Civil Wars

Appianus of Alexandria

Appianus. The Roman history of Appian of Alexandria, Volume 2: The Civil Wars. White, Horace, translator. New York: The Macmillan Company. London: Macmillan and Co. Ltd. 1899.

Curio, in order that he might not be detected changing sides too suddenly, brought forward vast plans for repairing and building roads, of which he was to be superintendent for five years. He knew that he could not carry any such measure, but he hoped that Pompey's friends would oppose him so that he might have that as an excuse for opposing Pompey. Things turned out as he had anticipated, so that he had a pretext for disagreement. Claudius proposed the sending of successors to take command of Cæsar's provinces, as his term was now expiring. Paulus was silent. Curio, who was thought to differ from both, praised the motion of Claudius, but added that Pompey ought to resign his provinces and army just like Cæsar, for in this way he said the commonwealth would be made free and be relieved from fear in all directions. Many opposed this as unjust, because Pompey's term had not yet expired. Then Curio came out more openly and decidedly against appointing successors to Cæsar unless Pompey also should lay down his command; for since they were both suspicious of each other, he contended that there could be no lasting peace to the commonwealth unless both were reduced to the character of private citizens. He said this because he knew that Pompey would not give up his command and because he saw that the people were incensed against Pompey on account of his prosecutions for bribery. As Curio's position was plausible, the plebeians praised him as the only one who was willing to incur the enmity of both Pompey and Cæsar in order to fulfil worthily his duties as a citizen; and once they escorted him home like an athlete, scattering flowers, as though he had won the prize in some great and difficult contest, for nothing was considered more perilous then than to have a difference with Pompey.

Pompey, while lying sick in Italy,[*](Cicero makes mention of this illness of Pompey in the Tusculan Disputations (i. 35).) wrote an artful letter to the Senate, praising Cæsar's exploits and also recounting his own from the beginning, saying that he had been invested with a third consulship, and with provinces and an army afterward, which he had not solicited, but had been called to serve the public weal. He added that the powers which he had accepted unwillingly he would gladly yield to those who wished to take them back, and would not wait the time fixed for their expiration. The artfulness of this communication consisted in showing the fairness of Pompey and in exciting prejudice against Cæsar, as though the latter was not willing to give up his command even at the appointed time. When Pompey came back to the city, he spoke to the senators in the same way and then, also, promised to lay down his command. As a friend and marriage connection of Cæsar he said that the latter would very cheerfully do the same, for his had been a long and laborious contest against very warlike peoples; he had added much to the Roman power and now he would come back to his honors and his sacrificings[*](qusi/as, " sacrificings." This refers, says Combes-Dounous, to Cæsar's duties as Pontifex Maximus, a life office, to which he had been chosen in his younger days.) and take his rest. He said these things in order that successors to Cæsar might be sent at once, while he (Pompey) should merely stand on his promise. Curio exposed his artifice, saying that promises were not sufficient, and insisting that Pompey should lay down his command now and that Cæsar should not be disarmed until Pompey himself had returned to private life. On account of private enmity, he said, it would not be advisable either for Cæsar or for the Romans that such great authority should be held by one man. Rather should each of them have power against the other in case one should attempt violence against the commonwealth. Throwing off all disguise, he denounced Pompey unsparingly as one aiming at supreme power, and said that unless he would lay down his command now, when he had the fear of Cæsar before his eyes, he would never lay it down at all. He moved that, unless they both obeyed, both should be voted public enemies and military forces be levied against them. In this way he concealed the fact that he had been bought by Cæsar.

Pompey was angry with him and threatened him and at once withdrew indignantly to his country-seat. The Senate now had suspicions of both, but it considered Pompey the better republican of the two, and it hated Cæsar because he had not shown it proper respect during his consulship. Some of the senators really thought that it would not be safe to the commonwealth to deprive Pompey of his power until after Cæsar should lay down his, since the latter was outside of the city and was the man of more towering designs. Curio held the contrary opinion, that they had need of Cæsar against the power of Pompey, or otherwise that both armies should be disbanded at the same time. As the Senate would not agree with him he dismissed it, leaving the whole business still unfinished. He had the power to do so as tribune. Thus Pompey had occasion to regret that he had restored the tribunician power to its pristine vigor after it had been reduced to extreme feebleness by Sulla. Nevertheless, one decree was voted before the session was ended, and that was that Cæsar and Pompey should each send one legion of soldiers to Syria to defend the province on account of the disaster to Crassus. Pompey artfully recalled. the legion that he had lately lent to Cæsar on account of the disaster to Cæsar's two generals, Titurius and Cotta. Cæsar awarded to each soldier 250 drachmas and sent the legion to Rome together with another of his own. As the expected danger did not show itself in Syria, these legions were sent into winter quarters at Capua.

