History of the Peloponnesian War

On the next day the Syracusans set up two trophies on Epipolae, one where the Athenian ascent was made, the other at the place where the Boeotians made the first resistance; and the Athenians recovered their dead under truce.

Not a few were killed, both of the Athenians and their allies; the arms taken, however, were out of all proportion to the dead, for while some of those who were forced to leap down the bluffs perished, some escaped.

After this the Syracusans, their earlier confidence now being restored as a result of their unexpected good fortune, sent Sicanus with fifteen ships to Agrigentum, which was in a state of revolution, in order that he might if possible win over that city; and Gylippus went out once more by land to the other parts of Sicily to secure additional troops, being in hope that he could even carry the walls of the Athenians by storm, now that the engagement on Epipolae had turned out thus.

Meanwhile the Athenian generals were deliberating about the situation in view both of the calamity that had happened and of the utter discouragement that now prevailed in the army. They saw that they were not succeeding in their undertaking, and that the soldiers were finding their stay burdensome.

For they were distressed by sickness for a double cause, the season of the year being that in which men are most liable to illness, while at the same time the place in which they were encamped was marshy and unhealthy; and the situation in general appeared to them to be utterly hopeless.

Demosthenes, therefore, was of the opinion that they should not remain there any longer, but since the plan which had induced him to risk the attack upon Epipolae had failed, his vote was for going away without loss of time, while it was still possible to cross the sea and to have some superiority over the enemy with at any rate the ships of the armament which had come to reinforce them.

From the point of view of the State, also, he said, it was more profitable to carry on the war against the enemy who were building a hostile fortress in their own territory than against the Syracusans, whom it was no longer easy to conquer; and furthermore, it was not right that they should continue the siege and spend a great deal of money to no purpose.

Such was the judgment of Demosthenes. Nicias, however, although he also thought that their situation was bad, did not wish expressly to reveal their weakness, or that they should be reported to the enemy as openly voting in full council for the retreat; for, he urged, they would be far less likely, when they should wish to retreat, to do this unobserved.