History of the Peloponnesian War

Thucydides

Thucydides. The history of the Peloponnesian War, Volume 1-2. Dale, Henry, translator. London: Heinemann and Henry G. Bohn, 1851-1852.

It happened too, immediately after the battle of Amphipolis and the retreat of Ramphias from Thessaly, that neither party any longer applied themselves at all to the war, but they were rather inclined for peace. The Athenians were so, as having received a severe blow at Delium, and again shortly after at Amphipolis; and as no longer having that confident hope in their strength, through which they would not before accept the offered treaty, thinking, in consequence of their present success, that they should come off victorious in the struggle.

Besides, they were also afraid of their allies, lest they should be encouraged by their reverses to revolt on a larger scale; and they repented not having come to an arrangement, when they had a fine opportunity, after the events at Pylus.

The Lacedaemonians, on the other hand, wished for peace, because they found protracted beyond their expectation those hostilities by which they imagined that in a few years they should reduce the power of the Athenians, if they ravaged their land; and because they had met with the disaster on the island—such as had never yet befallen Sparta: and in consequence of their country being plundered from Pylus and Cythera; while their helots also were deserting, and there was a constant apprehension lest even those that remained in the country, trusting in the support of those who were out of it, should, on the strength of the present state of things, adopt some revolutionary designs against them, as on a former occasion.

It happened, too, that their thirty years' truce with the Argives was on the point of expiring, and the Argives would not renew it, unless the Cynurian territory were restored to them; so that it appeared impossible for them to carry on war at once with the Argives and Athenians. Besides, they suspected that some of the states in the Peloponnese would revolt from them to the Argives; as was really the case.

On these considerations both parties thought it best to conclude the arrangement; and particularly the Lacedaemonians, through the desire of recovering their men taken in the island; for those of them who were Spartans were of the highest rank, [*](ʽὁμοίως.] The meaning of this word is considered very doubtful; but to me it appears to signify, that as the prisoners were men of the highest rank, (or whatever the dignity might be which was intended by the word πρῶτοι,) so they were connected with those amongst themselves who were of the same rank.) and connected with themselves in the same way.

They began therefore to negotiate immediately after their capture; but the Athenians, being so successful, would not yet make peace on fair terms. When, however, they had been defeated at Delium, immediately the Lacedaemonians, finding that they would now be more ready to accept their proposals, concluded the armistice for a year, during which they should meet together, and consult respecting a treaty for a longer period.

And when, moreover, the defeat at Amphipolis had befallen the Athenians, and Cleon and Brasidas were dead, who on each side were most opposed to the cause of peace-the one, because he was successful and honoured in consequence of the war; the other, because he thought, that if tranquillity were secured, he would be more easily detected in his evil practices, and less believed in his calumniations-then the individuals who in either country were most desirous of taking the lead, namely, Pleistoanax son of Pausanias, king of the Lacedaemonians, and Nicias son of Niceratus, who of all his contemporaries was most generally successful in his military commands, were much more anxious for peace than ever. Nicias was so, because he wished, while he had met with no disaster, and was in high repute, permanently to secure his good fortune; and both at present to obtain a respite from troubles himself and give his countrymen the same, and to hand down to futurity a name for having continued to the end without subjecting the state to any disaster; and he thought that such a result is secured by freedom from danger, and by a man's committing himself as little as possible to fortune, and that such freedom from danger is afforded by peace. Pleistoanax, on the other hand, took the same view, because he was calumniated by his enemies on the subject of his restoration, and was continually being brought forward by them as the object of religious scruple on the part of the Lacedaemonians, whenever they met with any defeat; as though it were owing to his illegal restoration that these things befell them.

For they charged him with having, in concert with Aristocles, his brother, prevailed on the prophetess at Delphi to give the following charge to such Lacedaemonians as went, during a long period, to consult the oracle;

that they should bring back the seed of the demigod son of Jupiter from a foreign land to his own; else they would [*]( i.e. that owing to the scarcity of provisions, they would have to buy them as dearly as though the implements used in raising them had been made of silver.) plough with a silver share.

And so they said that in the course of time, when he had gone as an exile to Lycaeum, (in consequence of his former return from Attica, which was thought to have been effected by bribery,) and had then, through fear of the Lacedaemonians, half his house within the sanctuary of Jupiter, he induced them, in the nineteenth year of his exile, to restore him with the same dances and sacrifices as when they appointed their kings on first settling in Lacedaemonian.

Being annoyed therefore by this calumny, and thinking that in time of peace, when no reverse was experienced, and when, moreover, the Lacedaemonians were recovering their men from the island, he too should give his enemies no handle against him; whereas, as long as there was war, the leading men must always be exposed to accusations from the occurrence of disasters; he was ardently desirous of the pacification.

And so during this winter they were meeting in conference; and when it was now close upon spring, [*]( Literally, an armament was shaken on high before them; i.e. held in terrorem over their heads; like a weapon brandished in a man's face.) The terrors of an armament, for which orders were sent round to the different states, as though for the purpose of building forts, were held forth by the Lacedaemonians, that the Athenians might the more readily listen to them. And when, after these conferences had been held. and they had urged many claims against each other, it was agreed that they should make peace on restoring what they had respectively taken during the war; but that the Athenians should keep Nisaea; (for on their demanding back Plataea, the Thebans said that it was not by force that they held the place, but in consequence of the inhabitants themselves having surrendered on definite terms, and not betrayed it to them; and the Athenians maintained that in the same way had they got possession of Nisaea;) then the Lacedaemonians convened their allies; and when all the rest, except the Boeotians, Corinthians, Eleans, and Megareans, who were displeased with what was being done, had voted for putting an end to the war, they concluded the arrangement, and made a treaty and bound themselves by oaths to the Athenians, and they to them, to the following effect: