Exordia

For while it is pardonable that a man who has not obtained a hearing should feel convinced that he has himself better plans thought out than those approved by you, yet to go on acting shamelessly after you have given a hearing and decided between alternatives, instead of giving in to the judgement of the majority and retiring, would plainly justify suspicion of some other motive by no means honorable. As for me, although I should have thought it proper to remain silent on this occasion had I observed you abiding by your previous decisions—for I am one of those who are convinced that these are to your advantage—yet, now that certain members seem to have changed their minds because of the speeches made by these men, even though you perhaps know that what they say is neither true nor for your good, I will nevertheless make this clear in case you are unaware of it.

It would have been just and proper, men of Athens, for each member then to try to convince you of what he believed to be best when you were considering these matters for the first time, in order that two evils might not be resulting which are above all others damaging to the city—that no decision of yours should be proving final and that you should be convicting yourselves of madness by changing your minds. Since, however, certain men who then kept silence are now finding fault, I wish to address a few words to them.

For I am amazed at the political procedure of these men, or rather I consider it vile. For if, though free to recommend measures when you are considering questions, they choose instead to denounce decisions once made, they play the part of doubledealers,[*](The meaning of sycophant is made clear in Dem. 18.188-189.) not as they claim, of men of goodwill. I should like to ask them—and what I am about to say is not to become the signal for any tirade—just why, since they praise the Spartans in all other respects, they do not imitate the most admirable of all their practices, but rather do the very opposite.