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Such was Cyrus’s address; and after him[*](Chrysantas emphasizes the importance of discipline) Chrysantas rose and spoke as follows: Well, gentlemen, I have noticed often enough before now that a good ruler is not at all different from a good father. For as fathers provide for their children so that they may never be in want of the good things of life, so Cyrus seems to me now to be giving us counsel how we may best continue in prosperity. But there is one thing that he has not stated so clearly, it seems to me, as he should have done, and that I will try to present to any who do not know about it.

Bethink you, then, of this: what city that is hostile could be taken or what city that is friendly could be preserved by soldiers who are insubordinate? What army of disobedient men could gain a victory? How could men be more easily defeated in battle than when they begin to think each of his own individual safety? And what possible success could be achieved by such as do not obey their superiors? What state could be administered according to its laws, or what private establishments could be maintained, and how could ships arrive at their destination?

And as for us, how have we secured the good things we now have, except by obedience to our commander? For by that course we always quickly reached our required destination, whether by day or by night, and following our commander in close array we were invincible, and we left half done none of the tasks committed to us. If, therefore, obedience to one’s commander is, as it seems, the first essential to achieving success, then you may be sure that this same course is the first essential to ensuring its permanence.

Heretofore, you know, many of us had no[*](and the need of obedience to Cyrus) command but were under command; but now all of you here are so situated that you have command, some of larger, some of smaller divisions. Therefore, as you yourselves will expect to exercise authority over those under your command, so let us also give our obedience to those whom it is our duty to obey. And we must distinguish ourselves from slaves in this way, that, whereas slaves serve their masters against their wills, we, if indeed we claim to be free, must do of our own free will all that seems to be of the first importance. And you will find that among states, even when the government is not a monarchy, that state which most readily obeys its officers is least likely to be compelled to submit to its enemies.

Let us, therefore, present ourselves before[*](Duty of attendance at court) our ruler’s headquarters yonder, as Cyrus bids; let us devote ourselves to those pursuits by which we shall best be able to hold fast to that which we ought, and let us offer ourselves for whatever service Cyrus may need us for. And this trust will not be abused, for we may be sure that Cyrus will never be able to find anything in which he can employ us for his own advantage and not equally for ours; for we have common interests and we have common enemies.

When Chrysantas had finished this address,[*](Policies adopted) many others also both of the Persians and the allies rose to support him. They passed a resolution that the nobles should always be in attendance at court and be in readiness for whatever service Cyrus wished until he should dismiss them. And as they then resolved, so even unto this day those who are the subjects of the great king in Asia continue to do—they are constantly in attendance at the court of their princes.

And the institutions which Cyrus inaugurated as a means of securing the kingdom permanently to himself and the Persians, as has been set forth in the foregoing narrative, these the succeeding kings have preserved unchanged even to this day.

And it is the same with these as with everything else: whenever the officer in charge is better, the administration of the institution is purer; but when he is worse, the administration is more corrupt. Accordingly, the nobles came to Cyrus’s court with their horses and their spears, for so it had been decreed by the best of those who with him had made the conquest of the kingdom.

Cyrus next appointed officers to have charge of[*](Cyrus appoints many officers) the various departments; for example, tax-collectors, paymasters, boards of public works, keepers of his estates, and stewards of his commissary department. He appointed also as superintendents of his horses and hounds those who he thought would keep these creatures in a condition most efficient for his use.

But he did not in the same way leave to others the precaution of seeing that those whom he thought he ought to have as his associates in establishing the permanence of his success should be the ablest men available, but he considered that this responsibility was his own. For he knew that if ever there should be occasion for fighting, he would then have to select from their number men to stand beside and behind him, men in whose company also he would have to meet the greatest dangers; from their number likewise he knew that he would have to appoint his captains both of foot and of horse.

Besides, if generals should be needed where he himself could not be, he knew that they would have to be commissioned from among that same number. And he knew that he must employ some of these to be governors and satraps of cities or of whole nations, and that he must send others on embassies—an office which he considered of the very first importance for obtaining without war whatever he might want.

If, therefore, those by whom the most[*](The importance of wise appointments) numerous and most important affairs of state were to be transacted were not what they ought to be, he thought that his government would be a failure. But if they were all that they ought to be, he believed that everything would succeed. In this conviction, therefore, he took upon himself this charge; and he determined that the same practice of virtue should be his as well. For he thought that it was not possible for him to incite others to good and noble deeds, if he were not himself such as he ought to be.

When he had arrived at this conclusion, he thought, first of all, that he needed leisure if he were to be able to confine his attention to affairs of paramount importance. He decided, then, that it was out of the question for him to neglect the revenues, for he foresaw that there would necessarily be enormous expenses connected with a vast empire; and on the other hand, he knew that for him to be constantly engaged in giving his personal attention to his manifold possessions would leave him with no time to care for the welfare of the whole realm.

As he thus pondered how the business of[*](He models his civil service after the army) administration might be successfully conducted and how he still might have the desired leisure, he somehow happened to think of his military organization: in general, the sergeants care for the ten men under them, the lieutenants for the sergeants, the colonels for the lieutenants, the generals for the colonels, and thus no one is uncared for, even though there be many brigades; and when the commander-in-chief wishes to do anything with his army, it is sufficient for him to issue his commands only to his brigadier-generals.

On this same model, then, Cyrus centralized the administrative functions also. And so it was possible for him, by communicating with only a few officers, to have no part of his administration uncared for. In this way he now enjoyed more leisure than one who has care of a single household or a single ship. When he had thus organized his own functions in the government, he instructed those about him to follow the same plan of organization.

In this way, then, he secured leisure for himself and for his ministers; and then he began to take measures that his associates in power should be such as they ought to be. In the first place, if any of those who were able to live by the labours of others failed to attend at court, he made inquiry after them; for he thought that those who came would not be willing to do anything dishonourable or immoral, partly because they were in the presence of their sovereign and partly also because they knew that, whatever they did, they would be under the eyes of the best men there; whereas, in the case of those who did not, come he believed that they absented themselves because they were guilty of some form of intemperance or injustice or neglect of duty.

We will describe first, therefore, the manner[*](How he enforced the discipline) in which he obliged all such to come; he would direct some one of the best friends he had at court to seize some of the property of the man who did not present himself and to declare that he was taking only what was his own. So, whenever this happened, those who lost their effects would come to him to complain that they had been wronged.

Cyrus, however, would not be at leisure for a long time to give such men a hearing, and when he did give them a hearing he would postpone the trial for a long time. By so doing he thought he would accustom them to pay their court and that he would thus excite less ill-feeling than he would if he compelled them to come by imposing penalties.

That was one of his methods of training them to attend. Another was to give those who did attend the easiest and the most profitable employment; and another was never to distribute any favours among those who failed to attend.

But the surest way of compulsion was this: if a man paid no attention to any of these three methods, he would take away all that he had and give it to some one else who he thought would present himself when he was wanted; and thus he would get a useful friend in exchange for a useless one. And the king to-day likewise makes inquiries if any one absents himself whose duty it is to be present.