Republic

Then the nature which we assumed in the philosopher, if it receives the proper teaching, must needs grow and attain to consummate excellence, but, if it be sown[*](Cf. 107 B, Tim. 42 D.) and planted and grown in the wrong environment, the outcome will be quite the contrary unless some god comes to the rescue.[*](This is the θεῖα μοῖρα of 493 A and Meno 99 E. Cf. What Plato Said, p. 517.) Or are you too one of the multitude who believe that there are young men who are corrupted by the sophists,[*](See What Plato Said, pp. 12 ff. and on Meno 93-94. Plato again anticipates many of his modern critics. Cf. Grote’s defence of the sophists passim, and Mill, Unity of Religion(Three essays on Religion, pp. 78, 84 ff.).) and that there are sophists in private life[*](ἰδιωτικούς refers to individual sophists as opposed to the great sophist of public opinion. Cf. 492 D, 493 A, 494 A.) who corrupt to any extent worth mentioning,[*](For καὶ ἄξιον λόγου Cf. Euthydem 279 C, Laches 192 A, Laws 908 B, 455 C, Thucyd. ii. 54. 5, Aristot. Pol. 1272 b 32, 1302 a 13, De part. an. 654 a 13, Demosth. v. 16, Isoc. vi. 65.) and that it is not rather the very men who talk in this strain who are the chief sophists and educate most effectively and mould to their own heart’s desire young and old, men and women?When? said he. Why, when, I said, the multitude are seated together[*](Cf. Gorg. 490 B, Emerson, Self-Reliance: It is easy . . . to brook the rage of the cultivated classes . . . . But . . . when the unintelligent brute force that lies at the bottom of society is made to growl and mow, it needs the habit of magnanimity and religion to treat it godlike as a trifle of no concernment, Carlyle, French Revolution: Great is the combined voice of men . . . . He who can resist that has his footing somewhere beyond time. For the public as the great sophist cf. Brimley, Essays, p. 224 (The Angel in the House): The miserable view of life and its purposes which society instils into its youth of both sexes, being still, as in Plato’s time, the sophist par excellence of which all individual talking and writing sophists are but feeble copies. Cf. Zeller, Ph. d. Gr. 4 II. 1. 601 Die sophistische Ethik ist seiner Ansicht nach die einfache Konsequenz der Gewöhnlichen. This is denied by some recent critics. The question is a logomachy. Of course there is more than one sophistic ethics. Cf. Mill, Dissertations and Discussions, iv. pp. 247 ff., 263 ff., 275. For Plato’s attitude toward the sophists see also Polit. 303 C, Phaedr, 260 C, What Plato Said, pp. 14-15, 158.) in assemblies or in court-rooms or theaters or camps or any other public gathering of a crowd, and with loud uproar censure some of the things that are said and done and approve others, both in excess, with full-throated clamor and clapping of hands, and thereto the rocks and the region round about re-echoing redouble the din of the censure and the praise.[*](Cf. Eurip. Orest. 901, they shouted ὡς καλῶς λέγοι, also Euthydem. 303 B οἱ κίονες, 276 B and D, Shorey on Horace, Odes i.20.7 datus in theatro cum tibi plausus, and also the account of the moulding process in Protag. 323-326.) In such case how do you think the young man’s heart, as the saying is, is moved within him?[*](What would be his plight, his state of mind; how would he feel? Cf. Shorey in Class. Phil. v. (1910) pp. 220-221, Iliad xxiv. 367, Theognis 748 καὶ τίνα θυμὸν ἔχων; Symp. 219 D 3 τίνα οἴεσθέ με διάνοιαν ἔχειν; Eurip. I.A. 1173 τίν’ ἐν δόμοις με καρδίαν ἕξειν δοκεῖς;) What private teaching do you think will hold out and not rather be swept away by the torrent of censure and applause, and borne off on its current, so that he will affirm[*](Adam translates as if it were καὶ φήσει. Cf. my Platonism and the History of Science, Amer. Philos. Soc. Proc. lxvi. p. 174 n. See Stallbaum ad loc.) the same things that they do to be honorable and base, and will do as they do, and be even such as they? That is quite inevitable, Socrates, he said. And, moreover, I said, we have not yet mentioned the chief necessity and compulsion. What is it? said he. That which these educators and sophists impose by action when their words fail to convince. Don’t you know that they chastise the recalcitrant with loss of civic rights and fines and death? They most emphatically do, he said. What other sophist, then, or what private teaching do you think will prevail in opposition to these? None, I fancy, said he. No, said I, the very attempt[*](Cf. Protag. 317 A-B, Soph. 239 C, Laws 818 D.) is the height of folly.

