De fraterno amore

Plutarch

Plutarch. Moralia, Vol. VI. Helmbold, W.C., translator. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press; London: William Heinemann Ltd., 1939 (printing).

In this essay Plutarch has arranged his material somewhat more methodically than is his usual practice. In chaps. 1-7 he shows that Brotherly Love is in accordance with nature; in 9-19 he tells us how we should conduct ourselves toward a brother: (a) while our parents are alive, (b) when they are dead, (c) when the brother is our inferior, (d) when our superior; and also the reasons for quarrels and the treatment thereof. He closes with some pleasant tales of affection for brothers’ children.

That Plutarch wrote this work after De Adulatore et Amico, De Amicorum Multitudine,[*](This point was subsequently shown, but with much less care and detail, by G. Hein (Quaestiones Plut., diss. Berlin, 1916, p. 37), who seems to have been ignorant of Brokate’s far superior work.) and the Life of Cato Minor was demonstrated by C. Brokate (De aliquot Plui. libellis, diss. Güttingen, 1913, pp. 17-24, 58; and see the excellent tables on pp. 47, 61). Plutarch appears to have retained a certain amount of more or less irrelevant material on friendship from his recent work on these treatises, and also to have drawn upon some portions of Theophrastus’s treatise On Friendship.[*](Cf. Brokate, op. cit., pp. 7 ff.)

The essay is No. 98 in the Lamprias catalogue.

The ancient representations of the Dioscuri are called by the Spartans beam-figures [*](Cf. M. C. Waites, Amer. Jour. Arch., xxiii., 1919, pp. 1 ff.: this passage is cited by Eustathius on Il., 1125. 60.): they consist of two parallel wooden beams joined by two other transverse beams placed across them; and this common and indivisible character of the offering appears entirely suitable to the brotherly love of these gods. In like manner do I also dedicate this treatise On Brotherly Love to you, Nigrinus and Quietus,[*](The identity of Avidius Nigrinus and Avidius Quietus is not certainly established; see Prosopographia Imp. Rom., i. pp. 189-190.) a joint gift for you both who well deserve it. For as to the exhortations this essay contains, since you are already putting them into practice, you will seem to be giving your testimony in their favour rather than to be encouraged to perform them; and the pleasure you will take in acts which are right will make the perseverance of your judgement more firm, inasmuch as your acts will win approval before spectators, so to speak, who are honourable and devoted to virtue.

Now Aristarchus,[*](Nauck, comparing Suidas, s.v. Theodectes, and Stephanus Byzantius, would correct Aristarchus to Aristandrus, the father of the tragic poet Theodectas of Phaselis.) the father of Theodectes, by way of jeering at the crowd of sophists, used to say that in the old days there were barely seven Sophists, [*](That is, the Seven Wise Men. Plutarch so uses σοφιστής (cf. Moralia, 96 a, where all mss. but one read σοφιστοῦ; 857 f); so also Aristotle, Frag. 5 ed. V. Rose. Cf. the earlier usage of Herodotus, i. 29 (where Wells’s note is hopelessly wrong); ii. 49; iv. 95; Hippocrates, De Vet. Med., 20.) but

that in his own day an equally large number of non-sophists could not easily be found. And according to my observation, brotherly love is as rare in our day as brotherly hatred was among the men of old; when instances of such hatred appeared, they were so amazing that the times made them known to all as warning examples in tragedies and other stage-performances; but all men of to-day, when they encounter brothers who are good to each other, wonder at them no less than at those famous sons of Molione,[*](Cf. Moralia, 1083 c; Fraser’s note on Apollodorus, ii. 7. 2 (L.C.L. vol. i. p. 249).) who, according to common belief, were born with their bodies grown together; and to use in common a fathers wealth and friends and slaves is considered as incredible and portentous as for one soul to make use of the hands and feet and eyes of two bodies.

And yet the illustration of such common use by brothers Nature has placed at no great distance from us; on the contrary, in the body itself she has contrived to make most of the necessary parts double and brothers and twins[*](Cf. Hierocles, Frag. De Fraterno Amore (Stobaeus, vol. iv. p. 663 ed. Hense).): hands, feet, eyes, ears, nostrils; and she has thus taught us that she has divided them in this fashion for mutual preservation and assistance, not for variance and strife. And when she separated the very hands into a number of unequal fingers, she supplied men with the most accurate and skilful of instruments, so that Anaxagoras[*](Diels, Frag. d. Vorsokratiker ⁵, ii. p. 30, 102.) of old assigned the reason for man’s wisdom and intelligence to his having hands. The contrary of this, however, seems to be true[*](Cf. Aristotle, De Partibus Animalium, iv. 10 (687 a 17 ff.).): it is not because man acquired hands that he is wisest of animals;

it is because by nature he was endowed with reason and skill that he acquired instruments of a nature adapted to these powers. And this fact is obvious to everyone: Nature from one seed and one source has created two brothers, or three, or more, not for difference and opposition to each other, but that by being separate they might the more readily co-operate with one another. For indeed creatures that had three bodies and an hundred hands, if any such were ever really born, being joined together in all their members, could do nothing independently and apart from one another, as may brothers, who can either remain at home or reside abroad, as well as undertake public office and husbandry through each other’s help if they but preserve that principle of goodwill and concord which Nature has given them. But if they do not, they will differ not at all, I think, from feet which trip up one another and fingers which are unnaturally entwined and twisted by each other.[*](Cf. Xenophon, Memorabilia, ii. 3. 18-19.) But rather, just as in the same body the combination of moist and dry, cold and hot, sharing one nature and diet, by their consent and agreement engender the best and most pleasant temperament and bodily harmony-without which, they say, there is not any joy or profit either in wealth or
  1. In that kingly rule which makes men
  2. Like to gods[*](From Ariphron’s Paean to Health: cf. 450 b, supra. The present passage is paraphrased by Stobaeus, vol. iv. p. 658 ed. Hense.) -
but if overreaching and factious strife be engendered in them, they corrupt and destroy the animal most shamefully; so through the concord of brothers both
family and household are sound and flourish, and friends and intimates, like an harmonious choir, neither do nor say, nor think, anything discordant;
Even the base wins honour in a feud[*](Bergk, Poet. Lyr. Graec., iii. p. 690; Edmonds, Elegy and Iambus, ii. p. 284; quoted also in Life of Alexander, liii. (695 e); Life of Nicias, xi. (530 d); Comparison of Lysander and Sulla, i. (475 f).):
a slandering servant, or a flatterer who slips in from outside, or a malignant citizen. For as diseases in bodies which cannot accept their proper diet engender cravings for many strange and harmful foods, so slander and suspicion entertained against kinsmen ushers in evil and pernicious associations which flow in from outside to fill the vacant room.[*](Cf. 468 c-d, supra.)

