On the Cavalry Commander

I want to add a word of warning against another error. Some men, when they suppose themselves to be stronger than the enemy whom they are going to attack, take an utterly inadequate force with them.[*](Hellenica 6.5.51.) The consequence is that they are apt to incur the loss they expected to inflict. Or, when they know themselves to be weaker than the enemy, they use all their available strength in the attack.

The right procedure, in my opinion, is just the opposite: when the commander expects to win, he should not hesitate to use the whole of his strength: for an overwhelming victory never yet was followed by remorse.

But when he tries conclusions with a much stronger force, knowing beforehand that he is bound to retreat when he has done his best, I hold that it is far better in such a case to throw a small part of his strength into the attack than the whole of it; only horses and men alike should be his very best. For such a force will be able to achieve something and to retreat with less risk.

But when he has thrown the whole of his strength into an attack on a stronger force, and wants to retire, the men on the slowest mounts are bound to be taken prisoners; others to be thrown through lack of horsemanship; and others to be cut off owing to inequalities in the ground, since it is hard to find a wide expanse of country entirely to your liking.

Moreover, owing to their numbers they will collide and hinder and hurt one another frequently. But good horses and men will contrive to escape, especially if you manage to scare the pursuers by using your reserves.

Sham ambuscades, too, are helpful for this purpose. It is also useful to discover on what quarter your friends may suddenly reveal themselves in a safe position and make the pursuit slower.

Then again it is obvious that in point of endurance and speed the advantage is much more likely to rest with a small than with a large force. I do not mean that mere paucity of numbers will increase the men’s powers of endurance and add to their speed; but it is easier to find few men than many who will take proper care of their horses and will practise the art of horsemanship intelligently on their own account.

Should it happen at any time that the cavalry forces engaged are about equal, I think it would be a good plan to split each regiment into two divisions, putting one under the command of the colonel, and the other under the best man available.

The latter would follow in the rear of the colonel’s division for a time; but presently, when the adversary is near, he would wheel on receiving the order and charge. This plan, I think, would make the blow delivered by the regiment more stunning and more difficult to parry.

Both divisions should have an infantry contingent; and if the infantry, hidden away behind the cavalry, came out suddenly and went for the enemy, I think they would prove an important factor in making the victory more decisive; for I have noticed that a surprise cheers men up if it is pleasant, but stuns them if it is alarming.

Anyone will recognise the truth of this who reflects that, however great their advantage in numbers, men are dazed when they fall into an ambuscade, and that two hostile armies confronting each other are scared out of their wits for the first few days.

There is no difficulty in adopting these tactics; but only a good cavalry commander can find men who will show intelligence, reliability and courage in wheeling to charge the enemy.

For the commander must be capable both by his words and action of making the men under him realize that it is good to obey, to back up their leader, and to charge home; of firing them with a desire to win commendation; and of enabling them to carry out their intentions with persistence.

Suppose now that the cavalry are busy in the no-man’s-land that separates two battle lines drawn up face to face or two strategic positions, wheeling, pursuing and retreating. After such manoeuvres both sides usually start off at a slow pace, but gallop at full speed in the unoccupied ground.

But if a commander first feints in this manner, and then after wheeling, pursues and retreats at the gallop he will be able to inflict the greatest loss on the enemy, and will probably come through with the least harm, by pursuing at the gallop so long as he is near his own defence, and retreating at the gallop from the enemy’s defences.