For there is not, never has been and never will be,[*](Cf. Od. xvi. 437. See Friedländer, Platon, ii. 386 n. who says ἀλλοῖον γίγνεσθαι can only = ἀλλοιοῦσθαι, be made different.) a divergent type of character and virtue created by an education running counter to theirs[*](Cf. 429 C for the idiom, and Laws 696 A οὐ γὰρ μή ποτε γένηται παῖς καὶ ἀνὴρ καὶ γέρων ἐκ ταύτης τῆς τροφῆς διαφέρων πρὸς ἀρετήν.)—humanly speaking, I mean, my friend; for the divine, as the proverb says, all rules fail.[*](Cf. Symp. 176 C (of Socrates), Phaedr. 242 B, Theaet. 162 D-E.) And you may be sure that, if anything is saved and turns out well in the present condition of society and government, in saying that the providence of God[*](Cf. on 492 A, Apol. 33, Phaedo 58 E, Protag. 328 E, Meno 99 E, Phaedr. 244 C, Laws 642 C, 875 C, Ion 534 C.) preserves it you will not be speaking ill.Neither do I think otherwise, he said. Then, said I, think this also in addition. What? Each of these private teachers who work for pay, whom the politicians call sophists and regard as their rivals,[*](Cf. Arnold, Preface to Essays in Criticism; Phaedo 60 D, Laws 817 B, On Virtue 376 D.) inculcates nothing else than these opinions of the multitude which they opine when they are assembled and calls this knowledge wisdom. It is as if a man were acquiring the knowledge of the humors and desires of a great strong beast[*](Cf. Epist. v. 321 D ἔστιν γὰρ δή τις φωνὴ τῶν πολιτειῶν ἑκάστης καθάπερεί τινων ζῴων, each form of government has a sort of voice, as if it were a kind of animal (tr. L.A. Post). Hackforth says this is a clumsy imitation of the Republic which proves the letter spurious. Cf. Thomas Browne, Religio Medici, ii. 1 If there be any among those common objects of hatred I do contemn and laugh at, it is that great enemy of reason, virtue, and religion, the multitude . . . one great beast and a monstrosity more prodigious than Hydra, Horace, Epist. i. 1. 76 belua multorum es capitum. Also Hamilton’s Sir, your people is a great beast, Sidney, Arcadia, bk. ii. Many-headed multitude, Wallas, Human Nature in Politics, p. 172 . . . like Plato’s sophist is learning what the public is and is beginning to understand the passions and desires of that huge and powerful brute, Shakes. Coriolanus iv. i. 2 The beast with many heads Butts me away, ibid. ii. iii. 18 The many-headed multitude. For the idea cf. also Gorg. 501 B-C ff., Phaedr. 260 C 260 C, δόξας δὲ πλήθους μεμελετηκώς, having studied the opinions of the multitude, Isoc. ii. 49-50.) which he had in his keeping, how it is to be approached and touched, and when and by what things it is made most savage or gentle, yes, and the several sounds it is wont to utter on the occasion of each, and again what sounds uttered by another make it tame or fierce, and after mastering this knowledge by living with the creature and by lapse of time should call it wisdom, and should construct thereof a system and art and turn to the teaching of it, knowing nothing in reality about which of these opinions and desires is honorable or base, good or evil, just or unjust, but should apply all these terms to the judgements of the great beast, calling the things that pleased it good, and the things that vexed it bad, having no other account to render of them, but should call what is necessary just and honorable,[*](Cf. Class. Phil. ix. (1914) p. 353, n. 1, ibid. xxiii. (1928) p. 361 (Tim. 75 D), What Plato Said, p. 616 on Tim. 47 E, Aristot. Eth. 1120 b 1 οὐχ ὡς καλὸν ἀλλ’ ὡς ἀναγκαῖον, Emerson, Circle, Accept the actual for the necessary, Eurip, I. A. 724 καλῶς ἀναγκαίως τε. Mill iv. 299 and Grote iv. 221 miss the meaning. Cf. Bk I. on 347 C, Newman, Aristot. Pol. i. pp. 113-114, Iamblichus, Protrept. Teubner 148 K. ἀγνοοῦντος . . . ὅσον διέστηκεν ἐξ ἀρχῆς τὰ ἀγαθὰ καὶ τὰ ἀναγκαῖα, not knowing how divergent have always been the good and the necessary.) never having observed how great is the real difference between the necessary and the good, and being incapable of explaining it to another. Do you not think, by heaven, that such a one would be a strange educator? I do, he said. Do you suppose that there is any difference between such a one and the man who thinks that it is wisdom to have learned to know the moods and the pleasures of the motley multitude in their assembly, whether about painting or music or, for that matter, politics? For if a man associates with these and offers and exhibits to them his poetry[*](Cf. Laws 659 B, 701 A, Gorg. 502 B.) or any other product of his craft or any political. service,[*](Cf. 371 C, Gorg. 517 B, 518 B.) and grants the mob authority over himself more than is unavoidable,[*](Plato likes to qualify sweeping statements and allow something to necessity and the weakness of human nature. Cf. Phaedo 64 E καθ’ ὅσον μὴ πολλὴ ἀνάγκη, 558 D-E, 500 D, 383 C.) the proverbial necessity of Diomede[*](The scholiast derives this expression from Diomedes’ binding Odysseus and driving him back to camp after the latter had attempted to kill him. The schol. on Aristoph. Eccl. 1029 gives a more ingenious explanation. See Frazer, Pausanias, ii. p. 264.) will compel him to give the public what it likes, but that what it likes is really good and honorable, have you ever heard an attempted proof of this that is not simply ridiculous[*](καταγέλαστον is a strong word. Make the very jack-asses laugh would give the tone. Cf. Carlyle, Past and Present, iv. impartial persons have to say with a sigh that . . . they have heard no argument advanced for it but such as might make the angels and almost the very jack-asses weep. Cf. also Isoc. Panegyr. 14, Phil. 84, 101, Antid. 247, Peace 36, and καταγέλαστος in Plato passim, e.g. Symp. 189 B.)? No, he said, and I fancy I never shall hear it either.