It is true that the Arcadian prophet[*](Hegisistratus of Elis in Herodotus, ix. 37. The first sentence of this chapter is paraphrased by Stobaeus, vol. iv. p. 675 ed. Hense.) of necessity manufactured for himself, according to Herodotus, a wooden foot, deprived as he was of his own; but the man who quarrels with his brother, and takes as his comrade a stranger from the market-place or the wrestling-floor, appears to be doing nothing but cutting off voluntarily a limb of his own flesh and blood, and taking to himself and joining to his body an extraneous member. Indeed it is our very need, which welcomes and seeks friendship and comradeship, that teaches us to honour and cherish and keep our kin, since we are unable and unfitted by Nature to live friendless, unsocial, hermits’ lives. Wherefore Menander[*](Kock, Com. Att. Frag., iii. p. 169, Frag. 554 (p. 493 ed. Allinson, L.C.L.); v. 4 is quoted in Moralia, 93 c.) rightly says,

  1. Not from drink or from daily revelling
  2. Do we seek one to whom we may entrust
  3. Our life, father. Do we not think we’ve found
  4. Great good in but the shadow of a friend?
For most friendships are in reality shadows and imitations and images of that first friendship which Nature implanted in children toward parents and in brothers toward brothers; and as for the man who does not reverence or honour this friendship, can he give any pledge of goodwill to strangers? Or what sort of man is he who addresses his comrade as brother in salutations and letters, but does not care even to walk with his own brother when they are going the same way? For as it is the act of a madman to adorn the effigy of a brother and at the same time to beat and mutilate the brother’s body, even so to reverence and honour the name brother in others, but to hate and shun the person himself, is the act of one who is not sane and has never yet got it into his head that Nature is the most holy and great of sacred things.[*](For the hyperbole contrast 491 d, infra.)

I remember, for instance, that in Rome I undertook to arbitrate between two brothers, of whom one had the reputation of being a philosopher. But he was, as it appears, not only as a brother but also as a philosopher, masquerading under a false name and appellation; for when I asked him to conduct himself as brother to brother and as philosopher to layman, What you say, said he, as to his being a layman, is correct, but I account it no momentous or important matter to have sprung from the same loins. As for you, said I, it is obvious that you

consider it no important or momentous matter to have sprung from any loins at all. But certainly all other philosophers, even if they do not think so, at least do affirm with constant iteration that both Nature and the Law, which upholds Nature, have assigned to parents, after gods, first and greatest honour[*](Cf. Commentarii in Hesiodum, 65 (Bernardakis, vol. vii. p. 84), on Works and Days, 707.); and there is nothing which men do that is more acceptable to gods than with goodwill and zeal to repay to those who bore them and brought them up the favours long ago lent to them when they were young. [*](Plato, Laws, 717 c; cf. 496 c, infra.) Nor is there, again, a greater exhibition of an impious nature than neglect of parents or offences against them. Therefore, while we are forbidden to do wrong to all others, yet to our mother and father, if we do not always afford, both in deed and in word, matter for their pleasure, even if offence be not present, men consider it unholy and unlawful. Hence what deed or favour or disposition, which children may show toward their parents, can give more pleasure than steadfast goodwill and friendship toward a brother?

And surely this fact is quite easy to perceive from the contrary. For when we observe that parents are grieved by sons who maltreat a servant honoured by mother and father, and neglect plants or farm-lands in which their parents took delight, and that remissness in caring for some house-dog or horse hurts elderly persons who feel a jealous affection for them; and when, again, we observe that parents are vexed when their children disparage and hiss at concerts and spectacles and athletes all of which they themselves used to admire; when we observe these things, is it reasonable to suppose that parents are indifferent

when sons quarrel, hate and malign each other, and array themselves ever against each other s interests and activities, and are finally ruined by each other? No one can say that the parents are indifferent. Hence when, on the other hand, brothers love and feel affection for each other, and, in so far as Nature has made them separate in their bodies, so far do they become united in their emotions and actions, and share with each other their studies and recreations and games, then they have made their brotherly love a sweet and blessed sustainer of old age [*](Perhaps with a reference to Pindar, Frag. 214L cf. 477 b, supra, and the note.) for their parents. For no father is so fond of oratory or of honour or of riches as he is of his children; therefore fathers do not find such pleasure in seeing their sons gaining a reputation as orators, acquiring wealth, or holding office as in seeing that they love one another. So they report of Apollonis of Cyzicus, mother of King Eumenes[*](Cf. 489 d f., infra; Gnomologicum Vaticanum, 293 (Wiener Stud., x. p. 241).) and three other sons, Attalus and Philetaerus and Athenaeus, that she always congratulated herself and gave thanks to the gods, not because of wealth or empire, but because she saw her three sons members of the body-guard of the eldest, who passed his days without fear surrounded by brothers with swords and spears in their hands. So again, on the contrary, when Artaxerxes[*](Cf. Life of Artaxerxes, xxx. (1027 b).) perceived that his son Ochus had plotted against his brothers, he despaired and died.
For cruel are the wars of brothers,
as Euripides[*](Nauck, Trag. Graec. Frag. ², p. 675, Frag. 975.) says, and they are cruellest of all to
the parents themselves. For he that hates his own brother and is angry with him cannot refrain from blaming the father that begat and the mother that bore such a brother.[*](Perhaps this sentence is paraphrased by Stobaeus, vol. iv. p. 658 ed. Hense.)

So Peisistratus,[*](Cf. Moralia, 189 d; related also of Cato Maior in Plutarch’s Life, xxiv. (351 b).) marrying for a second time when his sons were full grown, said that because he considered them to be honourable and good he wished to become the father of more children like them. Excellent and just sons will not only love each other the more because of their parents, but will also love their parents the more because of each other; so will they always both think and say that, though they owe their parents gratitude for many favours, it is most of all for their brothers that they owe it,[*](Paraphrased by Stobaeus, vol. iv. p. 658 ed. Hense.) since these are truly the most precious and delightful of all the possessions they have received from them. Well indeed has Homer[*](Od., xvi. 117.) also depicted Telemachus as reckoning his brotherless condition a misfortune:

  1. The son of Cronus thus has doomed our race
  2. To have one son alone.
But Hesiod[*](Works and Days, 376; cf. the Commentarii in Hesiodum, 37 (Bernardakis, vol. vii. p. 70).) does not well in advising an only son to inherit his father’s estate - and that too when he was himself a pupil of the Muses,[*](Theogony, 22.) who, in fact, received this name[*](A fanciful derivation: Μοῦσαιfrom ὁμοῦ οὖσαι.) just because they were always together (homou ousas) in concord and sisterly affection.[*](Paraphrased by Stobaeus, vol. iv. p. 659 ed. Hense.)

