History of the Peloponnesian War

"And whoever does not think this to be the case, the very fact itself convicts him of being wrong. For on a former occasion you called us to your aid by holding out to us no other fear, than that, if we permitted you to fall under the Syracusans, we ourselves also should be exposed to danger.

It is not right therefore now, that you should refuse to be persuaded by that self-same argument by which you wished to persuade us; or that, because we are come with a larger armament, you should be suspicious of us; but much rather, that you should mistrust these men.

We, at least, have no power to remain amongst you without your support; and even if we should show ourselves base, and bring you into subjection, we should be unable to keep you under our dominion, both on account of the length of the voyage, and the difficulty of keeping guard over cities so great in extent, and of an inland character, as regards their resources. These men, on the other hand, living near you as they do, not in a camp, but in a city far stronger than our force here present, are constantly plotting against you;

and when, in each particular case, they have got an opportunity, they do not let it slip, (as they have shown both in other instances, and in that of the Leontines,) and at the present time they have the hardihood to urge you, as though you were void of sense, against those who are preventing this, and who have held up Sicily hitherto from sinking under them.

But we, in opposition to them, urge you to a far more real safety, begging you not to betray that which is secured to both of us by each other; and to consider, that while for them, even without any allies, the way to you is always open, you will not often have a chance of defending yourselves in conjunction with so large a force of auxiliaries; of which, if through your suspicions you allow it to depart, either unsuccessful, or, perhaps, even defeated, you will wish yet to see even a very small portion, when its presence will no longer accomplish any thing for you.

But neither do ye, Camarinaeans, nor the rest, be persuaded by these men's calumnies. For we have told you the whole truth concerning these things about which we are suspected, and will still remind you briefly of them, and so try to persuade you.

We say then, that we exercise dominion over the men in those parts to avoid being subject to another; but that we liberate those who are here, to avoid being hurt by them; that we are compelled to meddle with many things, because we have also many things to guard against; and that we came, both now and before, as allies to those of you here who were being injured, not without being invited, but after receiving an invitation.

And do not ye, either as judges of what is done by us, or as moderators, attempt to divert us, [which would now be difficult,) but so far as any thing in our meddling policy and disposition is at the same time profitable for you, that take, and make the most of it. And believe that it is not equally injurious to all, but that to a large majority of the Greeks it is even beneficial.

For every one in every place, even where we are not already present, both he who thinks that he will suffer wrong, and he who is meditating to commit it, through having a prospect ever close at hand, the one, of obtaining help from us against his injurer, the other, that if we come, [*]( I see no reason, either for changing ἀδεεῖς into ἀδεές, as Dobree and Arnold wish to do, or for taking the word with an active signification, thought it may possibly be so used sometimes.) they run a risk of not being free from alarm, both, I say, are alike compelled, the one, to be moderate against his own will, the other, to be saved without his own exertion.

This security, then, which is common to all who require it, and which is now presented to you, do not ye reject; but, acting like others, instead of constantly guarding against the Syracusans, now unite with us, and take at length your equal share in plotting against them.