Bearing all this in mind, recall our former question. Can the multitude possibly tolerate or believe in the reality of the beautiful in itself as opposed to the multiplicity of beautiful things, or can they believe in anything conceived in its essence as opposed to the many particulars?Not in the least, he said. Philosophy, then, the love of wisdom, is impossible for the multitude.[*](A commonplace of Plato and all intellectual idealists. Cf. 503 B, Polit. 292 E, 297 B, 300 E. Novotny, Plato’s Epistles, p. 87, uses this to support his view that Plato had a secret doctrine. Adam quotes Gorg. 474 A τοῖς δὲ πολλοῖς οὐδὲ διαλέγομαι, which is not quite relevant. Cf. Renan, Etudes d’histoire relig. p. 403 La philosophie sera toujours le fait d’une imperceptible minorité, etc.) Impossible. It is inevitable,[*](It is psychologically necessary. Cf. ibid, Vol. 1. on 473 E. Cf. 527 A, Laws 655 E, 658 E, 681 C, 687 C, Phaedr. 239 C, 271 B, Crito 49 D.) then, that those who philosophize should be censured by them. Inevitable. And so likewise by those laymen who, associating with the mob, desire to curry favor[*](Cf. Gorg. 481 E, 510 D, 513 B.) with it. Obviously. From this point of view do you see any salvation that will suffer the born philosopher to abide in the pursuit and persevere to the end? Consider it in the light of what we said before. We agreed[*](In 487 A.) that quickness in learning, memory, courage and magnificence were the traits of this nature. Yes. Then even as a boy[*](Cf. 386 A. In what follows Plato is probably thinking of Alcibiades. Alc. I, 103 A ff, imitates the passage. Cf. Xen. Mem. i. 2. 24.) among boys such a one will take the lead in all things, especially if the nature of his body matches the soul. How could he fail to do so? he said. His kinsmen and fellow-citizens, then, will desire, I presume, to make use of him when he is older for their own affairs. Of course. Then they will fawn[*](For ὑποκείσονται Cf. Gorg. 510 C, 576 A ὑποπεσόντες Eurip. Orest. 670 ὑποτρέχειν, Theaet. 173 A ὑπελθεῖν.) upon him with petitions and honors, anticipating[*](i.e. endeavoring to secure the advantage of it for themselves by winning his favor when he is still young and impressionable.) and flattering the power that will be his. That certainly is the usual way. How, then, do you think such a youth will behave in such conditions, especially if it happen that he belongs to a great city and is rich and well-born therein, and thereto handsome and tall? Will his soul not be filled with unbounded ambitious hopes,[*](Cf. Alc. I. 104 B-C ff.) and will he not think himself capable of managing the affairs of both Greeks and barbarians,[*](Cf. Alc. I. 105 B-C.) and thereupon exalt himself, haughty of mien and stuffed with empty pride and void of sense[*](ὑψηλὸν ἐξαρεῖν, etc., seems to be a latent poetic quotation.) He surely will, he said. And if to a man in this state of mind[*](Or perhaps subject to these influences. Adam says it is while he is sinking into this condition.) someone gently[*](Cf. Vol. I. on 476 E. Cf. 533 D, Protag. 333 E, Phaedo 83 A, Crat. 413 A, Theaet. 154. E.) comes and tells him what is the truth, that he has no sense and sorely needs it, and that the only way to get it is to work like a slave[*](Cf. Phaedo 66 C, Symp. 184 C, Euthydem. 282 B.) to win it, do you think it will be easy for him to lend an ear[*](Cf. Epin. 990 A, Epist. vii. 330 A-B.) to the quiet voice in the midst of and in spite of these evil surroundings[*](Cf. Alc. I. 135 E.) Far from it, said he. And even supposing, said I, that owing to a fortunate disposition and his affinity for the words of admonition one such youth apprehends something and is moved and drawn towards philosophy, what do we suppose will be the conduct of those who think that they are losing his service and fellowship? Is there any word or deed that they will stick at[*](For πᾶν ἔργον cf. Sophocles, E. 615.) to keep him from being persuaded and to incapacitate anyone who attempts it,[*](Cf. 517 E.) both by private intrigue and public prosecution in the court?