Now, as regards parents, brotherly love is of such sort that to love ones brother is forthwith a proof of love for both mother and father; and again, as

regards children, for them there is no lesson and example comparable to brotherly love on their father’s part. And, on the other hand, the contrary is a bad example for children who inherit, as from a father’s testament, his hatred of brothers. For a man who has grown old in law-suits and quarrels and contentions with his brothers, and then exhorts his children to concord,
Healer of others, full of sores himself,[*](Nauck, Trag. Graec. Frag. ², p. 703, Euripides, Frag. 1086; quoted also in Moralia, 71 f, 88 d, 1110 e. Cf. Aeschylus, Prometheus, 473; and ἰατρέ, θεράπευσον σεαυτόν.)
weakens the force of his words by his own actions. If, at any rate, Eteocles[*](Euripides, Phoenissae, 504-506.) of Thebes had said with reference to his brother,[*](Polyneices.)
  1. To where the sun and stars rise would I go,
  2. And plunge beneath the earth-if this I could-
  3. To hold Dominion, greatest of the gods,
and then had proceeded to exhort his own children[*](Phoenissae, 536-538, but it is Jocasta who speaks here, exhorting Eteocles to concord: cf. Moralia, 643 f.)
  1. Revere Equality, which ever binds
  2. Friend to friend, state to state, allies unto
  3. Allies: Nature made equal rights secure,
who would not have despised him? And what sort of man would Atreus have been, if, after serving his brother that dinner,[*](Atreus served to his brother Thyestes Thyestes’ own children at a feast of pretended reconciliation.) he had then proceeded to preach to his own children:
And yet the use of friends, fast joined with ties Of blood, alone brings help when troubles flow?[*](Nauck, Trag. Graec. Frag. ², p. 912, ades. 384.)

Therefore it is fitting to cleanse away completely hatred of brothers, which is both an evil sustainer of parents in their old age[*](Cf. 480 c, supra.) and a worse nurturer of children in their youth. And it is also a cause of slander and accusations against such brothers; for their fellow-citizens think that, after having been so closely bound together by their common education, their common life together, and their kinship, brothers could not have become deadly enemies unless each were aware of many wicked deeds committed by the other. There must be, they infer, great reasons for the breaking-up of a great goodwill and affection. For this reason it is not easy to effect a reconciliation of brothers; for just as things which have been joined together, even if the glue becomes loose, may be fastened together again and become united, yet if a body which has grown together is broken or split, it is difficult to find means of welding or joining it; so friendships knitted together through long familiarity, even though the friends part company, can be easily resumed again, but when brothers have once broken the bonds of Nature,[*](Cf. Racine, La Thebaïde: Mais, quand de la nature on a brise les chaines, Cher Attale, il n’est rien qui puisse reunir Ceux que des noeuds si forts n’ont pas sceu retenir. L’on hait avec exces lorsque l’on hait un frere. ) they cannot readily come together, and even if they do, their reconciliation bears with it a filthy hidden sore of suspicion. Or rather, every enmity between man and man which steals into the heart in company with the most painful emotions - contentiousness, anger, envy, remembrance of wrongs - causes pain and perturbation of mind; but when the enmity is toward a brother, with whom it is necessary to share sacrifices and the family’s sacred rites, to occupy the same sepulchre, and in life, perhaps, the same or a neighbouring habitation - such an enmity keeps the painful situation ever before our

eyes, and reminds us every day of the madness and folly which has made the sweetest countenance of the nearest kinsman become most frowning and angry to look upon, and that voice which has been beloved and familiar from boyhood most dreadful to hear. And though they see many other examples of brothers using the same house and table and undistributed estates and slaves, yet they alone maintain different sets of friends and guests, considering as hostile everything dear to their brothers - and that too though all the world may readily reflect that while friends and boon-companions may be taken as booty, and relatives by marriage and familiars may be obtained [*](With reference to Il., ix. 406-409: ληϊστοὶ μὲν γάρ τε βόες καὶ ἴφια μῆλα,κτητοὶ δὲ τρίποδές τε καὶ ἴππων ξανθὰ κάρηνα·ἀνδρὸς δὲ ψυχὴ πάλιν ἐλθέμεν οὔτε λεϊστὴοὔθ᾽ἑλετή, ἐπεὶ ἄρ κεν ἀμείψεται ἔρκος ὀδόντων. ) when the old ones, like arms or implements, have been lost, yet the acquisition of another brother is impossible,[*](Cf. the passage of Sophocles, Antigone, 905 ff., now accepted by most critics as genuine.) as is that of a new hand when one has been removed or that of a new eye when one has been knocked out; rightly, then, did the Persian[*](Herodotus, iii. 119.) woman declare, when she chose to save her brother in place of her children, that she could get other children, but not another brother, since her parents were dead.

What then, someone will say, must one who has a bad brother do? [*](Cf. Hierocles in Stobaeus, vol. iv. p. 661 ed. Hense.) We must remember this first of all: badness can lay hold on every kind of friendship; and, according to Sophocles,[*](Frag. 853 ed. Pearson, 769 ed. Nauck; cf. 463 d, supra.)