The persons who had been sent by Pompey to Cæsar to bring these legions spread many reports derogatory to Cæsar and repeated them to Pompey. They said that Cæsar's army was wasted by protracted service, that the soldiers longed for their homes and would change to the side of Pompey as soon as they should cross the Alps. They spoke in this way either from ignorance or because they were corrupted. In fact, every soldier was strongly attached to Cæsar and labored zealously for him, under the force of discipline and the influence of the gain which war usually brings to victors and which they received from Cæsar also; for he gave with ar lavish hand in order to mould them to his designs. They knew what his designs were, but they stood by him nevertheless. Pompey believed what was reported to him and collected neither soldiers nor apparatus suitable for so great a contest.[*](A parallel passage in Plutarch says that "when some were saying that if Cæsar should turn his forces against the city, they could not see what power would be able to resist him, Pompey smiled, and with great unconcern bade them take no care of that, 'for,' he said, ' whenever I stamp upon the ground in any part of Italy there will rise up forces enough both horse and foot.'" (Life of Pompey, 57.)) In the Senate the opinion of each member was asked and Claudius craftily divided the question and took the votes separately, thus: "Shall successors be sent to Cæsar?" and again, "Shall Pompey be deprived of his command?" The majority voted against the latter proposition, and it was decreed that successors to Cæsar should be sent. Then Curio put the question whether both should lay down their commands, and 22 senators voted in the negative while 370 went back to the opinion of Curio in order to avoid civil discord.[*](Mendelssohn marks the text at this place turbata.) Then Claudius dismissed the Senate, exclaiming, "Enjoy your victory and have Cæsar for a master."

Suddenly a false rumor came that Cæsar had crossed the Alps and was marching on the city, whereupon there was a great tumult and consternation on all sides. Claudius moved that the army at Capua be turned against Cæsar as a public enemy. When Curio opposed him on the ground that the rumor was false he exclaimed, "If I am prevented by the vote of the Senate from taking steps for the public safety, I will take such steps on my own responsibility as consul." After saying this he darted out of the Senate and proceeded to the suburbs with his colleague, where he presented a sword to Pompey, and said, "I and my colleague command you to march against Cæsar in behalf of your country, and we give you for this purpose the army now at Capua, or in any other part of Italy, and whatever additional forces you yourself choose to levy." Pompey promised to obey the orders of the consuls, but he added, "unless we can do better," thus dealing in trickery and still making a pretence of fairness. Curio had no power outside of the city (for it was not permitted to the tribunes to go beyond the walls), but he publicly deplored the state of affairs and demanded that the consuls should make proclamation that nobody need obey the conscription ordered by Pompey. As he could accomplish nothing, and as his term of office as tribune was about expiring, and he feared for his safety and despaired of being able to render any further assistance to Cæsar, he hastily departed to join the latter.

Cæsar had lately recrossed the straits from Britain and, after traversing the Gallic country along the Rhine, had passed the Alps with 5000 foot and 300 horse and arrived at Ravenna, which was contiguous to Italy and the last town in his government. After embracing Curio and returning thanks for what he had done for him, he looked over the present situation. Curio advised him to bring his whole army together now and lead it to Rome, but Cæsar thought it best still to try and come to terms. So he directed his friends to make an agreement in his behalf, that he should deliver up all his provinces and soldiers, except that he should retain two legions and Illyria with Cisalpine Gaul until he should be chosen consul. This was satisfactory to Pompey, but the consuls refused. Cæsar then wrote a letter to the Senate, which Curio carried a distance of 1300 stades[*](About 150 English miles. The Vatican codex says 1300 stades; all the others say 3300 (378 miles), which is quite incredible.) in three days and delivered to the newly elected consuls as they entered the senate-house on the first [*](Y.R. 705) of the calends of January.[*](Literally: " On the day of the new moon of the year.") The letter embraced a calm [*](B.C. 49) recital of all that Cæsar had done from the beginning of his career and a proposal that he would lay down his command at the same time with Pompey, but that if Pompey should retain his command he would not lay down his own, but would come quickly and avenge his country's wrongs and his own. When this letter was read, as it was considered a declaration of war, a vehement shout was raised on all sides that Lucius Domitius be appointed as Cæsar's successor. Domitius took the field immediately with 4000 of the new levies.