That is inevitable, he said. Is there any possibility of such a one continuing to philosophize? None at all, he said. Do you see, then, said I, that we were not wrong in saying that the very qualities that make up the philosophical nature do, in fact, become, when the environment and nurture are bad, in some sort the cause of its backsliding,[*](For ἐκπεσεῖν cf. 496 C.) and so do the so-called goods—[*](Cf. on 591 C. p. 32, note a.) riches and all such instrumentalities[*](Cf. Lysis 220 A; Arnold’s machinery, Aristotle’s χορηγία)? No, he replied, it was rightly said. Such, my good friend, and so great as regards the noblest pursuit, is the destruction and corruption[*](Cf. 491 B-E, Laws 951 B ἀδιάφθαρτος, Xen. Mem. i. 2. 24.) of the most excellent nature, which is rare enough in any case,[*](For καὶ ἄλλως Cf. Il. ix. 699.) as we affirm. And it is from men of this type that those spring who do the greatest harm to communities and individuals, and the greatest good when the stream chances to be turned into that channel,[*](Cf. on 485 D ὥσπερ ῥεῦμα.) but a small nature[*](Cf. on 491 E, p. 33, note d.) never does anything great to a man or a city. Most true, said he. Those, then, to whom she properly belongs, thus falling away and leaving philosophy forlorn and unwedded, themselves live an unreal and alien life, while other unworthy wooers[*](Cf. on 489 D, and Theaet. 173 C.) rush in and defile her as an orphan bereft of her kin,[*](Cf. Taine, à Sainte-Beuve, Aug. 14, 1865: Comme Claude Bernard, il dépasse sa spécialité et c’est ches des spécialistes comme ceux-là que la malheureuse philosophie livée aux mains gantées et parfumées d’eau bénite va trouver des maris capables de lui faire encore des enfants. cf. Epictet. iii. 21. 21. The passage is imitated by Lucian 3. 2. 287, 294, 298. For the shame that has befallen philosophy Cf. Euthydem. 304 ff., Epist. vii. 328 E, Isoc. Busiris 48, Plutarch 1091 E, Boethius, Cons. i. 3. There is no probability that this is aimed at Isocrates, who certainly had not deserted the mechanical arts for what he called philosophy. Rohde Kleine Schriften, i. 319, thinks Antisthenes is meant. But Plato as usual is generalizing. See What Plato Said, p. 593 on Soph. 242 C.) and attach to her such reproaches as you say her revilers taunt her with, declaring that some of her consorts are of no account and the many accountable for many evils. Why, yes, he replied, that is what they do say. And plausibly, said I; for other mannikins, observing that the place is unoccupied and full of fine terms and pretensions, just as men escape from prison to take sanctuary in temples, so these gentlemen joyously bound away from the mechanical[*](Cf. the different use of the idea in Protag. 318 E.) arts to philosophy, those that are most cunning in their little craft.[*](τεχνίον is a contemptuous diminutive, such as are common in Epictetus and Marcus Aurelius. Cf. also ἀνθρωπίσκοι in C, and ψυχάριον in 519 A.) For in comparison with the other arts the prestige of philosophy even in her present low estate retains a superior dignity; and this is the ambition and aspiration of that multitude of pretenders unfit by nature, whose souls are bowed and mutilated[*](Cf. 611 C-D, Theaet. 173 A-B.) by their vulgar occupations[*](For the idea that trade is ungentlemanly and incompatible with philosophy Cf. 522 B and 590 C, Laws 919 C ff., and What Plato Said, p. 663 on Rivals 137 B. Cf. Richard of Bury, Philobiblon, Prologue, Fitted for the liberal arts, and equally disposed to the contemplation of Scripture, but destitute of the needful aid, they revert, as it were, by a sort of apostasy, to mechanical arts. Cf also Xen. Mem. iv. 2. 3, and Ecclesiasticus xxxviii. 25 f. How can he get wisdom that holdeth the plough and glorieth in the goad . . . and whose talk is of bullocks? . . . so every carpenter and workmaster . . . the smith . . . the potter . . . ) even as their bodies are marred by their arts and crafts. Is not that inevitable? Quite so, he said. Is not the picture which they present, I said, precisely that of a little bald-headed tinker[*](For a similar short vivid description Cf. Erastae 134 B, Euthyphro 2 B. Such are common in Plautus, e.g. Mercator 639.) who has made money and just been freed from bonds and had a bath and is wearing a new garment and has got himself up like a bridegroom and is about to marry his master’s daughter who has fallen into poverty and abandonment?