Search out most human traits: you’ll find them base.
For it is impossible to discover that our relations with
relatives or comrades or lovers[*](Cf. Moralia, 758 d; Aristotle, Ethica Nicomachea, viii. 12 (1161 b 12 ff.).) are unmixed with baseness, free from passion, or pure from evil. So the Spartan, when he married a little wife, [*](Plutarch might aptly have quoted Aristophanes, Acharnians, 909: μικκός γα μᾶκος οὗτος. - ἀλλ’ ἅπαν κακόν.) said that of evils one should choose the least; but brothers one would prudently advise to put up with the evils with which they are most familiar rather than to make trial of unfamiliar ones; for the former procedure as being necessary brings no reproach, but the latter is blameworthy because voluntary. No boon-companion or comrade-in-arms or guest
Is yoked in honour’s bonds not forged by man,[*](Nauck, Trag. Graec. Frag. ², p. 549, Euripides, Frag. 595, probably from the Peirithoüs; quoted again in Moralia, 96 c, 533 a, 763 f.)
but he is who is of the same blood and upbringing, and born of the same father and mother. For such a kinsman it is altogether fitting to concede and allow some faults, saying to him when he errs,
I cannot leave you in your wretchedness[*](Adapted from Homer, Od., xiii. 331.)
and trouble and folly, lest I might, unwittingly,punish harshly and bitterly, because I hate it, some ailment instilled into you from the seed of father or mother. For, as Theophrastus[*](Frag. 74 (p. 181 ed. Wimmer, 1862); paraphrased by Stobaeus, vol. iv. p. 659 ed. Hense.) said, we must not grow to love those not of our blood and then judge them, but judge them first and love them later; but where Nature does not commit the initiative to judgement in conceiving goodwill toward another nor wait for the proverbial bushel of salt,[*](That is, does not wait many years for the relationship to ripen into affection; cf. Moralia, 94 a, and the references there cited.) but has begotten with the child at its birth the principle of love, in that case
there should be no harsh nor strict censors of his faults. But as it is, what would you say of those who sometimes readily put up with the wrongdoings of strangers and men of no kin to themselves, men picked up at some drinking-bout or play-ground or wrestling-floor,[*](Cf. Moralia, 94 a.) and take pleasure in their company, yet are peevish and inexorable toward their own brothers? Why some even breed and grow fond of savage dogs and horses, and many people do so with lynxes and cats, monkeys and lions, yet cannot endure their brothers’ rages or stupidities or ambitions; still others make over their houses and property to concubines and harlots, yet fight it out in a duel with their brothers over a site for a building or a corner of property; and finally, giving the name of hatred of evil [*](Cf. 456 f and 462 f, supra.) to their hatred of their brothers, they stalk about pompously, accusing and reviling the wickedness in their brothers; yet in others they take no offence at this same quality, but frequently resort to them and are often in their company.

Let this, then, serve as a preamble to my whole discourse. But as the starting-point of my admonitions, let us take, not the division of the father’s goods, as other writers do, but the misguided quarrels and jealousy of the children while the parents are yet alive. The ephors, when Agesilaüs[*](Cf. Life of Agesilaüs, v. (598 b).) used to send an ox as a mark of distinguished service to each member of the gerousia [*](The Spartan Council of Elders.) as he was appointed, fined him, alleging as their reason that by such demagogic means of gaining popular favour he was trying to acquire as his own personal followers men who belonged to the state; but one would advise a son to care for his parents, not with the design of acquiring their goodwill for himself alone or turning it away

from others to himself. It is in this way that many play the demagogue against their brothers, having a specious but unjust pretext for this rapacity; for they deprive them of the greatest and fairest of inheritances, their parents’ goodwill, by servilely and unscrupulously cutting across their brothers’ path, opportunely making their attacks when the parents are occupied and unsuspecting, and, in particular, showing themselves dutiful and obedient and prudent in those matters in which they perceive their brothers to be in error, or seeming to be so. But the right way, on the contrary, when a son sees that his father is angry with his brother, is to take his share of it and bear the brunt of it together with his brother, by such assistance making the anger lighter, and then by rendering services and favours to help somehow or other to restore his brother to his father’s grace. If there is error of omission, he can allege in the brother’s favour the absence of opportunity, or that he was engaged on some other work, or his very nature, as being more useful and more intelligent in other directions. The saying of Agamemnon[*](On behalf of Menelaüs: Il., x. 122-123.) also is admirable:
  1. Not to slackness does he yield or foolishness,
  2. But looks to me,
and to me he has committed this duty. And fathers are very willing to accept even the substitution of other terms[*](That is, terms which excuse the fault; cf. Moralia, 56 c.) and to believe their sons when they call their brothers’ carelessness simplicity, their stupidity straightforwardness, and their contentiousness inability to endure contempt;
the result is that he who aets as mediator succeeds in lessening the anger against his brother, and at the same time he increases his father’s goodwill toward himself.

Only after the erring brother has been defended in this manner should the other turn to him and rebuke him somewhat sharply, pointing out with all frankness his errors of commission and of omission. For one should neither give free rein to brothers, nor, again, should one trample on them when they are at fault (for the latter is the act of one who gloats over the sinner, the former that of one who aids and abets him), but should apply his admonition as one who cares for his brother and grieves with him. Otherwise he who has been the most zealous advocate before his parents becomes before the brother himself the most vehement of accusers. But if a brother is guiltless when he is accused, though it is right to be subservient to parents in everything else and to endure all their wrath and displeasure, yet pleas and justifications offered to parents on behalf of a brother who is being undeservedly criticized or punished are honourable and not reprehensible; nor must one be afraid that the words of Sophocles[*](Antigone, 742.) will be addressed to him:

  1. Most shameless son, who with his father dare
  2. To litigate,
when one is speaking with all frankness on behalf of a brother who seems to be receiving unfair treatment. For to the parents themselves, when they are proved wrong, such a litigation makes defeat sweeter than victory.

After the father is dead, however, even more

than before it is right for the brother to cling fast to his brother’s goodwill, immediately sharing his affection for the dead in tears and grief, rejecting the insinuations of servants and the calumnies of comrades who range themselves on the other side, and believing all the tales about the brotherly love of the Dioscuri and in particular the one which relates that Polydeuces[*](Pherecydes: cf. Jacoby, Frag. d. gr. Historiker, i. p. 101.) killed with a blow of his fist a man who whispered to him something against his brother.[*](Cited by Stobaeus, vol. iv. p. 659 ed. Hense (cf. also p. 675).) And when they seek to divide their father’s goods, they should not first declare war on each other, as the majority do, and then, shouting
Hearken, Alala, daughter of War,[*](Pindar, Frag. 78; cf. Moralia, 349 c, with the note.)
go out to meet each other ready armed, but they must by all means be on their guard against that day of the division, knowing that for some brothers it is the beginning of implacable enmity and strife, but for others the beginning of friendship and concord. Let them preferably assemble alone by themselves; otherwise, let there be present some common friend as a witness equally friendly to both, and then by the lots of Justice, as Plato[*](Critias, 109 b.) says, let them, as they give and take what is suitable to each and preferred by each, be of the opinion that it is the care and administration of the estate that is being distributed, but that its use and ownership is left unassigned and undistributed for them all in common. But those who have outbidden their brothers by their shrewd calculations
and then drag away from each other nurses and slave-boys, who have been brought up with their brothers and are their familiar companions, when they go away have got the better of their brothers by the value of a slave, but have lost the greatest and most valuable part of their inheritance, a brother’s friendship and confidence.

