great part in the history of opinion about usury. Cf. the article Usury in Hastings’s Encyclopaedia of Relig. and Ethics. ) and the offspring of the good. Have a care, however, lest I deceive you unintentionally with a false reckoning of the interest. We will do our best, he said, to be on our guard. Only speak on. Yes, I said, after first coming to an understanding with you and reminding you of what has been said here before and often on other occasions.[*](Cf. 475 E f. Plato as often begins by a restatement of the theory of ideas, i.e. practically of the distinction between the concept and the objects of sense. Cf. Rep. 596 A ff., Phaedo 108 b ff.) What? said he. We predicate to be[*](The modern reader will never understand Plato from translations that talk about Being. Cf. What Plato Said, p. 605.) of many beautiful things and many good things, saying of them severally that they are, and so define them in our speech. We do. And again, we speak of a self-beautiful and of a good that is only and merely good, and so, in the case of all the things that we then posited as many, we turn about and posit each as a single idea or aspect, assuming it to be a unity and call it that which each really is.[*](ὃ ἔστιν is technical for the reality of the ideas. Cf. Phaedo 75 B, D, 78 D, Parmen. 129 B, Symp. 211 C, Rep. 490 B, 532 A, 597 A.) It is so. And the one class of things we say can be seen but not thought, while the ideas can be thought but not seen. By all means. With which of the parts of ourselves, with which of our faculties, then, do we see visible things? With sight, he said. And do we not, I said, hear audibles with hearing, and perceive all sensibles with the other senses? Surely. Have you ever observed, said I, how much the greatest expenditure the creator[*](Creator, δημιουργός, God, the gods, and nature, are all virtual synonyms in such passages.) of the senses has lavished on the faculty of seeing and being seen?[*](Cf. Phaedr. 259 D, Tim. 45 B.) Why, no, I have not, he said. Well, look at it thus. Do hearing and voice stand in need of another medium[*](This is literature, not science. Plato knew that sound required a medium, Tim. 67 B. But the statement here is true enough to illustrate the thought.) so that the one may hear and the other be heard, in the absence of which third element the one will not hear and the other not be heard? They need nothing, he said. Neither, I fancy, said I, do many others, not to say that none require anything of the sort. Or do you know of any? Not I, he said. But do you not observe that vision and the visible do have this further need? How? Though vision may be in the eyes and its possessor may try to use it, and though color be present, yet without the presence of a third thing[*](Lit. kind of thing, γένος. Cf. 507 C-D.) specifically and naturally adapted to this purpose, you are aware that vision will see nothing and the colors will remain invisible.[*](Cf. Troland, The Mystery of Mind, p. 82: In order that there should be vision, it is not sufficient that a physical object should exist before the eyes. there must also be a source of so-called light.) What[*](Plato would not have tried to explain this loose colloquial genitive, and we need not.) is this thing of which you speak? he said. The thing, I said, that you call light. You say truly, he replied.