There is no difference at all, he said. Of what sort will probably be the offspring of such parents? Will they not be bastard[*](It is probably fanciful to see in this an allusion to the half-Thracian Antisthenes. Cf. also Theaet. 150 C, and Symp. 212 A.) and base? Inevitably. And so when men unfit for culture approach philosophy and consort with her unworthily, what sort of ideas and opinions shall we say they beget? Will they not produce what may in very deed be fairly called sophisms, and nothing that is genuine or that partakes of true intelligence[*](Cf. Euthydem. 306 D.)? Quite so, he said. There is a very small remnant,[*](Cf. Phaedrus 250 A ὀλίγαι δὴ λείπονται, and 404 A and on 490 E.) then, Adeimantus, I said, of those who consort worthily with philosophy, some well-born and well-bred nature, it may be, held in check[*](Perhaps overtaken. Cf. Goodwin on Dem. De cor. 107.) by exile,[*](It is possible but unnecessary to conjecture that Plato may be thinking of Anaxagoras or Xenophon or himself or Dion.) and so in the absence of corrupters remaining true to philosophy, as its quality bids, or it may happen that a great soul born in a little town scorns[*](Cf. Theaet. 173 B, 540 D.) and disregards its parochial affairs; and a small group perhaps might by natural affinity be drawn to it from other arts which they justly disdain; and the bridle of our companion Theages[*](This bridle has become proverbial. Cf. Plut. De san. tuenda 126 B, Aelian, Var. Hist. iv. 15. For Theages cf. also Apol. 33 E and the spurious dialogue bearing is name.) also might operate as a restraint. For in the case of Theages all other conditions were at hand for his backsliding from philosophy, but his sickly habit of body keeping him out of politics holds him back. My own case, the divine sign,[*](The enormous fanciful literature on the daimonion does not concern the interpretation of Plato, who consistently treats it as a kind of spiritual tact checking Socrates from any act opposed to his true moral and intellectual interests. Cf. What Plato Said, pp. 456-457, on Euthyphro 3 B, Jowett and Campbell, p. 285.) is hardly worth mentioning—for I suppose it has happened to few or none before me. And those who have been of this little company[*](For τούτων . . . γενόμενοι cf. Aristoph. Clouds 107 τούτων γενοῦ μοι.) and have tasted the sweetness and blessedness of this possession and who have also come to understand the madness of the multitude sufficiently and have seen that there is nothing, if I may say so, sound or right in any present politics,[*](The irremediable degeneracy of existing governments is the starting-point of Plato’s political and social speculations. Cf. 597 B, Laws 832 C f., Epist. vii. 326 A; Byron, apud Arnold, Essays in Crit. ii. p. 195 I have simplified my politics into an utter detestation of all existing governments. This passage, Apol. 31 E ff. and Gorg. 521-522 may be considered Plato’s apology for not engaging in politics. Cf. J. V. Novak, Platon u. d. Rhetorik, p. 495 (Schleiermacher, Einl. z. Gorg. pp. 15 f.), Wilamowitz, Platon, i. 441-442 Wer kann hier die Klage über das eigene Los überhören? There is no probability that, as an eminent scholar has maintained, the Republic itself was intended as a programme of practical politics for Athens, and that its failure to win popular opinion is the chief cause of the disappointed tone of Plato’s later writings. Cf. Erwin Wolff in Jaeger’s Neue Phil. Untersuchungen, Heft 6, Platos Apologie, pp. 31-33, who argues that abstinence from politics is proclaimed in the Apology before the Gorgias and that the same doctrine in the seventh Epistle absolutely proves that the Apology is Plato’s own. Cf. also Theaet. 173 C ff., Hipp. Maj. 281 C, Euthydem. 306 B, Xen. Mem. i. 6. 15.) and that there is no ally with whose aid the champion of justice[*](Cf. 368 b, Apol. 32 E εἰ . . . ἐβοήθουν τοῖς δικαίοις and 32 A μαχούμενον ὑπὲρ τοῦ δικαίου.) could escape destruction, but that he would be as a man who has fallen among wild beasts,[*](Cf. Pindar, Ol. i. 64. For the antithetic juxtaposition cf. also εἷς πᾶσιν below; see too 520 B, 374 A, Menex. 241 B, Phaedr. 243 C, Laws 906 D, etc. More in the Utopia (Morley, Ideal Commonwealths, p. 84) paraphrases loosely from memory what he calls no ill simile by which Plato set forth the unreasonableness of a philosopher’s meddling with government) unwilling to share their misdeeds[*](Cf. Democrates fr. 38, Diels ii.3 p. 73 καλὸν μὲν τὸν ἀδικέοντα κωλύειν· εἰ δὲ μή, μὴ ξυναδικεῖν, it is well to prevent anyone from doing wrong, or else not to join in wrongdoing.) and unable to hold out singly against the savagery of all, and that he would thus, before he could in any way benefit his friends or the state come to an untimely end without doing any good to himself or others,—for all these reasons I say the philosopher remains quiet, minds his own affair, and, as it were, standing aside under shelter of a wall[*](Maximus of Tyre 21. 20 comments, Show me a safe wall. See Stallbaum ad loc. for references to this passage in later antiquity. Cf. Heracleit. fr. 44, Diels 3 i. 67, J. Stenzel, Platon der Erzieher, p. 114, Bryce, Studies in History and Jurisprudence, p. 33, Renan, Souvenirs, xvii., P. E. More, Shelburne Essays, iii. pp. 280-281 Cf. also Epist. vii. 331 D, Eurip. Ion 598-601.) in a storm and blast of dust and sleet and seeing others filled full of lawlessness, is content if in any way he may keep himself free from iniquity and unholy deeds through this life and take his departure with fair hope,[*](Cf. Vol. I on 331 A, 621 C-D, Marc. Aurel. xii. 36 and vi. 30 in fine. See my article Hope in Hasting’s Encyclopaedia of Religion and Ethics.) serene and well content when the end comes.

