History of the Peloponnesian War

Thucydides

Thucydides, Vol. 1-4. Smith, Charles Foster, translator. London and Cambridge, MA: Heinemann and Harvard University Press, 1919-1923.

By this time the Athenians were getting into a state of so great confusion and perplexity that it has not been easy to learn from either side just how the several events occurred. In the daytime things are clearer, of course, yet even so those who are present do not know everything that happens, but each man barely knows what happens near himself; but in a battle by night—the only one that took place in this war between large armies—how could anyone know anything clearly?

For though there was a bright moon, they could only see one another, as it is natural to do in moonlight—seeing before them the vision of a person but mistrusting their recognition of their own friends. There were, besides, large numbers of hoplites belonging to both sides moving about in a narrow space. And on the Athenian side, some were already being defeated, while others, still in their first onset, were advancing unchecked;

but of the rest of their army a large portion had only just finished the ascent and others were still coming up, so that they did not know which body to join. For the front lines were already all in confusion in consequence of the rout that had taken place, and the two sides were difficult to distinguish by reason of the outcries.

The Syracusans and their allies, as they were winning, were cheering one another and indulging in no little shouting—it being impossible in the night to communicate in any other way— while at the same time they held their ground against their assailants; the Athenians were trying to find their own comrades, and regarded as hostile whatever came from the opposite direction, even though it might be a party of friends belonging to the troops already in flight, and as they were constantly calling out the demand for the watchword, the only means they had of distinguishing friend from foe, they not only caused much confusion in their own ranks, everybody making the demand at the same time, but also made their watchword known to the enemy. They had not the same opportunity, however, of learning the enemy's watchword, because the Syracusans, who were winning the day and had not become scattered, had less difficulty in recognizing one another.

The result was that if a body of Athenians, even though superior in number, fell in with a party of the enemy, these would make their escape, inasmuch as they knew the Athenian watchword, whereas if they on their part could not give the answer they were put to the sword.

But that which put the Athenians at the greatest disadvantage and did them most harm was the singing of the paean; for the song of both armies was very similar and caused perplexity. Whenever, that is, the Argives or the Corcyraeans or any Dorian contingent of the Athenian army would raise the paean, the Athenians were just as much terrified thereby as when the enemy sang.

And so finally, when once they had been thrown into confusion, coming into collision with their own comrades in many different parts of the army, friends with friends and citizens with fellow-citizens, they not only became panic-stricken but came to blows with one another and were with difficulty separated.

And as they were being pursued by the enemy many hurled themselves down from the bluffs and perished; for the way down from Epipolae was narrow; and of those who in their attempt to escape got down to the level ground, the greater part, and especially those who belonged to the first expedition and therefore had a better acquaintance with the country, got through to the camp, but of those who had come later, some missed the roads and wandered about over the country, and these when day came were destroyed by the Syracusan cavalry, which were scouring the fields.