Wars in Spain

Pompeius, being cast down by so many misfortunes, marched away with his senatorial council to the towns to spend the rest of the winter, expecting a successor to come early in the spring. Fearing lest he should be called to account, he made overtures to the Numantines secretly for the purpose of bringing the war to an end. The Numantines themselves, being exhausted by the slaughter of so many of their bravest men, by the loss of their crops, by want of food, and by the length of the war, which had been protracted beyond expectation, sent legates to Pompeius. He publicly advised them to surrender at discretion, because no other kind of treaty seemed worthy of the dignity of the Roman people, but privately he told them what terms he should impose. When they had come to an agreement and the Numantines had given themselves up, he demanded and received from them hostages, together with the prisoners and deserters. He also demanded thirty talents of silver, a part of which they paid down and the rest he agreed to wait for. His successor, [*](Y.R. 615) Marcus Popillius Læna, had arrived when they brought the [*](B.C.139 ) last instalment. Pompeius being no longer under any apprehension concerning the war, since his successor was present, and knowing that he had made a disgraceful peace and without authority from Rome, began to deny that he had come to any understanding with the Numantines. The latter proved the contrary by witnesses who had taken part in the transaction, senators, and his own prefects of horse and military tribunes. Popillius sent them to Rome to carry on the controversy with Pompeius there. The case was brought before the Senate, and the Numantines and Pompeius debated it there. The Senate decided to continue the war. Thereupon Popillius attacked the Lusones who were neighbors of the Numantines, but he accomplished nothing, and on the arrival of his successor in office, Hostilius Mancinus, he returned to Rome. [*](Y.R. 617)

Mancinus had frequent encounters with the Numantines in which he was worsted, and finally, after great loss, took refuge in his camp. On a false rumor that the Cantabri and Vaccæi were coming to the aid of the Numantines, he became alarmed, extinguished his fires, and fled in the darkness of night to a desert place where Nobilior once had a [*](B.C.137 ) camp. Being shut up in this place at daybreak without preparation or fortification and surrounded by Numantines, who threatened all with death unless he made peace, he agreed to terms like those previously made between the Romans and Numantines. To this agreement he bound himself by an oath. When these things were known at Rome there was great indignation at this most ignominious treaty, and the other consul, Æmilius Lepidus, was sent to Spain, Mancinus being called home to stand trial. The Numantine ambassadors followed him thither. Æmilius becoming tired of idleness while awaiting the decision from Rome (for some men sought the command, not for the advantage of the city, but for glory, or gain, or the honor of a triumph), falsely accused the Vaccæi of supplying the Numantines with provisions during the war. Accordingly he ravaged their country and laid siege to their principal city, Pallantia, which had in no way violated the treaty, and he persuaded Brutus, his brother-in-law, who had been sent to Farther Spain (as I have before related), to join him in this undertaking. [*](Y.R. 618)

Here they were overtaken by Cinna and Cæcilius, messengers from Rome, who said that the Senate was at a loss to know why, after so many disasters had befallen them in Spain, Æmilius should be seeking a new war, and they placed in his hands a decree warning him not to attack the Vaccæi. But he, having actually begun the war, considered that the Senate was ignorant of that, and of the fact that Brutus was coöperating with him, and that the Vaccæi had aided the Numantines with provisions, money, and men. Accordingly he made answer that it would be dangerous to abandon the war, since nearly all Spain would rebel if they should imagine that the Romans were afraid. He sent Cinna's party home without having accomplished their errand, and he wrote in this sense to the Senate. After this he began, in a fortified place, to construct engines and collect provisions. While he was thus engaged, Flaccus, who had been sent out on a foraging expedition, found himself in an ambuscade but he saved himself by a trick. He cunningly spread a rumor among his men that Æmilius had captured Pallantia. The soldiers raised a shout of victory. The barbarians, hearing it and thinking that the report was true, withdrew. In this [*](B.C.136 ) way Flaccus rescued his convoy from danger.

The siege of Pallantia was long protracted, the food supply of the Romans failed, and they began to suffer from hunger. All their animals perished and many of the men died of want. The generals, Æmilius and Brutus, kept heart for a long time. Being compelled to yield at last, they gave an order suddenly one night, about the last watch, to retreat. The tribunes and centurions ran hither and thither to hasten the movement, so as to get them all away before daylight. Such was the confusion that they left behind everything, and even the sick and wounded, who clung to them and besought them not to abandon them. Their retreat was disorderly and confused and much like a flight, the Pallantines hanging on their flanks and rear and doing great damage from early dawn till evening. When night came the Romans, worn with toil and hunger, threw themselves on the ground by companies just as it happened, and the Pallantines, moved by some divine interposition, went back to their own country. And this was what happened to Æmilius.

When these things were known at Rome, Æmilius was deprived of his command and consulship, and when he returned to Rome as a private citizen he was fined besides. The dispute before the Senate between Mancinus and the Numantine ambassadors was still going on. The latter exhibited the treaty they had made with Mancinus; he, on the other hand, put the blame on Pompeius, his predecessor in the command, who had turned over to him a worthless and ill-provided army, with which Pompeius himself had often been beaten, and so had made a similar treaty with the Numantines. He added that the war had been under bad omens, for it had been decreed by the Romans in violation of these agreements. The senators were equally incensed against both, but Pompeius escaped because he had been tried for this offence long before. They decided to deliver Mancinus to the Numantines for making a disgraceful treaty without their authorization. In this they followed the example of the fathers, who once delivered to the Samnites twenty generals who had made similar treaties without authority. Mancinus was taken to Spain by Furius, and delivered naked to the Numantines, but they [*](Y.R. 619) refused to receive him. Calpurnius Piso was chosen general [*](B.C.135 ) against them, but he did not march against Numantia. He made an incursion into the territory of Pallantia, and having collected a small amount of plunder, spent the rest of his term of office in winter quarters in Carpetania.

The Roman people being tired of this Numantine [*](B.C.134 ) war, which was protracted and severe beyond expectation, elected Cornelius Scipio, the conqueror of Carthage, consul again, believing that he was the only man who could subdue the Numantines. As he was still under the consular age the Senate voted, as was done when Scipio was appointed general against the Carthaginians, that the tribunes of the people should repeal the law respecting the age limit, and reënact it for the following year.[*](Scipio was not under the consular age at this time. He was born in the year of Rome 569 and was now fifty-one years old. The consular age was forty-three. Livy, xliv. 44; Velleius, ii. 4; Cicero, De Amicitia, 3.) Thus Scipio was made consul a second time and hastened to Numantia. He did not take any army by levy because the city was exhausted by so many wars, and because there were plenty of soldiers in Spain. With the Senate's consent he took a certain number of volunteers sent to him by cities and kings on the score of private friendship. To these were added 500 of his clients and friends whom he joined in one body and called it the troop of friends. All these, about 4000 in number, he put under marching orders in charge of Buteo, his nephew, while he went in advance with a small escort to the army in Spain, having heard that it was full of idleness, discord, and luxury, and well knowing that he could never overcome the enemy unless he should first bring his own men under strict discipline.