Well, he said, that is no very slight thing to have achieved before taking his departure. He would not have accomplished any very great thing either,[*](Cf. Aristot. Eth. Nic. 1094 b 9 μεῖζόν γε καὶ τελεώτερον τὸ τῆς πόλεως φαίνεται καὶ λαβεῖν καὶ σώζειν, yet the good of the state seems a grander and more perfect thing both to attain and to secure (tr. F. H. Peters).) I replied, if it were not his fortune to live in a state adapted to his nature. In such a state only will he himself rather attain his full stature[*](For αὐξήσεται Cf. Theaet. 163 C ἵνα καὶ αὐξάνῃ and Newman, Aristot. Pol. i. p. 68 As the Christian is said to be complete in Christ so the individual is said by Aristotle to be complete in the πόλις Spencer, Data of Ethics, xv. Hence it is manifest that we must consider the ideal man as existing in the ideal social state. Cf. also 592 A-B, 520 A-C and Introd. Vol. I. p. xxvii.) and together with his own preserve the common weal. The causes and the injustice of the calumniation of philosophy, I think, have been fairly set forth, unless you have something to add.[*](An instance of Socrates’ Attic courtesy. Cf 430 B, Cratyl. 427 D, Theaet. 183 C, Gorg. 513 C, Phaedr. 235 A. But in Gorg. 462 C it is ironical and perhaps in Hipp. Maj. 291 A.) No, he said, I have nothing further to offer on that point. But which of our present governments do you think is suitable for philosophy? None whatever, I said; but the very ground of my complaint is that no polity[*](κατάστασις = constitution in both senses. Cf. 414 A, 425 C, 464 A, 493 A, 426 C, 547 B. So also in the Laws. The word is rare elsewhere in Plato.) of today is worthy of the philosophic nature. This is just the cause of its perversion and alteration; as a foreign seed sown in an alien soil is wont to be overcome and die out[*](For ἐξίτηλον Cf. Critias 121 A.) into the native growth,[*](This need not be a botanical error. in any case the meaning is plain. Cf. Tim. 57 B with my emendation.) so this kind does not preserve its own quality but falls away and degenerates into an alien type. But if ever it finds the best polity as it itself is the best, then will it be apparent[*](For the idiom cf. αὐτὸ δείξει Phileb. 20 C, with Stallbaum’s note, Theaet. 200 E, Hipp. Maj. 288 B, Aristoph. Wasps 994, Frogs 1261, etc., Pearson on Soph. fr. 388. Cf. αὐτὸ σημανεῖ, Eurip. Bacch. 476, etc.) that this was in truth divine and all the others human in their natures and practices. Obviously then you are next, going to ask what is this best form of government. Wrong, he said[*](Plato similarly plays in dramatic fashion with the order of the dialogue in 523 B, 528 A, 451 B-C, 458 B.) I was going to ask not that but whether it is this one that we have described in our establishment of a state or another. In other respects it is this one, said I; but there is one special further point that we mentioned even then, namely that there would always have to be resident in such a state an element having the same conception of its constitution that you the lawgiver had in framing its laws.[*](Cf. on 412 A and What Plato Said, p. 647 on Laws 962; 502 D.) That was said, he replied. But it was not sufficiently explained, I said, from fear of those objections on your part which have shown that the demonstration of it is long and difficult. And apart from that the remainder of the exposition is by no means easy.[*](Cf. Soph. 224 C. See critical note.) Just what do you mean? The manner in which a state that occupies itself with philosophy can escape destruction. For all great things are precarious and, as the proverb truly says, fine things are hard.[*](So Adam. Others take τῷ ὄντι with χαλεπά as part of the proverb. Cf. 435 C, Crat. 384 A-B with schol.) All the same, he said, our exposition must be completed by making this plain. It will be no lack of will, I said, but if anything,[*](For the idiomatic ἀλλ’ εἴπερ Cf. Parmen. 150 B, Euthydem. 296 B, Thompson on Meno, Excursus 2, pp. 258-264, Aristot. An. Post. 91 b 33, Eth. Nic. 1101 a 12, 1136 b 25, 1155 b 30, 1168 a 12, 1174 a 27, 1180 b 27, Met. 1028 a 24, 1044 a 11, Rhet. 1371 a 16.) a lack of ability, that would prevent that. But you shall observe for yourself my zeal. And note again how zealously and recklessly I am prepared to say that the state ought to take up this pursuit in just the reverse of our present fashion.[*](What Plato here deprecates Callicles in the Gorgias recommends, 484 C-D. For the danger of premature study of dialectic cf. 537 D-E ff. Cf. my Idea of Education in Plato’s Republic, p. 11. Milton develops the thought with characteristic exuberance, Of Education: They present their young unmatriculated novices at first coming with the most intellective abstractions of logic and metaphysics . . . to be tossed an turmoiled with their unballasted wits in fathomless and unquiet deeds of controversy, etc.) In what way?