And some we know who, even with no thought of gain, but merely from the love of contention, deal with their father’s goods with no more decency than they would with spoils taken from an enemy. Of this number were Charicles and Antiochus the Opuntians, who would not part until they had split in two a silver cup and torn apart a cloak,[*](Compare the Judgement of Solomon.) as though driven on by some imprecation from a tragedy to

Divide with whetted sword their heritage.[*](Adapted from Euripides, Phoenissae, 68: the curse of Oedipus on his sons, exemplified by the speech of Eteocles cited in 481 a, supra; and cf. Aeschylus, Septem, 789.)
Some even relate to outsiders boastfully how by knavery and craftiness and jugglery of accounts they have got the better of their brothers in the apportionment, when they ought rather to rejoice and to pride themselves on having surpassed their brothers in fairness and generosity and compliance. It is worth our while to illustrate this point by citing the case of Athenodorus, and indeed all my countrymen still speak of him. For he had an elder brother named Xenon, who, as administrator of Athenodorus’s estate, squandered a large part of his substance; at last Xenon raped a woman, was condemned in court, and lost the entire estate, made confiscate to the imperial treasury. But Athenodorus, although he was then still a beardless lad, yet when his portion of the
money was restored to him, he did not neglect his brother, but put down all the money before them both and apportioned it; and even though he was being treated very unfairly in the division, he did not express indignation or change his mind, but calmly and cheerfully endured his brother’s folly, which had become notorious throughout Greece.

When Solon,[*](Cf. Life of Solon, xiv. (85 d).) speaking of principles of government, said that equality does not create sedition, he was thought to be playing up too much to the crowd by introducing an arithmetical proportion, a democratic principle,[*](Cf. Moralia, 719 b, 643 c: that is, arithmetical, instead of what Aristotle terms proportionate equality.) instead of the sound geometrical proportion.[*](Cf., for example, Plato, Gorgias, 508 a.) As for a man who gives advice to brothers in the matter of a family estate after the manner of Plato’s[*](Republic, 462 c; cf. Moralia, 140 d, 767 d, and Aristotle’s attempted refutation, Politics, ii. 1. 8 (1261 b 16).) advice to the citizens of his state, to abolish, if possible, the notion of mine and not mine, but if he cannot do this, to cherish equality and cling to it, and thus lays a fair and abiding[*](Perhaps with a reference to Euripides, Phoenissae, 538 (cited 481 a, supra).) foundation of concord and peace, let him also make use of eminent precedents, such as that reply of Pittacus to the king of Lydia[*](Croesus: cf. Diogenes Laertius, i. 75.) who inquired if Pittacus had money: Twice as much, said he, as I would wish, now that my brother is dead. But since it is not only the getting of money and the losing of it that makes less grow hostile to more, [*](Euripides, Phoenissae, 539: τῷ πλέονι δ᾽αἰεὶ πολέμιον καθίσταται.) but in general, as Plato[*](Republic, 547 a.) says, in inequality movement is produced and in equality rest and repose; thus all

manner of inequality is dangerous as likely to foster brothers’ quarrels, and though it is impossible for them to be equal and on the same footing in all respects (for on the one hand our natures at the very beginning make an unequal apportionment, and then later on our varying fortunes beget envies and jealousies, the most shameful diseases and baneful plagues,[*](Cf., for example, 468 b, supra.) ruinous not only for private houses, but for whole states as well); against these inequalities we must be on our guard and must cure them, if they arise. One would therefore advise a brother, in the first place, to make his brothers partners in those respects in which he is considered to be superior, adorning them with a portion of his repute and adopting them into his friendships, and if he is a cleverer speaker than they, to make his eloquence available for their use as though it were no less theirs than his; in the next place, to make manifest to them neither haughtiness nor disdain, but rather, by deferring to them and conforming his character to theirs, to make his superiority secure from envy and to equalize, so far as this is attainable, the disparity of his fortune by his moderation of spirit. Lucullus,[*](Cf. Life of Lucullus, i. (492 b).) for instance, refused to hold office before his brother, older though he was, but forwent his own proper time for candidature and awaited his brother’s. And Polydeuces[*](Quoted by Stobaeus, vol. iv. p. 659 ed. Hense, joined with the Polydeuces quotation in 483 c, supra.) refused to become even a god by himself, but chose rather to become a demigod with his brother and to share his mortal portion upon the condition of yielding to Castor part of his own immortality.

But you, fortunate man, one might say, are so

situated that, without in the least diminishing your present blessings, you can make another an equal sharer in them and give him a portion of your adornment so that he may enjoy the radiance, as it were, of your reputation or excellence or prosperity. Just so did Plato make his brothers famous by introducing them into the fairest of his writings, Glaucon and Adeimantus into the Republic, Antiphon the youngest into the Parmenides.

And further, just as there exist inequalities in the natures and the fortunes of brothers, so it is impossible that the one brother should excel at all points and in all ways. They say that the elements come into being from one substance, yet possess the most opposite faculties; but of two brothers sprung from one mother and father, no one ever saw the one, like the wise man of the Stoics,[*](Cf. 472 a, supra, and the note; this Stoic paradox is parodied at length by Horace in Satires, i. 3.) at once handsome, gracious, liberal, eminent, rich, eloquent, learned, philanthropic, and the other ugly, graceless, illiberal, dishonoured, needy, a poor speaker, unlearned, misanthropic. Yet somehow or other there inheres, in even the more disreputable and humble creatures, some portion of grace or faculty or natural aptitude for some good thing:

  1. As among urchin’s foot and rough rest-harrow[*](A field shrub with tough roots, also called cammock. )
  2. There grow the blossoms of soft snow-drops.[*](Bergk, Poet. Lyr. Graec., iii. p. 689; Edmonds, Elegy and Iambus, ii. p. 282; quoted also in Moralia, 44 e, 621 e.)
Therefore he who appears to have the better in other respects, if he does not try to curtail or conceal these
points of vantage in his brother or thrust him, as though in athletic competitions, from the first places always, but yields in his turn and reveals that his brother is better and more useful in many respects, by thus continually removing all ground for envy, fuel for fire, as it were, will quench the envy, or rather will not allow it to spring up or begin at all. And he who continually makes his brother a helper and adviser in matters in which he himself is supposed to be superior, as in law-suits, being himself a barrister; in the conduct of office, himself a politician; in practical affairs, himself being fond of such-in brief, he that permits his brother to be left out of no task that is worthy of notice and would bring honour, but makes him a sharer in all honourable enterprises and employs him when present, waits for him when absent, and, in general, by showing that his brother is no less a man of affairs than himself, but merely more inclined to shrink from fame and power-he deprives himself of nothing, but adds a great deal to his brother.