Since Antony and Cassius, who succeeded Curio as tribunes, agreed with the latter in opinion, the Senate became more bitter than ever and declared Pompey's army the protector of Rome, and that of Cæsar a public enemy. The consuls, Marcellus and Lentulus, ordered Antony and his friends out of the Senate lest they should suffer some harm, although they were tribunes. Then Antony sprang from his chair in anger and with a loud voice called gods and men to witness the indignity put upon the sacred and inviolable office of tribune, saying that while they (the tribunes) were expressing the opinion which they deemed conducive to the public interest, they were driven out with contumely though they had wrought no murder or other outrage. Having spoken thus he rushed out like one possessed, predicting war, slaughter, proscription, banishment, confiscation, and various other impending evils, and invoking direful curses on the authors of them. Curio and Cassius rushed out with him, for a detachment of Pompey's army was already observed standing around the senate-house. The tribunes made their way to Cæsar the next night with the utmost speed, concealing themselves in a hired carriage, and disguised as slaves. Cæsar showed them in this condition to his army, whom he excited by saying that his soldiers, after all their great deeds, had been stigmatized as public enemies and that distinguished men like these, who had dared to speak out for them, had been thus driven with ignominy from the city.[*](This speech is reported by Cæsar himself at considerable length in his Commentaries on the Civil War (i. 7). It was made to the thirteenth legion, the only one present. The soldiers cried out that they were ready to defend their general and the tribunes from all harm.)

The war had now been begun on both sides and already openly declared. The Senate, thinking that Cæsar's army would be slow in arriving from Gaul and that he would not rush into so great an adventure with a small force, directed Pompey to assemble 130,000 Italian soldiers, chiefly veterans who had had experience in war, and to recruit as many able-bodied men as possible from the neighboring provinces. They voted him for the war all the money in the public treasury at once, and their own private fortunes in addition if they should be needed for the pay of the soldiers. With the fury of party rage they levied additional contributions on the allied cities, which they collected with the greatest possible haste. Cæsar had sent messengers to bring his own army, but as he was accustomed to rely upon the terror caused by the celerity and audacity of his movements, rather than on the magnitude of his preparations, he decided to take the aggressive in this great war with his 5000 men and to anticipate the enemy by seizing the advantageous positions in Italy.

Accordingly, he sent forward some centurions with a few of his bravest troops in peaceful garb to go inside the walls of Ariminum and take it by surprise. This was the first town in Italy after leaving Cisalpine Gaul. Toward evening Cæsar himself rose from a banquet on a plea of indisposition, leaving some friends who were still feasting. He mounted his chariot and drove toward Ariminum, his cavalry following at a short distance. When his course brought him to the river Rubicon, which forms the boundary line of Italy, he stopped and, while gazing at the stream, revolved in his mind the evils that might result from his crossing it with arms. Recovering himself he said to those who were present, "My friends, stopping here will be the beginning of sorrows for me; crossing over will be such for all mankind." Thereupon, he crossed with a rush like one inspired, uttering the common phrase, "Let the die be cast."[*]("The Rubicon," says Duruy, "is probably the Fiumicino di Savignano, a reddish torrent twelve miles north of Ariminum, formed by the confluence of three brooks from the Apennines." Duruy doubts the whole story of Cæsar's hesitation at the Rubicon, but Plutarch (Life of Cæsar, 32) says that Asinius Pollio was present; and there is reason to believe that both Plutarch and Appian drew from Pollio's history.) Then he resumed his hasty journey and took possession of Ariminum about daybreak, advanced beyond it, stationed guards at the commanding positions, and, either by force or by kindness, mastered all whom he fell in with. As is usual in cases of panic, there was flight and migration from all the country-side in disorder and tears, the people having no exact knowledge, but thinking that Cæsar had arrived with an army of boundless strength.