At present, said I, those who do take it up are youths, just out of boyhood,[*](Cf. 386 A, 395 C, 413 C, 485 D, 519 A, Demosth. xxi. 154, Xen. Ages. 10.4, Aristot. Eth. Nic. 1103 b 24, 1104 b 11, Isoc. xv. 289.) who in the interval[*](Cf. 450 C.) before they engage in business and money-making approach the most difficult part of it, and then drop it—and these are regarded forsooth as the best exemplars of philosophy. By the most difficult part I mean discussion. In later life they think they have done much if, when invited, they deign to listen[*](Cf. 475 D, Isoc. xii. 270 ἀλλ’ οὐδ’ ἄλλου δεικνύοντος καὶ πονήσαντος ἠθέλησεν ἀκροατὴς γενέσθαι would not even be willing to listen to one worked out and submitted by another (tr. Norlin in L.C.L.).) to the philosophic discussions of others. That sort of thing they think should be by-work. And towards old age,[*](Cf. Antiphon’s devotion to horsemanship in the Parmenides, 126 C. For πρὸς τὸ γῆρας cf. 552 D, Laws 653 A.) with few exceptions, their light is quenched more completely than the sun of Heracleitus,[*](Diels i. 3 p. 78, fr. 6. Cf. Aristot. Meteor. ii. 2. 90, Lucretius v. 662.) inasmuch as it is never rekindled. And what should they do? he said. Just the reverse. While they are lads and boys they should occupy themselves with an education and a culture suitable to youth, and while their bodies are growing to manhood take right good care of them, thus securing a basis and a support[*](Cf. 410 C and What Plato Said, p. 496 on Protag. 326 B-C.) for the intellectual life. But with the advance of age, when the soul begins to attain its maturity, they should make its exercises more severe, and when the bodily strength declines and they are past the age of political and military service, then at last they should be given free range of the pasture[*](Like cattle destined for the sacrifice. A favorite figure with Plato. Cf. Laws 635 A, Protag. 320 A. It is used literally in Critias 119 D.) and do nothing but philosophize,[*](Cf. 540 A-B, Newman, Aristot. Pol. i. pp. 329-330. Wilamowitz, Platon, ii. 207-208, fancies that 498 C to 502 A is a digression expressing Plato’s personal desire to be the philosopher in Athenian politics.) except incidentally, if they are to live happily, and, when the end has come, crown the life they have lived with a consonant destiny in that other world. You really seem to be very much in earnest, Socrates, he said; yet I think most of your hearers are even more earnest in their opposition and will not be in the least convinced, beginning with Thrasymachus. Do not try to breed a quarrel between me and Thrasymachus, who have just become friends and were not enemies before either. For we will spare no effort until we either convince him and the rest or achieve something that will profit them when they come to that life in which they will be born gain[*](A half-playful anticipation of the doctrine of immortality reserved for Bk. x. 608 D ff. It involves no contradiction and justifies no inferences as to the date and composition of the Republic. Cf. Gomprez iii. 335. Cf. Emerson, Experience, in fine, which in his passage into new worlds he will carry with him. Bayard Taylor (American Men of Letters, p. 113), who began to study Greek late in life, remarked, Oh, but I expect to use it in the other world. Even the sober positivist Mill says (Theism, pp. 249-250) The truth that life is short and art is long is from of old one of the most discouraging facts of our condition: this hope admits the possibility that the art employed in improving and beautifying the soul itself may avail for good in some other life even when seemingly useless in this.) and meet with such discussions as these. A brief time[*](For εἰς here cf. Blaydes on Clouds 1180, Herod. vii. 46, Eurip. Heracleidae 270.) your forecast contemplates, he said. Nay, nothing at all, I replied, as compared with eternity.[*](Cf. on 486 A. see too Plut. Cons. Apol. 17. 111 C a thousand, yes, ten thousand years are only an ἀόριστος point, nay, the smallest part of a point, as Simonides says. Cf. also Lyra Graeca (L. C. L.), ii. p. 338, Anth. Pal. x. 78.) However, the unwillingness of the multitude to believe what you say is nothing surprising. For of the thing here spoken they have never beheld a token,[*](γενόμενον . . . λεγόμενον. It is not translating to make no attempt to reproduce Plato’s parody of polyphonic prose. The allusion here to Isocrates and the Gorgian figure of παρίσωσις and παρομοίωσις is unmistakable. The subtlety of Plato’s style treats the accidental occurrence of a Gorgian between the artificial style and insincerity of the sophists and the serious truth of his own ideals. Cf. Isoc. x. 18 λεγόμενος . . . γενόμενος What Plato Said, p. 544 on Symp. 185 C, F. Reinhardt, De Isocratis aemulis, p. 39, Lucilius, bk. v. init. hoc nolueris et debueris te si minu delectat, quod τεχνίον Isocrateium est, etc.) but only the forced and artificial chiming of word and phrase, not spontaneous and accidental as has happened here.

