Civil Wars

They sent a detachment in advance under command of Lucius Bibulus, in company with Rhascupolis, to cut a path. They found it a very laborious task, but they accomplished it nevertheless with enthusiastic zeal, and all the more when some who had gone ahead came back and said that they had had a distant view of the river. On the fourth day, fatigued with labor and thirst, the water which they carried being nearly exhausted, they recollected that it had been said that they should be in a waterless region only three days. So they fell into a panic, fearing that they were the victims of a stratagem. They did not disbelieve those who had been sent in advance and who said that they had seen the river, but they thought that they themselves had been led in a different direction. They lost heart and cried aloud, and when they saw Rhascupolis riding by and exhorting them to have courage, they reviled him and threw stones at him. While Bibulus was beseeching them with words of good cheer to persevere to the end, towards evening the river was seen by those in front, who, as was natural, raised a cry of joy, which was taken up by those behind in due order until it reached the rear. When Brutus and Cassius learned this they hurried forward at once, leading on the remainder of their army through the pathway that had been cleared. Nevertheless, they did not conceal their doings from the enemy altogether, nor surround them, for Rhascus, the brother of Rhascupolis, having his suspicions aroused by the shouting, made a reconnoissance; and when he saw what was being done he was astonished at so large an army traversing a pathway where no water could be obtained, and where he thought not even a wild beast could penetrate by reason of the dense foliage, and he forthwith communicated the news to the army of Norbanus. The latter retreated by night from the gorge of the Sapæans toward Amphipolis. Each of the Thracian brothers received an ovation in his own army, the one because he had led an army by an unknown path, the other because he had discovered the movement.

Thus Brutus and Cassius by an astounding act of audacity advanced to Philippi, where Tillius also disembarked, and the whole army was there assembled. Philippi is a city that was formerly called Datus, and before that Crenides, because there are many springs[*](krhni/s: "a small spring.") bubbling around a hill there. Philip fortified it because he considered it an excellent stronghold against the Thracians, and named it from himself, Philippi. It is situated on a precipitous hill and its size is exactly that of the summit of the hill. There are woods on the north through which Rhascupolis led the army of Brutus and Cassius. On the south is a marsh extending to the sea. On the east are the gorges of the Sapæans and Corpileans, and on the west a very fertile and beautiful plain extending to the towns of Murcinus and Drabiscus and the river Strymon, about 350 stades. Here it is said that Cora was carried off while gathering flowers, and here is the river Zygactes, in crossing which they say that the yoke of the god's chariot was broken, from which circumstance the river received its name.[*](This is the mythological tale of the seizure of Proserpine by Pluto. The Greek name of Proserpine was Persephone, but she was worshipped at Athens under the name of Cora (the maiden), in conjunction with her mother, Demeter. The place of her seizure was commonly assigned to the plain of Enna in Sicily. The word Zygactes in Greek means "broken yoke." This river is not mentioned by any other author.) The plain slopes downward so that movement is easy to those descending from Philippi, but toilsome to those going up from Amphipolis.

There is another hill not far from Philippi which is called the Hill of Dionysus, in which are gold mines called the Asyla. Ten stades farther are two other hills, at a distance of eighteen stades from Philippi itself and eight stades from each other. On these hills Cassius and Brutus were encamped, the former on the southern and the latter on the northern of the two. They did not advance against the retreating army of Norbanus because they learned that Antony was approaching, Octavius having been left behind at Epidamnus on account of sickness. The plain was admirably situated for fighting and the precipitous hill-tops for camping, since on one side of them were marshes and ponds stretching as far as the river Strymon, and on the other gorges destitute of roads and impassable. Between these hills, eight stades apart, lay the main pass from Europe to Asia as between gates. Across this space they built a fortification from camp to camp, leaving a gate in the middle, so that the two camps became virtually one. Alongside this fortification flowed a river, which is called by some the Ganga and by others the Gangites,[*](This is the river Angites mentioned in Herodotus vii. 113, where Xerxes paused and offered a sacrifice of white horses to the river Strymon. Its present name is the Anghista.) and behind it was the sea, where they could keep their supplies and shipping in safety. Their depot was on the island of Thasos, 100 stades distant. Their triremes were anchored at Neapolis, at a distance of seventy stades. Brutus and Cassius were satisfied with the position and they proceeded to fortify their camps.

