Exordia

If you were of the same mind, men of Athens, when listening to the speeches of those who counsel you and when judging the outcome of measures taken, offering advice would be the safest thing in the world. For if you met with good luck and success—because one must always use words of good omen—the credit for these would be common to yourselves and the sponsor. But, as things are, you most enjoy listening to those who say what you wish to hear, yet often you charge them with deceiving you if everything does not turn out the way you would like,

not taking this into account, that of the task of studying and calculating the best measures, within human limitations, and of explaining them to you, each man is himself the arbiter, but of their execution and profitableness the control, for the most part, lies in the power of Fortune.[*](Demosthenes defends himself by this argument in Dem. 18.192-193: τὸ μὲν γὰρ πέρας, ὡς ἂν ὁ δαίμων βουληθῇ, πάντων γίγνεται· ἡ δὲ προαίρεσις αὐτὴ τὴν τοῦ συμβούλου διάνοιαν δηλοῖ) As a human being it is enough for a man to stand accountable for his own thinking; but to stand accountable also for the play of Fortune is quite impossible.

Certainly, if a way had been discovered whereby a man might address the people with safety to the State and without hazard to himself, it would be madness to ignore it; but since it is a certainty that one who declares an opinion on actions about to be taken will share in the benefits therefrom accruing and participate in the credit for these benefits, I consider it shameful to speak as a loyal citizen, yet not face the test if some danger shall arise therefrom.[*](He refers to the anger of the Assembly.)

So I pray the gods that such measures as are destined to profit both the State and myself may occur to my mind to suggest and to you to adopt. For to seek by any and every means to be on the winning side is either one of two things, I should say, a sign of mental derangement or of one who is bent on selfish gain.