Such is the advice, then, which one would give to the superior brother. The inferior brother, on the other hand, must reflect that his brother is not the only one who is richer or more learned or more famous than himself, but that he is frequently inferior to many others-ten thousand times ten thousand,

As many as enjoy the fruit of spacious earth[*](Simonides, Frag. 5, v. 17; cf. 470 d, supra, and the note.);
whether, then, he envies every man as he walks about, or whether, among the vast number of fortunate beings, the only one that distresses him is his nearest and dearest, he has left no room for any other man
to surpass him in wretchedness. Just as Metellus,[*](Cf. Moralia, 202 a.) therefore, thought that Romans should be grateful to the gods because so great a man as Scipio was not born in any other city, so each one of us should pray that, if possible, he himself may succeed beyond all other men, yet if this cannot be, that his brother may have that superiority and influence so coveted by himself. But some are by nature so unfortunate in matters of right conduct that they exult in famous friends and are proud if they are on terms of hospitality with commanders and men of wealth, but consider that their brothers’ brilliance obscures their own; and that while they are elated by the narration of their fathers’ successes and their great-grandfathers’ high commands,[*](Or perhaps praetorships (so Wyttenbach).) matters from which they received no benefit and in which they had no share, yet they are depressed and dejected when their brothers inherit fortunes, are elected to office, or contract marriages with famous families. And yet they should by all means envy no one; if this is impossible, they should turn their malignancy outwards[*](Cf. Moralia, 91 f f.) and drain it off on those not of their blood, just as men do who divert sedition from the city by means of foreign wars:
  1. Many Trojans have I and famous allies,
  2. And many Achaeans have you[*](Homer, Il., vi. 227, 229: Plutarch points the quotation with envy and so does not retain the Homeric context, in which Diomedes indicates the other Greeks for Glaucus, and the other Trojans for himself, to kill. ) -
by nature suitable objects for envy and jealousy.

But a brother should not, like the pan of a balance, incline the opposite way and be himself lowered when his brother is raised on high; but just

as lesser numbers multiply greater and are multiplied by them, so should he give increase to his brother and at the same time be increased along with him by their common blessings. For it is not true of the fingers, either, that the one which writes and plays musical instruments is superior to the one which cannot, by either nature or attainment, do so, but in some manner or other they all contrive to move together and assist each other, having been made unequal, as though of set purpose, and all deriving their power to grasp from the position of the others opposite the thumb, the largest and strongest of them.

In this spirit Craterus,[*](Half-brother of Antigonus Gonatas (see F. Jacoby and Schoch, Pauly-Wissowa, RE, xi. col. 1617, 1621).) the brother of King Antigonus, and Perlatis, the brother of Cassander, assigned themselves to the management of their brothers’ military and domestic affairs; but men like Antiochus and Seleucus, and again Grypus and Cyzicenus,[*](Antiochus, VIII and IX respectively.) who had not learned to play parts secondary to their brothers, but yearned for the purple and the crown, infected themselves and each other with many horrors, and infected all Asia also.

But since envy and jealousy of those who surpass them in repute and honour are implanted by nature chiefly in men of ambitious character, to guard against these vices it is highly expedient that brothers should not seek to acquire honours or power in the same field, but in quite different fields. Wild beasts, to be sure, which depend for their food upon the same things, war against each other, and athletes who direct their efforts toward one and the same contest are rivals; whereas boxers are friendly to pancratiasts and long-distance runners are well disposed toward wrestlers, and they mutually assist and

cheer for each other. This, in fact, is the reason why, of the two sons of Tyndareüs, Polydeuces won his victories in boxing and Castor in running. And Homer did well to represent Teucer as renowned in archery, while his brother was foremost among the heavy-armed:
And he covered Teucer with gleaming shield.[*](Ajax and Teucer: Il., viii. 272.)
So, of those engaged in the service of the state, generals do not at all envy popular leaders; nor, among those occupied with the art of speaking, do barristers envy teachers of rhetoric; nor, among physicians, do dieticians envy surgeons; but they even call each other into consultation and commend one another. For brothers to seek eminence and repute from the same art or faculty is precisely the same as for both to fall in love with one woman and each seek to outstrip the other in her esteem. Those, indeed, who travel different roads afford each other no help, but those who follow different modes of life both strive to avoid envy and are of greater service to each other, as were Demosthenes and Chares,[*](Cf. Comp. of Demosthenes and Cicero, iii. (887 c); Life of Phocion, vii. (744 f).) and again Aeschines and Eubulus, Hypereides and Leosthenes, of whom the former in each pair harangued the people and drew up laws, the latter commanded armies and translated words into action. Therefore those who cannot, by their very nature, share without envy their brothers’ reputation and influence, should divert as far as possible from those of their brothers their own desires and
ambitions, so that by their successes they may give pleasure to each other instead of pain.[*](With the substance of chapters 13-15 Cicero’s remarks on inequality in friendship (Laelius, 19-20, 69-73) may be compared.)

But, over and above these considerations, we should be on our guard against the pernicious talk of relatives, of members of our household, and sometimes even of a wife who joins the rest in challenging our ambition by saying: Your brother carries all before him and is admired and courted, but you are not visited by anybody and enjoy no distinction at all. Not so, a sensible man would reply. I have a brother who is highly esteemed, and most of his influence is mine to share. Socrates, for instance, remarked that he would rather have Darius than a daric as a friend, and for a brother who has good sense it is no less an advantage than the possession of wealth, high office, or eloquence, to have a brother who has attained to fame by virtue of office or wealth or eloquence.

But although these means are the best for smoothing away such inequalities, yet there are the other differences which naturally arise among brothers who lack the proper training, differences due to disparity in their ages. For, generally speaking, elder brothers, when they claim the right always to dominate and to have precedence over the younger and to have the advantage in every matter where reputation and influence are involved, are oppressive and disagreeable; and younger brothers, in turn, being restive under the curb and becoming fractious, make it their practice to despise and belittle the elder. The result is that while the younger, feeling that they are being treated despitefully and are discriminated against, resent and try to avoid their elders’ admonitions, the elder, ever clinging fast to their superiority, fear their brothers’