Antony moved his army rapidly, wishing to anticipate the enemy in occupying Amphipolis as an advantageous position for the battle. When he found it already fortified by Norbanus he was delighted. Leaving his apparatus there and one legion, under the command of Pinarius, he advanced with the greatest boldness and encamped in the plain at a distance of only eight stades from the enemy, and straightway the superiority of the enemy's situation and the inferiority of his own became evident. The former were on elevated ground, the latter on the plain; the former procured fuel from the mountains, the latter from the marshes; the former obtained water from a river, the latter from wells freshly dug; the former drew their supplies from Thasos, requiring carriage of only a few stades, while the latter was 350 stades[*](This should be 250 stades, according to Schweighäuser, that being approximately the distance between Amphipolis and Philippi.) from Amphipolis. Still it seems that Antony was compelled to do as he did, for there was no other hill, and the rest of the plain, lying in a sort of hollow, was liable to inundation at times from the river; for which reason also the fountains of water were found fresh and abundant in the wells that were dug there. Antony's audacity, although he was driven to it by necessity, confounded the enemy when they saw him pitch his camp so near them and in such a contemptuous manner as soon as he arrived. He raised numerous towers and fortified himself on all sides with ditch, wall, and palisade. The enemy also completed their fortification wherever the work was defective. Cassius, observing that Antony's advance was reckless, extended his fortification at the only place where it was still wanting, from the camp to the marsh, a space which had been overlooked on account of its narrowness, so that there was now nothing unfortified except the cliffs on Brutus's flank and the marsh on that of Cassius and the sea lying against the marsh. In the centre everything was intercepted by ditch, palisade, wall, and gates.

In this way both sides had fortified themselves, in the meantime making trial of each other by cavalry skirmishes only. When they had done all that they intended and Octavius had arrived (for, although he was not yet strong enough for a battle, he could be carried along the ranks reclining in a litter), he and Antony prepared for battle forthwith. Brutus and Cassius also drew out their forces on their higher ground, but did not come down. They decided not to give battle, hoping to wear out the enemy by want of supplies. There were nineteen legions of infantry on each side, but those of Brutus and Cassius lacked something of being full, while those of Octavius and Antony were complete. Of cavalry the latter had 13,000 and the former 20,000, including Thracians on both sides. Thus in the multitude of men, in the spirit and bravery of the commanders, and in arms and munitions, was beheld a most magnificent display on both sides; yet they did nothing for several days. Brutus and Cassius did not wish to engage, but rather to continue wasting the enemy by lack of provisions, since they themselves had abundance from Asia, all transported by the sea from close at hand, while the enemy had nothing in abundance and nothing from their own territory. They could obtain nothing through merchants from Egypt, since that country was exhausted by famine, nor from Spain or Africa by reason of Pompeius, nor from Italy by reason of Murcus and Domitius. Macedonia and Thessaly, which were the only countries then supplying them, would not suffice much longer.

Mindful chiefly of these facts Brutus and Cassius protracted the war. Antony, fearful of the same, resolved to force them to an engagement. He formed a plan of effecting a passage through the marsh secretly, if possible, in order to get in the enemy's rear without their knowledge, and cut off their avenue of supply from Thasos. So he arrayed his forces for battle with all the standards set each day, so that it might seem that his entire army was drawn up, while a part of his force was really working night and day cutting a narrow passage in the marsh, cutting down reeds, throwing up a causeway and flanking it with stone so that the earth should not fall away, and bridging the deeper parts with piles, all in the profoundest silence. The reeds, which were still growing around his passage-way, prevented the enemy from seeing his work. After working ten days in this manner he sent a column of troops by night suddenly, who occupied all the strong positions inside and built several redoubts at the same time. Cassius was amazed at the ingenuity as well as the secrecy of this work, and he formed the counter design of cutting Antony off from his redoubts. He carried a transverse wall across the whole marsh from his camp to the sea, cutting and bridging in the same manner as Antony had done, and laying a solid foundation for his rampart, thus intercepting the passage sage made by Antony, so that those inside could not escape to him, nor he render assistance to them.

