History of the Peloponnesian War

"Wherefore we are worthy of the empire we enjoy, because we supplied the most numerous fleet, and showed uncompromising zeal in behalf of the Greeks; and because these men, by so readily acting as they did, [*]( i. e. of one so utterly opposed to the good of Greece.) even in favour of the Mede, inflicted injury on us; while at the same time we aim at gaining strength against the Peloponnesians.

And we make no fine professions of justly enjoying dominion, either as having by ourselves overthrown the barbarian, or as having faced danger for the liberty of these men, more than for that of all, and of ourselves at the same time. For in no one is it an invidious thing to provide for his own safety. And now, having come hither also for the sake of our own security, we see that these same things are expedient for you likewise.

And we prove it from what these men state to our prejudice, and what you, in your too great alarm, suspect; [*]( Hermocrates had endeavoured to excite the jealousy of the Camarinaeans, by telling them, that the Athenians did but pretend to aid the Leontines, while their real object was the subjugation of all Sicily. 'Such language,' says Euphemus, 'may possibly beguile you for the moment; but when you come to act, you will follow your real interests.' —Arnold.) knowing that those who through fear are suspicious, though pleased at the moment by the charms of oratory, yet afterwards attend to their real interests in what they undertake.

For we have said that we hold our dominion there under the influence of fear, and that for the same reason we are come to put the states here on a safe footing, in concert with our friends; and not to enslave them, but rather to prevent their being so treated.

"And let no one suppose that we are interesting ourselves in you without any connexion existing between us; since he must know that through your being preserved, and resisting the Syracusans, (being not too weak to do so,) we should be less readily hurt by their sending a force to the Peloponnesians.

In this way, then, you are connected with us in the greatest degree; and on this account too it is reasonable that we should reinstate the Leontines, not as subjects, like their kinsmen in Euboea, but in as powerful a condition as possible; that from their own country, living as they do close to these men's borders, they may in our behalf be annoying to them.

For in Greece we are by ourselves able to cope with our enemies; and the Chalcidians, after whose subjugation the orator says that we are inconsistently giving liberty to those here, are advantageous to us by being without any armament, and only paying us money; but the people here, both the Leontines and our other friends, by being left as independent as possible.

"To an individual, however, who has absolute power, or to a state that holds dominion, nothing is inconsistent that is profitable, nothing reckoned as kindred that does not command confidence; but in every case, as opportunity may serve, you must become either a foe or a friend. And in our case, our advantage here consists in this,—not that we should reduce our friends to weakness, but that, owing to the strength of our friends, our foes should be powerless. Nor ought you to doubt this.

For even in the case of our allies in those parts, as they are severally useful to us, so we govern them; the Chians and Methymnaeans as independent, on condition of their supplying ships; the greater part of them on more stringent terms, subject to contribution of money; but others, although they are islanders and easy to reduce, as allies on terms of entire freedom, because they he in favourable positions around the Peloponnese.

So that here also it is natural that we should regulate them with an eye to our advantage, and, as we say, with reference to our fear of the Syracusans. For they are aiming at dominion over you, and wish, after uniting you on the strength of your suspicions of us, themselves to sway the empire of Sicily, by force, or through your forlorn condition, when we have departed without gaining our object. And it must be so, if you unite with them; for neither will so great a force, when united, be any longer easy for us to manage, nor would these men want strength to deal with you, when we were not here.