Epistles

Plato to Dionysius wishes well-doing. I hear from Archedemus [*](A disciple of Archytas af Tarentum, the Pythagorean scientist; cf. Plat. L. 3.319a; Plat. L. 7.339a, Plat. L. 7.349d.) that you think that not only I myself should keep quiet but my friends also from doing or saying anything bad about you; and that you except Dion only. [*](cf. Plat. L. 7.347c.) Now your saying this, that Dion is excepted, implies that I have no control over my friends; for had I had this control over you and Dion, as well as the rest, more blessings would have come to us all and to the rest of the Greeks also, as I affirm. But as it is, my greatness consists in making myself follow my own instructions. [*](This closely resemblesPlat. Laws 835c (with μόνος for μέγας).) However, I do not say this as though what Cratistolus and Polyxenus [*](Polyxenus was a Sophist and a disciple of Bryson of Megara, cf. Plat. L. 2.314dand Plat. L. 13.360c. Of Cratistolus nothing further is known.) have told you is to be trusted; for it is said that one of these men declares that at Olympia [*](Probably the Olympic Festival of 364 B.C. (not 360 B.C. as in Plat. L. 7.350b); see the Prefatory Note.) he heard quite a number of my companions maligning you. No doubt his hearing is more acute than mine; for I certainly heard no such thing. For the future, whenever anyone makes such a statement about any of us, what you ought, I think, to do is to send me a letter of inquiry; for I shall tell the truth without scruple or shame. Now as for you and me, the relation in which we stand towards each other is really this. There is not a single Greek, one may say, to whom we are unknown, and our intercourse is a matter of common talk; and you may be sure of this, that it will be common talk also in days to come, because so many have heard tell of it owing to its duration and its publicity. What, now, is the point of this remark? I will go back to the beginning and tell you.

It is natural for wisdom and great power to come together, and they are for ever pursuing and seeking each other and consorting together. Moreover, these are qualities which people delight in discussing themselves in private conversation and hearing others discuss in their poems. For example, when men talk about Hiero [*](Hiero, the elder, was tyrant of Gela and Syracuse 485-467 B.C. Pausanias defeated the Persians at Plataea 479 B.C. Simonides of Ceos was a famous lyric poet.) or about Pausanias the Lacedaemonian they delight to bring in their meeting with Simonides and what he did and said to them; and they are wont to harp on Periander of Corinth and Thales of Miletus, and on Pericles and Anaxagoras, and on Croesus also and Solon as wise men with Cyrus as potentate. [*](Periander was tyrant of Corinth; Thales the first of the Ionian philosophers; Pericles the famous Athenian statesman; Anaxagoras, of Clazomenae, the philosopher; Croesus, king of Lydia, famed for his wealth; Solon, the Athenian legislator; Cyrus, the Persian king, who overthrew Croesus.) The poets, too, follow their example, and bring together Creon and Tiresias, Polyeidus and Minos, Agamemnon and Nestor, Odysseus and Palamedes [*](Creon and Tiresias are characters in Sophocles’ Oed. Tyr. andAntig.; Polyeidus and Minos in Eurip.Polyeidus; the rest in Homer; Aeschylus, inProm. Vinct., tells us about Zeus and Prometheus.); and so it was, I suppose, that the earliest men also brought together Prometheus and Zeus. And of these some were—as the poets tell—at feud with each other, and others were friends; while others again were now friends and now foes, and partly in agreement and partly in disagreement. Now my object in saying all this is to make it clear, that when we ourselves die men’s talk about us will not likewise be silenced; so that we must be careful about it. We must necessarily, it seems, have a care also for the future, seeing that, by some law of nature, the most slavish men pay no regard to it, whereas the most upright do all they can to ensure that they shall be well spoken of in the future. Now I count this as a proof that the dead have some perception of things here on earth; [*](This question is also alluded to in Plat. Menex. 248c, Plat. Apol. 40c ff.) for the best souls divine that this is so, while the worst deny it; and the divinings of men who are godlike are of more authority than those of men who are not. I certainly think that, had it been in their power to rectify what was wrong in their intercourse, those men of the past whom I have mentioned would have striven to the utmost to ensure a better report of themselves than they now have. [*](On the subject of posthumous fame cf. Plat. Sym. 208c ff.) In our case, then—if God so grant—it still remains possible to put right whatever has been amiss in word or deed during our intercourse in the past. For I maintain that, as regards the true philosophy, men will think and speak well of it if we ourselves are upright, and ill if we are base. And in truth we could do nothing more pious than to give attention to this matter, nothing more impious than to disregard it. How this result should be brought about, and what is the just course to pursue, I will now explain.