When Antony saw this about noon, instantly, with rage and fury, he turned his own army, which was facing in another direction, and led it against the fortification of Cassius which lay between his camp and the marsh. He carried tools and ladders intending to take it by storm and force his way into Cassius' camp. While he was making this audacious charge, obliquely and up hill, across the space that separated the two armies, the soldiers of Brutus were provoked at the insolence of the enemy in dashing boldly athwart their front while they stood there armed. So they charged of their own volition, without any order from their officers, took them in flank, and killed as many as they could reach. The battle once begun they charged upon the army of Octavius, also, which was drawn up opposite, put it to flight, pursued it to the camp which Antony and Octavius had in common, and captured it. Octavius himself was not there, having been warned in a dream to beware of that day, as he has himself written in his Memoirs.[*](w(s au)to\s e)n toi=s u(pomnh/masin e)/grayen. Plutarch used the same words with a single variation, substituting i(storei= (relates) for e)/grayen (has written). This identity of language would indicate that they drew from the same source, yet their accounts of the beginning of the battle differ from each other. Plutarch says that at a council of war held by Brutus and Cassius it was resolved to give battle on the following day, although Cassius favored delay; that after the resolution was taken Cassius was in good spirits, and expressed his confidence in victory; and that on the following morning the scarlet robe, which was the Roman signal of battle, was hung out in the camps of both Brutus and Cassius. Still, the two accounts are not necessarily conflicting, since one tells what took place in the republican camp, and the other what occurred in that of the triumvirs. Plutarch's authority is Messala Corvinus, who commanded a legion under Brutus, and who was probably present at the council of war, since he relates a conversation that he had with Cassius immediately after it. (Life of Brutus, 39, 40.))

When Antony saw that battle was joined he was delighted because he had forced it, for he had been in trouble about his supplies. He judged it inadvisable to turn again toward the plain, lest in making the evolution his ranks should be thrown into disorder. So he continued his charge, as he had begun it, on the run, and advanced under a shower of missiles, and forced his way till he struck a body of Cassius' troops, which had not moved from its assigned position and which was amazed at this unexpected audacity. He courageously broke this advance guard and dashed against the fortification that ran between the marsh and the camp, demolished the palisade, filled up the ditch, undermined the works, and killed the men at the gates, disregarding the missiles hurled from the wall, until he had forced an entrance through the gates, and others had made breaches in the fortification, and still others had climbed up on the debris. All this was done so swiftly that those who had just now captured the fortification met Cassius' men, who had been at work in the marsh, coming to the assistance of their friends, and, with a powerful charge, put them to flight, drove them into the marsh, and then at once wheeled against the camp of Cassius itself. These were only the men who had scaled the fortification with Antony, the remainder being engaged in conflict with the enemy on the other side of the wall.

As the camp was in a strong position it was guarded by only a few men, for which reason Antony easily overcame them. Cassius' soldiers outside the camp were already worsted, and when they saw that the camp was taken they scattered in disorderly flight. The victory was complete and alike on either side, Brutus defeating the enemy's left wing and taking their camp, while Antony overcame Cassius and ravaged his camp with irresistible courage. There was great slaughter on both sides, but by reason of the extent of the plain and the clouds of dust they were ignorant of each other's fate. When they learned the facts they recalled their scattered forces. Those who returned resembled porters rather than soldiers, and did not at once perceive each other nor see anything clearly. Otherwise either party would have flung down their burdens and fiercely attacked the others carrying off plunder in this disorderly fashion. According to conjecture the number of killed on the side of Cassius, including slave shield-bearers, was about 8000 and on the side of Octavius double that number.[*](Messala is the authority for this estimate of the losses. Plutarch says: "The losses of Brutus and Cassius were 8000, including the military servants, whom Brutus called Brigas. Messala says that he thinks those of the enemy were more than twice as great," evidently a a very wild guess, like most of our statistics of the casualties of battles in ancient times. (Life of Brutus, 45.))

