History of the Peloponnesian War

Thucydides

Thucydides. The English works of Thomas Hobbes of Malmesbury. Hobbes, Thomas. translator. London: John Bohn, 1843.

It must be a stock of money, not forced contributions, that support the wars; and such as live by their labour are more ready to serve the wars with their bodies than with their money. For they make account that their bodies will outlive the danger, but their money they think is sure to be spent, especially if the war (as it is likely) should last.

So that the Peloponnesians and their confederates, though for one battle they be able to stand out against all Greece besides, yet to maintain a war against such as have their preparations of another kind, they are not able; inasmuch as not having one and the same counsel, they can speedily perform nothing upon the occasion; and having equality of vote and being of several races, everyone will press his particular interest, whereby nothing is like to be fully executed.

For some will desire to take revenge on some enemy and others to have their estates least wasted. And being long before they can assemble, they take the lesser part of their time to debate the common business and the greater to dispatch their own private affairs. And everyone supposeth that his own neglect of the common estate can do little hurt and that it will be the care of somebody else to look to that for his own good, not observing how by these thoughts of everyone in several the common business is jointly ruined.

"But their greatest hindrance of all will be their want of money, which being raised slowly, their actions must be full of delay, which the occasions of war will not endure.

As for their fortifying here and their navy, they are matters not worthy fear.

For it were a hard matter for a city equal to our own in time of peace to fortify in that manner, much less in the country of an enemy, and we no less fortified against them.

And if they had a garrison here, though they might, by excursions and by the receiving of our fugitives, annoy some part of our territory, yet would not that be enough both to besiege us and also to hinder us from sallying into their territories and from taking revenge with our fleet, which is the thing wherein our strength lies.

For we have more experience in land service by use of the sea than they have in sea service by use of the land.