Against Phormio

I for my part am trying to conceive what in the world he would have written in the special plea, if Theodotus had dismissed the suit, when now, after Theodotus has decreed that we should go into court, he declares that the action is not one that can be brought before you, to whom Theodotus bade us go.[*](If, under the present circumstances, Phormio’s insolence is so great, who can say what it would have been, had the arbitrator decided in his favor?) Surely I should suffer most cruel treatment if, when the laws declare that suits growing out of contracts made at Athens shall be brought before the Thesmothetae, you, who have sworn to decide according to the laws, should dismiss the suit.

That we lent the money is attested by the agreement, and by Phormio himself; that it has been repaid is attested by no one except Lampis, who is an accomplice in the crime. Phormio claims to prove the payment on the testimony of Lampis alone, but I adduce Lampis and those who heard him declare that he had not received the money. Further, Phormio is in a position to bring my witnesses to trial, if he maintains that their testimony is false, but I have no means of dealing with his witnesses, who say they know that Lampis testified that he had received the money. If Lampis’s own deposition had been put into court,[*](When the arbitrator determined that the case before him should be tried in court, he sealed in two jars, or boxes (ἐχῖνοι), all documents bearing upon the case. One of these was assigned to either party in the suit, and only such depositions, citations of laws, or challenges, as were contained in them, might be introduced at the trial.) these men would perhaps have said that I ought to prosecute him for giving false testimony; but, as it is, I have not this deposition, and Phormio thinks he should get off unscathed, since he has left no valid security for the verdict which he urges you to pronounce.[*](Phormio relies upon the testimony of Lampis. Under the circumstances it is impossible for me to sue Lampis for perjury, in which case Phormio might be prosecuted for collusion. He therefore hopes to get off scot-free.)

Would it not indeed be absurd if, when Phormio admits that he borrowed, but alleges that he has made payment, you should make of none effect that which he himself admits and by your vote give effect to what is under dispute? And if, when Lampis, on whose testimony my opponent relies, after at first denying that he had received the money, now testifies to the contrary, you should determine that he has received it, although there are no witnesses to support the fact?

And if you refuse to admit as proofs all that he truthfully stated, and should count more worthy of belief the lies which he told after he had been corrupted? Verily, men of Athens, it is far more just to draw conclusions from statements made in the first instance than from those subsequently fabricated; for the former he made truthfully, and not with ulterior purpose, while the later ones are lies designed to further his interests.