On the Estate of Hagnias
Isaeus
Isaeus. Forster, Edward Seymour, translator. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press; London: William Heinemann Ltd., 1927 (1962 printing).
Argument
A certain Hagnias had several cousins, namely, Theopompus, his brother Stratocles, Stratius, and Eubulides. When he was at the point of death he adopted a daughter, stipulating in his will that, if anything should happen to her, the estate should pass to Glaucon, who was his half-brother, his mother's son. After making these arrangements he died; and the daughter received the inheritance and then herself died. Eubulides having also died, his daughter brought an action against Glaucon and was awarded the estate. After this, Stratocles and Stratius having died, Theopompus, acting alone, brought a suit against her and was awarded the estate. It is against him that the son of his brother Stratocles brings an action through a guardian, alleged that the inheritance belongs in equal shares to Theopompus and to his brother's son. The discussion turns on a point of fact.
Laws
I have read you the laws because my opponent bases on the first of them the claim of the child to half the estate—a claim which is false. Hagnias, it is true, was not our brother; but in the matter of a brother's property the law[*](The text of the law is given in Dem. 43.51 (Πρὸς Μακάπτατον).) has given the right of inheritance first to brothers and nephews provided they are on the father's side; for they are related to the deceased in the nearest degree.
In default of these, the law next names sisters by the same father and their issue. If these fail, it gives the right of succession as next-of-kin to the third degree, namely, first cousins on the father's side including their children. If this degree is also lacking, the law goes back and gives the succession to the relatives of the deceased on his mother's side on the same principles as originally regulated the rights of inheritance by the relatives on the father's side.
These are the only rights of next-of-kin which the framer of the law recognizes; the wording which he employs is briefer than my paraphrase, but he shows his intention quite clearly in the text of the law. This child does not possess a single one of these titles as next-of-kin to Hagnias, but is outside all relationship. In order that you may know exactly upon what points you are going to give your verdict, I challenge my opponent to state, without superfluous words, in which of the above-mentioned degrees of relationship this child stands to the former tenant of the estate. If he can be shown to be in any way related, I willingly concede that half the estate is his.
If, on the other hand, he cannot prove the existence of any such relationship, surely he will be clearly convicted of bringing a vexatious suit against me and of trying to deceive you in contravention of the laws. I intend, therefore, to make him stand up before you and to interrogate him, reading out the text of the law. You will thus learn whether, or no, the child has any right to the fortune of Hagnias. (To the Clerk) Please take these laws; and (to his opponent) you, come up here, since you are so clever at misrepresentation and at distorting the laws. Read on.
Laws
Stop. I wish to question you. Is the child a brother of Hagnias, or a nephew, the son of a brother or sister, or a first cousin, or the child of a first cousin on his mother's or his father's side? Which of these titles, which are regarded by the law as constituting kinship, does he possess? And beware of saying that he is my nephew; for it is not a question now of my estate, for I am still alive. If I had died without issue and he were claiming my property, it would be quite fitting that he should give this reply to one who interrogated him. On the present occasion, however, it is the half of Hagnias's estate that you say belongs to the child; you must, therefore, define the degree of relationship which unites him to Hagnias. Tell these gentlemen, therefore, what it is.
You observe that he cannot define the relationship, but gives any sort of answer rather than the information which you require. Yet one who is acting in good faith ought not to be embarrassed, but ought to be able to answer immediately, and not only so but also swear an oath and produce witnesses about the degree of relationship, so that you might have attached greater credence to what he said. As it is, regarding matters about which he has given no answer, produced no witnesses, sworn no oath and quoted no law, he thinks that you, who have sworn to give your verdict according to the laws, ought to believe him and illegally condemn me in this criminal suit. This is the wicked and shameless sort of scoundrel that he is.