augmentation as though it meant elimination for themselves. Just as, then, we think it right that those who receive a favour should look upon it as of greater, and those who bestow it as of lesser value, so, in regard to a difference in ages, if we advise the elder to regard it as no great matter and the younger to think it no slight thing, we should rid the one of arrogance and neglect, and the other of disdain and contempt. And since it is fitting that the older should be solicitous about the younger and should lead and admonish him, and that the younger should honour and emulate and follow the older, let the solicitude of the former be rather that of a comrade than of a father, and of one who would persuade rather than command, and would rejoice in a brother’s successes and applaud them rather than criticize him if he errs and restrain him-a spirit showing not only a greater desire to help, but also more kindness of heart. And in the emulation of the younger let imitation, not rivalry, be present; for imitation is the act of one who admires, but rivalry of one who envies. It is for this reason that men love those who wish to become like themselves, but repress and crush those who wish to become their equals. And among the many honours which it is fitting that the young render to their elders, obedience is most highly esteemed, and, together with respectfulness, brings about a staunch goodwill and favour which will in turn lead to concessions. Thus it was with Cato[*](Cf. Life of Cato Minor, iii. (761 b-c). Q. Servillus Caepio was Cato’s half-brother.): he so won over his elder brother Caepio by obedience and gentleness and silence from his earliest childhood that finally, by the time they both were men, he had so subdued him and filled him with so great a respect for himself that Caepio would neither
do nor say anything without Cato’s knowledge. For example, it is said that on one occasion, when Caepio had affixed his seal to a deposition and Cato carne up later and was unwilling to add his own seal, Caepio demanded that the document be returned and removed his seal before asking the reason why his brother had suspected the deposition instead of believing it to be true. In the case of Epicurus[*](Cf. Moralia, 1100 a; Epicurus, Frag. 178 (Usener, Epicurea, p. 155).) also his brothers’ respect for him was clearly great because of the goodwill and solicitude he had for them, inspired as they were with admiration both for his other attainments and especially for his philosophy. For even if they were mistaken in their opinion, yet since they were convinced and constantly declared from their earliest childhood that there was no one wiser than Epicurus, we may well admire both the man who inspired this devotion and also those who felt it. However, of the more recent philosophers, Apollonius the Peripatetic, by making Sotion, his younger brother, more famous than himself, refuted the man who asserted that fame could not be shared with another. And for myself, though I have received from Fortune many favours which call for gratitude, that my brother Timon’s[*](Timon appears in the Quaest. Symp., i. 2 and ii. 5.) affection for me has always transcended and still transcends all the rest, no one is unaware who has ever had any dealings whatever with me, and least of all you,[*](Nigrinus and Quietus; cf. 478 b, supra.) my familiar friends.

Furthermore, there are other disturbances which brothers of nearly the same age must guard against; they are but small, to be sure, yet continuous and frequent, and create a vicious practice of offending and exasperating one another on all occasions,

which at last ends in incurable hatred and malevolence. For having once begun to differ in childish matters, about the care of animals and their fights, as, for instance, those of quails or cocks, they then continue to differ about the contests of boys in the palaestra, of dogs on the hunt, and of horses at the races, until they are no longer able to control or subdue their contentious and ambitious spirit in more important matters. So the most powerful of the Greeks in my time, disagreeing first about rival dancers, then about harp-players, and afterwards by continually holding up to invidious comparison the swimming-baths and porticoes and banquet-halls at Aedepsus,[*](Medicinal hot baths in Euboea; Cf. Moralia, 667 c-d.) and then manoeuvring for places and positions, and going on to cut off aqueducts and divert their waters, they became so savage and reckless that they were deprived of everything by the despot,[*](Probably Domitian, as Reiske conjectured.) and, becoming exiles and paupers and-I had almost said-something other than their former selves, they remained the same only in their hatred for one another. It is therefore of no slight importance to resist the spirit of contentiousness and jealousy among brothers when it first creeps in over trivial matters, practising the art of making mutual concessions, of learning to take defeat, and of taking pleasure in indulging brothers rather than in winning victories over them. For the men of old gave the name of Cadmean[*](Cf. Moralia, 10 a, and the note; the expedition of the Seven against Thebes, in which the two sons of Oedipus, Eteocles and Polyneices, died fighting against each other in single combat.) victory to no other than that of the brothers at Thebes, as being the most shameful and the worst of victories.

What then? Do not practical affairs bring many

occasions for controversy and dissension even to those who have the reputation of being of an equitable and gentle disposition? Yes, certainly. But there also we must see to it that the affairs fight the battle quite by themselves, without our inserting into the contest, like a hook, as it were, any emotion arising from contentiousness or anger; but, keeping our eyes fixed impartially upon the swaying of Justice, as though we were watching a pair of balances, we should with all speed turn over the matter in dispute to the decision of a jury or of arbitrators, and cleanse its filth away before, like a dye or stain, it sinks into the fabric and its colours become fast and hard to wash out. We should next pattern ourselves after the Pythagoreans, who, though related not at all by birth, yet sharing a common discipline,[*](No doubt the Ἀκροάματα of the Master: see Iamblichus, Vita Pythagorica, 82 ff. (Notopoulos).) if ever they were led by anger into recrimination, never let the sun go down[*](Cf. Ephesians, iv. 26-27: Let not the sun go down upon your wrath; neither give place to the devil.) before they joined right hands, embraced each other, and were reconciled. For just as it is nothing alarming if a fever attends a swelling in the groin, but if the fever persists when the swelling is gone, it is thought to be a malady and to have a deeper origin: so when the dissension of brothers ceases after the matter in dispute is settled, the dissension was caused by the matter; but if it remains, the matter was but a pretext and contained some malignant and festering reason.

It is worth our while to inquire into a dispute of brothers who were not Greeks, which arose, not about a little patch of land, nor over slaves or flocks, but about the empire of Persia. For when Darius died, some thought it right that Ariamenes should be king, being the eldest of his children; but others chose

Xerxes,[*](Cf. Moralia, 173 b-c; Justin, ii. 10; the account in Herodotus, vii. 2-3, has scarcely anything in common with this story.) as being the child of Atossa, the daughter of Cyrus, and born to Darius after he had come to the throne. Now Ariamenes carne down from the country of the Medes in no hostile manner, but quietly, as though to a court of justice; and Xerxes was present and performing the functions of a king. But when his brother came, putting aside the diadem and pressing down the crest of his tiara, which reigning kings wear erect,[*](Cf. Moralia, 340 c.) he went to meet Ariamenes and embraced him, and, sending gifts, he bade the bearers say, With these your brother Xerxes honours you now; but if he shall be proclaimed king by judgement and vote of the Persians, he grants to you the right of being second after himself. And Ariamenes said, I accept the gifts, yet I believe the kingdom of the Persians to be mine by right. But I shall guard for my brothers their honour after my own, and for Xerxes as the first of my brothers. And when the day of judgement came, the Persians appointed as judge Artabanus, the brother of Darius; but Xerxes sought to evade their decision that the judgement should be made by Artabanus, since he put his faith in the people. But Atossa, his mother, chided him: Why, my son, do you try to evade Artabanus, who is your uncle and the best of the Persians? Why do you so fear this contest in which even the second place is honourable-to be adjudged brother to the king of Persia? Xerxes was therefore persuaded and when the pleas were made, Artabanus declared that the kingdom belonged by right to Xerxes; and Ariamenes at once leapt up and did obeisance to his
brother and taking him by the hand set him upon the kingly throne. From that time forth Ariamenes was highest in honour with Xerxes and showed himself of such loyalty toward the king that he fell in the seafight at Salamis performing deeds of valour for his brother’s glory.[*](Cf. Life of Themistocles, xiv. (119 d-e).) Let this, then, be set forth as a pure and blameless model of goodwill and highmindedness.