When Cassius was driven out of his fortifications and no longer had any camp to go to, he ascended the hill to Philippi and took a survey of the situation. He could not see accurately on account of the dust, nor could he see everything, but upon discovering that his own camp was captured he ordered Pindarus, his shield-bearer, to draw his sword and kill him. While Pindarus delayed a messenger ran up and said that Brutus had been victorious on the other wing and was ravaging the enemy's camp. Cassius merely answered, "Tell him that I pray his victory may be complete." Then, turning to Pindarus, he said, "What are you waiting for? Why do you not deliver me from my shame?" Then, as he presented his throat, Pindarus slew him. This is one account of the death of Cassius. Others say that as some horsemen were approaching, bringing the good news from Brutus, he took them for enemies and sent Titinius to find out exactly; that the horsemen pressed around Titinius joyfully as a friend of Cassius, and at the same time uttered loud hurrahs; that Cassius, thinking that Titinius had fallen into the hands of enemies, said, "Have I waited to see my friend torn from me?" and that then he withdrew to a tent with Pindarus, and Pindarus was never seen afterward. For this reason some persons think that he killed Cassius without orders. Cassius ended his life on his birthday, on which also the battle was fought, and Titinius killed himself because he had been too slow.[*](The second of these two accounts of the death of Cassius is found, at greater length, in Plutarch (Life of Brutus, 43); in Velleius (ii. 70); in Valerius Maximus (ix. 9. 2); in Dion Cassius (xlvii. 46); and with a slight variation in Florus (iv. 7).)

Brutus wept over the dead body of Cassius and called him the last of the Romans, meaning that his equal in virtue would never exist again. He reproached him for haste and precipitancy, but at the same time he esteemed him happy because he was freed from cares and troubles, "which," he said, "are leading Brutus, ah, whither?" He delivered the corpse to friends to be buried secretly lest the army should be moved to tears at the sight; and himself passed the whole night, without food and without care for his own person, restoring order in Cassius' army. In the morning the enemy drew up their army in order of battle, so that they might not seem to have been beaten. Brutus, perceiving their design, exclaimed, "Let us arm also and make believe that we have suffered no defeat." So he put his forces in line, and the enemy withdrew. Brutus said to his friends, jeeringly, "They challenged us when they thought we were tired, but they dared not put us to the test."

On the same day that witnessed the battle of Philippi another great calamity took place in the Adriatic. Domitius Calvinus was bringing two legions of infantry on transport ships to Octavius, one of which was known as the Martian legion, a name which had been given to it as a distinction for bravery. He led also a prætorian cohort of about 2000 men, four squadrons of horse, and a considerable corps d'elite of other troops, under the convoy of a few triremes. Murcus and Ahenobarbus met them with 130 war-ships. A few of the transports that were in front got away under sail. The wind suddenly failing, the rest floated about in a dead calm on the sea, having been delivered by some god into the hands of their enemies. The latter, without danger to themselves, fell upon each ship and crushed it; nor could the triremes that escorted them render any aid, since they were hemmed in by reason of their small number. The men who were exposed to this danger performed many deeds of valor. They hastily lashed their ships together with ropes and spars to prevent the enemy from breaking through their line. But when they succeeded in doing this Murcus discharged burning arrows at them. Then they cast off their fastenings as quickly as possible and separated from each other on account count of the fire, and thus again were exposed to being surrounded or rammed by the triremes.

Some of the soldiers, and especially the Martians, who excelled in bravery, were exasperated that they should lose their lives uselessly, and so killed themselves rather than be burned to death; others leaped on board the triremes of the enemy, giving and receiving blows. Vessels half burned floated a long time, containing men perishing by fire, by hunger, and by thirst. Others, clinging to masts or planks, were thrown upon barren rocks or promontories, and of these some were saved unexpectedly. Some of them were nourished for five days by licking pitch, or chewing sails or ropes, until the waves bore them to the land. The greater part, vanquished by their misfortunes, surrendered to the enemy. Seventeen triremes surrendered, and the men in them took the oath to Murcus. Their general, Calvinus, who was believed to have perished, returned to Brundusium on his ship five days later. Such was the catastrophe that befell in the Adriatic on the same day that the battle of Philippi was fought, whether it be more fitly called a shipwreck or a naval engagement. The coincidence of the two battles caused amazement when it became known later.