But the figure of a man equilibrated and assimilated to virtue’s self perfectly, so far as may be, in word and deed, and holding rule in a city of like quality, that is a thing they have never seen in one case or in many. Do you think they have?By no means.Neither, my dear fellow, have they ever seriously inclined to hearken to fair and free discussions whose sole endeavor was to search out the truth[*](As the Platonic dialectic does (Phileb. 58 C-D, Cf. What Plato Said, p. 611) in contrast with the rhetorician, the lawyer (Theaet. 172 D-E) and the eristic (Euthydem. 272 B, Hipp. Maj. 288 D).) at any cost for knowledge’s sake, and which dwell apart and salute from afar[*](Cf. Eurip. Hippol. 102, Psalm cxxxviii. 6 the proud he knoweth afar off.) all the subtleties and cavils that lead to naught but opinion[*](Cf. Phaedrus 253 D with Theaetet. 187 C, and Unity of Plato’s Thought, p. 48.) and strife in court-room and in private talk.They have not, he said. For this cause and foreseeing this, we then despite our fears[*](Cf. on 489 A.) declared under compulsion of the truth[*](Cf. Aristot. Met. 984 b 10, 984 a 19.) that neither city nor polity nor man either will ever be perfected until some chance compels this uncorrupted remnant of philosophers, who now bear the stigma of uselessness, to take charge of the state whether they wish it or not, and constrains the citizens to obey them, or else until by some divine inspiration[*](Cf. Laws 757 E. But we must not attribute personal superstition to Plato. See What Plato Said, index, s. v. Superstition.) a genuine passion for true philosophy takes possession[*](Cf. Laws 711 D, Thuc. vi. 24. 3; so iv. 4. 1 ὁρμὴ ἐπέπεσε.) either of the sons of the men now in power and sovereignty or of themselves. To affirm that either or both of these things cannot possibly come to pass is, I say, quite unreasonable. Only in that case could we be justly ridiculed as uttering things as futile as day-dreams are.[*](We might say, talking like vain Utopians or idly idealists. The scholiast says, p. 348, τοῦτο καὶ κενήν φασι μακαρίαν. cf. ibid, Vol. I. on 458 A, and for εὐχαί on 450 D, and Novotny on Epist. vii. 331 D.) Is not that so? It is. If, then, the best philosophical natures have ever been constrained to take charge of the state in infinite time past,[*](Cf. Laws 782 A, 678 A-B, and What Plato Said, p. 627 on Laws 676 A-B; Also Isoc. Panath. 204-205, seven hundred years seemed a short time.) or now are in some barbaric region[*](Cf. Phaedo 78 A.) far beyond our ken, or shall hereafter be, we are prepared to maintain our contention[*](For the ellipsis of the first person of the verb Parmen. 137 C, Laches 180 A. The omission of the third person is very frequent.) that the constitution we have described has been, is, or will be[*](Cf. 492 E, Laws 711 E, 739 C, 888 E.) realized[*](Cf. Vol. I. Introd. p. xxxii, and ibid. on 472 B, and What Plato Said, p. 564, also 540 D, Newman, Aristot. Pol. i. p. 377.) when this philosophic Muse has taken control of the state.[*](This is what I have called the ABA style. Cf. 599 E, Apol. 20 C, Phaedo 57 B, Laches 185 A, Protag. 344 C, Theaet. 185 A, 190 B, etc. It is nearly what Riddell calls binary structure, Apology, pp. 204-217.) It is not a thing impossible to happen, nor are we speaking of impossibilities. That it is difficult we too admit. I also think so, he said. But the multitude—are you going to say?—does not think so, said I. That may be, he said. My dear fellow, said I, do not thus absolutely condemn the multitude.[*](It is uncritical to find contradictions in variations of mood, emphasis, and expression that are broadly human and that no writer can avoid. Any thinker may at one moment and for one purpose defy popular opinion and for another conciliate it; at one time affirm that it doesn’t matter what the ignorant people think or say, and at another urge that prudence bids us be discreet. So St. Paul who says (Gal. i. 10) Do I seek to please men? for if I yet please men I should not be the servant of Christ, says also (Rom xiv. 16) Let no then your good be evil spoken of. Cf. also What Plato Said, p. 646 on Laws 950 B.) They will surely be of another mind if in no spirit of contention but soothingly and endeavoring to do away with the dispraise of learning you point out to them whom you mean by philosophers, and define as we recently did their nature and their pursuits so that the people may not suppose you to mean those of whom they are thinking.