Civil Wars

Appianus of Alexandria

Appianus. The Roman history of Appian of Alexandria, Volume 2: The Civil Wars. White, Horace, translator. New York: The Macmillan Company. London: Macmillan and Co. Ltd. 1899.

The soldiers ran together tumultuously without arms, and, as was their custom, saluted their commander who had suddenly appeared among them. When he bade them tell what they wanted they were so surprised that they did not venture to speak openly of the donative in his presence, but they adopted the more moderate course of demanding their discharge from the service, hoping that, since he needed soldiers for the unfinished wars, he would speak about the donative himself. But, contrary to the expectation of all, he replied without hesitation, " I discharge you." Then, to their still greater astonishment, and while the silence was most profound, he added, "And I will give you all that I have promised when I have my triumph with others." At this expression, as unexpected as it was kind to them, shame immediately took possession of all, and reflection, together with jealousy at the thought of their abandoning their commander in the midst of such great wars and of others joining in the triumph instead of themselves, and of their losing the gains of the war in Africa, which were expected to be great, and becoming enemies of Cæsar himself as well as of the opposite party. Moved by these fears they remained still more silent and embarrassed, hoping that Cæsar would yield and change his mind on account of his immediate necessity. But he remained silent also, until his friends urged him to say something more to them and not leave his old comrades of so many campaigns with a short and austere word. Then he began to speak, addressing them first as "citizens," not "fellow-soliders," which implied that they were already discharged from the army and were private individuals.

They could endure it no longer, but cried out that they repented of what they had done, and besought him to keep them in his service. But Cæsar turned away and was leaving the platform when they shouted with greater eagerness and urged him to stay and punish them for their misdeeds. He delayed a while longer, not going away and not turning back, but pretending to be undecided. At length he came back and said that he would not punish any of them, but that he was grieved that even the tenth legion, to which he had always given the first place of honor, should join in such a riot. "And this legion alone," he continued, "I will discharge from the service. Nevertheless, when I return from Africa I will give them all that I have promised. And when the wars are ended I will give lands to all, not as Sulla did by taking it from the present holders and colonizing the takers among the losers, and making them everlasting enemies to each other, but I will give the public land, and my own, and will purchase what may be needful." There was clapping of hands and joyful acclaim on all sides, but the tenth legion was plunged in grief because to them alone Cæsar appeared inexorable. They begged him to choose a portion of their number by lot and put them to death. But Cæsar, seeing that there was no need of stimulating them any further when they had repented so bitterly, became reconciled to all, and departed straightway for the war in Africa.

He crossed from Rhegium to Messana and went to Lilybæum.[*](The modern Marsala, at the western extremity of Sicily. It was the port nearest the African coast. Hirtius says that Cæsar arrived there on the 14th day before the Calends of January and sailed eight days later.) Here, learning that Cato was guarding the enemy's magazines with a fleet and a part of the land forces at Utica, and that he had with him 300 men who had for a long time constituted their council of war and were called the Senate, and that the commander, L. Scipio, and the flower of the army were at Adrumetum, he sailed against [*](Y.R. 708) the latter. He arrived at a time when Scipio had gone [*](B.C. 46) away to meet Juba, and he drew up his forces for battle near Scipio's very camp in order to come to an engagement with the enemy at a time when their commander was absent. Labienus and Petreius, Scipio's lieutenants, attacked him, defeated him badly, and pursued him in a haughty and disdainful manner until Labienus' horse was wounded in the belly and threw him, and his attendants carried him off. Petreius, thinking that he had made a thorough test of the army and that he could conquer whenever he liked, drew off his forces, saying to those around him, "Let us not deprive our general, Scipio, of the victory." In one part of the day's work did Cæsar's luck show itself, in that the victorious enemy seems to have abandoned the field at the very moment of success. It is said that in the flight Cæsar dashed up to his whole line[*](e)gxri/mptwn a(/pasin. How could he dash up to all of them at once? Mendelssohn suggests a)podra=sin, i.e. he dashed up to the runaways.) and turned it around and seizing one of those who carried the principal standards (the eagles) dragged him to the front. Finally, Petreius retired and Cæsar was glad to do the same. Such was the result of Cæsar's first battle in Africa.

Not long afterward it was reported that Scipio himself was advancing with eight legions of foot, 20,000 horse (of which most were Africans), and a large number of light-armed troops, and thirty elephants; together with King Juba, who had some 30,000 foot-soldiers in addition, raised for this war, and 20,000 Numidian cavalry, besides a large number of spearmen and sixty elephants. Cæsar's army began to be alarmed and a tumult broke out among them on account of the disaster they had already experienced and of the reputation of the forces advancing against them, and especially of the numbers and bravery of the Numidian cavalry. War with elephants, to which they were unaccustomed, also frightened them.[*]("Whenever," says Suetonius, " his (Cæsar's) troops were dispirited by reports of the great force of the enemy, he rallied their courage not by denying the truth of what was said or minimizing the facts but on the contrary by exaggerating every particular. Accordingly, when his troops were in great alarm at the expected arrival of King Juba, he called them together and said, 'I have to inform you that in a very few days the king will be here with ten legions, 30,000 horse, 100,000 light-armed foot, and 300 elephants. Let none of you therefore presume to make any further inquiry or indulge in conjectures, but take my word for what I tell you, which I have from undoubted intelligence; otherwise I shall put them aboard an old crazy vessel and leave them exposed to the mercy of the winds to be transported to some other country.' " (Jul. 66.)) But Bocchus, another Mauritanian prince, seized Cirta, which was the capital of Juba's kingdom. When this news reached Juba he started for home at once with his army, leaving thirty of his elephants only with Scipio. Thereupon Cæsar's men plucked up courage to such a degree that the fifth legion begged to be pitted against the elephants, and it overcame them valiantly. From that day to the present this legion has borne the figure of an elephant on its standards.

The battle was long, severe, and doubtful in all parts of the field until toward evening, when victory declared itself on the side of Cæsar, who went straight on and captured Scipio's camp and did not desist, even in the night, from reaping the fruits of his victory until he had made a clean sweep.[*](This was the battle of Thapsus. According to Hirtius Cæsar's soldiers broke away from their officers and began the battle without. orders. (Bell. Afr. 82.)) The enemy scattered in small bodies wherever they could. Scipio himself with Afranius, abandoning everything, fled by sea with twelve open ships. And thus was this army also, composed of nearly 80,000 men who had been under long training and were inspired with hope and courage by the previous battle, in the second engagement, completely annihilated. And now Cæsar's fame began to be celebrated as of a man of invincible fortune, and those who were vanquished by him attributed nothing to his merit, but ascribed everything, including their own blunders, to Cæsar's luck. And it seems that the result of this war also was due to the bad generalship of the commanders who, as in Thessaly, neglected their opportunity to wear out Cæsar by delay until his supplies were exhausted, in this foreign land, and in like manner failed to reap the fruits of their first victory by pushing it sharply to the end.[*](suntrifqei\s ou(/tws o)ce/ws dialuqh=nai. No commentator has been able to explain satisfactorily the first of these four words. Schweighäuser says that po/lemos must be understood, but he adds that a "crushed war" would be a wonderful thing. It may mean that the war, " crushed out in this way, quickly came to an end.")