History of the Peloponnesian War

Thucydides

Thucydides. The history of the Peloponnesian War, Volume 1-2. Dale, Henry, translator. London: Heinemann and Henry G. Bohn, 1851-1852.

"Now the penalty of death has been enacted in states for many offences, and those not equal to this, but less heinous; and yet, urged on by hope, men venture to commit them; and no one ever yet came into danger [*]( Literally, having passed sentence upon himself. ) with a conviction of his own mind that he would not succeed in his attempt.

What city, too, when bent on revolt, ever attempted it with deficient resources—according to its own idea—either internal, or by means of alliance with others?

Indeed all men, both in private and public capacity, are naturally disposed to do wrong, an there is no law that will keep them from it; atleast men have gone through all kinds of punishment in their enactments, to try if by any means they might be less injured by evil-doers, and it is probable that in early times the punishments for the greatest offences were more lenient; but as they are disregarded, they generally, in the course of time, extend to death;

and still even this is disregarded. Either, then, some fear more dreadful than this must be discovered, or this, at any rate, does not restrain men: but poverty inspiring ing boldness through necessity, and larger means inspiring ambition though insolence and pride, and the other conditions of life through some human passion or other, according as they are severally enslaved by some fatal and overpowering one, lead men on to dangers.

Moreover, hope and desire for every thing, the one taking the lead, and the other following; and the one devising the attempt, while the other suggests the facility of succeeding in it; cause the most numerous disasters; and though unseen, they are more influential than the dangers that are seen. Fortune, too, aids them no less in urging men on;

for by sometimes siding them unexpectedly, she induces them to run the risk even with inferior means; especially in the case of states, in as much as the venture is for the greatest object, namely, freedom, or empire over others: and as each individual, when acting in concert with all, unreasonably carries his ideas to an extravagant length concerning then.

In short, it is impossible [to remedy the evil], and the man is very simple who thinks, that when human nature is eagerly set on doing a thing, he has any means of diverting it, either by the rigour of laws, or any other kind of terror.