Anabasis

when, however, in their march out of the plain they had mounted to the top of the first hill, and were descending it, so as to ascend the next, at this moment the barbarians came upon them and down from the hilltop discharged their missiles and sling-stones and arrows, fighting under the lash.[*](Like Xerxes’ troops at Thermopylae (Hdt. 7.223).)

They not only inflicted many wounds, but they got the better of the Greek light troops and shut them up within the lines of the hoplites, so that these troops, being mingled with the non-combatants, were entirely useless throughout that day, slingers and bowmen alike.

And when the Greeks, hard-pressed as they were, undertook to pursue the attacking force, they reached the hilltop but slowly, being heavy troops, while the enemy sprang quickly out of reach;

and every time they returned from a pursuit to join the main army, they suffered again in the same way.[*](i.e. as described in 25-26.) On the second hill the same experiences were repeated, and hence after ascending the third hill they decided not to stir the troops from its crest until they had led up a force of peltasts from the right flank of the square to a position on the mountain.[*](cp. Xen. Anab. 3.4.24)

As soon as this force had got above the hostile troops that were hanging upon the Greek rear, the latter desisted from attacking the Greek army in its descent, for fear that they might be cut off and find themselves enclosed on both sides by their foes.

In this way the Greeks continued their march for the remainder of the day, the one division by the road leading over the hills while the other followed a parallel course along the mountain slope, and so arrived at the villages. There they appointed eight surgeons, for the wounded were many.

In these villages they remained for three days, not only for the sake of the wounded, but likewise because they had provisions in abundance—flour, wine, and great stores of barley that had been collected for horses, all these supplies having been gathered together by the acting satrap of the district.

On the fourth day they proceeded to descend into the plain. But when Tissaphernes and his command overtook them, necessity taught them to encamp in the first village they caught sight of, and not to continue the plan of marching and fighting at the same time; for a large number of the Greeks were hors de combat, not only the wounded, but also those who were carrying them and the men who took in charge the arms of these carriers.

When they had encamped, and the barbarians, approaching toward the village, essayed to attack them at long range, the Greeks had much the better of it; for to occupy a position and therefrom ward off an attack was a very different thing from being on the march and fighting with the enemy as they followed after.

As soon as it came to be late in the afternoon, it was time for the enemy to withdraw. For in no instance did the barbarians encamp at a distance of less than sixty stadia from the Greek camp, out of fear that the Greeks might attack them during the night.

For a Persian army at night is a sorry thing. Their horses are tethered, and usually hobbled also to prevent their running away if they get loose from the tether, and hence in case of any alarm a Persian has to put saddle-cloth and bridle on his horse, and then has also to put on his own breastplate and mount his horse—and all these things are difficult at night and in the midst of confusion. It was for this reason that the Persians encamped at a considerable distance from the Greeks.

When the Greeks became aware that they were desirous of withdrawing and were passing the word along, the order to pack up luggage was proclaimed to the Greek troops within hearing of the enemy. For a time the barbarians delayed their setting out, but when it began to grow late, they went off; for they thought it did not pay to be on the march and arriving at their camp in the night.

When the Greeks saw at length that they were manifestly departing, they broke camp and took the road themselves, and accomplished a march of no less than sixty stadia. Thus the two armies got so far apart that on the next day the enemy did not appear, nor yet on the third; on the fourth day, however, after pushing forward by night the barbarians occupied a high position on the right of the road by which the Greeks were to pass, a spur of the mountain, namely, along the base of which ran the route leading down into the plain.

As soon as Cheirisophus observed that the spur was already occupied, he summoned Xenophon from the rear, directing him to come to the front and bring the peltasts with him.

Xenophon, however, would not bring the peltasts, for he could see Tissaphernes and his whole army coming into view;[*](i.e. from the rear.) but he rode forward himself and asked, Why are you summoning me? Cheirisophus replied, It is perfectly evident; the hill overhanging our downward road has been occupied, and there is no getting by unless we dislodge these people.

Why did you not bring the peltasts? Xenophon answered that he had not thought it best to leave the rear unprotected when hostile troops were coming into sight. Well, at any rate, said Cheirisophus, it is high time to be thinking how we are to drive these fellows from the height.

Then Xenophon observed that the summit of the mountain was close above their own army and that from this summit there was a way of approach to the hill where the enemy were; and he said, Our best plan, Cheirisophus, is to drive with all speed for the mountain top; for if we once get possession of that, those men above our road will not be able to hold their position. If you choose, then, stay in command of the army, and I will go; or, if you prefer, you make for the mountain top, and I will stay here.

Well, said Cheirisophus, I leave it to you to choose whichever part you wish. Then Xenophon, with the remark that he was the younger, elected to go, but he urged Cheirisophus to send with him some troops from the front; for it would have been too long a journey to bring up men from the rear.

Cheirisophus accordingly sent with him the peltasts at the front, replacing them with those that were inside the square; he also ordered the three hundred picked men[*](See Xen. Anab. 3.4.21 above and note 2 thereon.) under his own command at the front of the square to join Xenophon’s force.

Then they set out with all possible speed. But no sooner had the enemy upon the hill observed their dash for the summit of the mountain than they also set off, to race with the Greeks for this summit.