But Antiochus[*](Cf. Moralia, 184 a.) might be condemned because of his lust for dominion, yet admired because his love for his brother was not altogether extinguished thereby For he went to war against Seleucus[*](Cf. 508 d, infra.) for the kingdom, though he was the younger brother and had the aid of his mother. But when the war was at its height, Seleucus joined battle with the Galatians and was defeated; he disappeared and was thought to be dead, since practically all his army had been cut to pieces by the barbarians. So when Antiochus learned this, he laid aside his purple and put on a dark robe, and, shutting the gates of the palace, went into mourning for his brother. But a little later, when he heard that his brother was safe and was again collecting another army, he came forth and sacrificed to the gods, and made proclamation to the cities over which he ruled that they should sacrifice and wear garlands of rejoicing.

The Athenians,[*](Cf. Moralia, 740 f - 741 b (Quaest. Symp., ix. 6, which is unfortunately fragmentary); Frazer’s note on Apollodorus, iii. 14. 1 (L.C.L., vol. ii. pp. 78 f.).) though they absurdly invented the tale of the strife of the gods, yet inserted in it no slight correction of its absurdity, for they always omit[*](That is, in Meton’s scheme the day regularly became an ἡμέρα ἐξαιρέσιμος to make the lunar year agree with the solar.) the second day of Boedromion, thinking that on that day occurred Poseidon’s quarrel with Athena.

What, then, prevents us also from treating the day on which we have quarrelled with any of our family or relatives as one to be consigned to oblivion, and counting it one of the unlucky days, instead of forgetting because of one day the many good days in which we grew up and lived together? For either it is in vain and to no avail that Nature has given us gentleness and forbearance, the child of restraint, or we should make the utmost use of these virtues in our relations with our family and relatives. And our asking and receiving forgiveness for our own errors reveals goodwill and affection quite as much as granting it to others when they err. For this reason we should neither overlook the anger of others, nor be stubborn with them when they ask forgiveness, but, on the contrary, should try to forestall their anger, when we ourselves are time and again at fault, by begging forgiveness, and again, when we have been wronged, in our turn should forestall their request for forgiveness by granting it before being asked.

Eucleides,[*](Cf. 462 c, supra; paraphrased by Stobaeus, vol. iv. p. 659 ed. Hense; Hierocles, apud Stob., vol. iv. p. 662. See also Sternbach on Gnomologicum Vaticanum, 278 (Wiener Stud., x. p. 237).) the Socratic, is famous in the schools because, when he heard an inconsiderate and brutal speech from his brother who said, May I be damned if I don’t get even with you, he replied, And so will I, if I don’t persuade you to stop your anger and love me as you used to do.

But in the case of King Eumenes[*](Eumenes II of Pergamum; and cf. Moralia, 184 b, 480 c, supra.) it was not a mere word, but a deed, which revealed a gentleness that no one could surpass. For Perseus, the king of Macedonia, who was his enemy, procured men to kill him. These men set an ambush near Delphi, observing that he was coming on foot from the sea to the

temple of the god. They carne behind him and hurled great stones down upon his head and neck; these made him dizzy and he fell down and was thought to be dead. A report of his death spread far and wide, and some of his friends and servants Carne back to Pergamum, and were thought to bring their report as actual eye-witnesses of the calamity. Attalus, therefore, the eldest of the king’s brothers, an honourable man and more loyal to Eumenes than any of the others,[*](The other brothers are mentioned by name in 480 c, supra.) not only took the crown and was proclaimed king, but also married his brother’s wife, Strato nice, and had intercourse with her. But when the news carne that Eumenes was alive, and he himself was approaching, Attalus laid aside the crown, took his spears, as had been his custom before, and went with the other guardsmen to meet the king. And Eumenes not only cordially clasped his hand, but also embraced the queen, showing her honour and friendliness; and living a considerable time after his return, without giving a hint of blame or suspicion, he died, leaving to Attalus both his kingdom and his wife. And what did Attalus? When Eumenes was dead, he was unwilling to acknowledge as his own[*](By the ceremony in which the father raises the child in his arms to acknowledge its legitimacy. Probably Attalus did not actually disown his children, but merely made it clear that he did not regard them as heirs to the throne.) any of the children his wife had borne him, though they were many, but brought up and educated his brother’s son[*](Stratonice had been childless for over sixteen years; she now became pregnant and, in due course, bore a son, whom Eumenes, according to Polybius, xxx. 2, had not acknowledge at least five years later; but subsequently he succeeded his legal uncle, Attalus II, as Attalus III. See W. S. Ferguson, Class. Phil., i. 233 ff. Cf. also Livy, xlii. 15 and Pauly-Wissowa, RE, xi., col. 1099.) and in his own life-time placed the crown upon his head and saluted him as king.

But Cambyses,[*](Cf. Herodotus, iii. 30.) frightened by a dream into the

belief that his brother would be king of Asia, killed him without waiting for any evidence or proof. For this reason, when Cambyses died, the throne passed from the line of Cyrus and the kingship was gained by the family of Darius, a man who knew how to give, not only to brothers, but also to friends, participation in affairs of state and in power.

Then this further matter must be borne in mind and guarded against when differences arise among brothers: we must be careful especially at such times to associate familiarly with our brothers’ friends, but avoid and shun all intimacy with their enemies, imitating in this point, at least., the practice of Cretans, who, though they often quarrelled with and warred against each other, made up their differences and united when outside enemies attacked; and this it was which they called syncretism. [*](Cf. the Etymologicum Magnum, s.v. συγκρητίσαι.) For some there are, fluid as water, who, seeping through those who relax their hold and disagree, overturn affinities and friendships, hating indeed both sides, but attacking the one which yields more readily because of its weakness. For while it is true that when a man is in love his young and guileless friends share his love, it is also true that the most ill-disposed of enemies make a show of sharing the indignation and wrath of one who is angered and at variance with his brother. As, then, Aesop’s[*](Fabulae, 16 and 16 b ed. Halm.) hen said to the cat who inquired, with pretended solicitude, of the sick bird How are you? Very well, if you keep away; so one would say to the sort of person who brings up the subject of the quarrel and makes inquiries and tries to dig up some secrets, But I shall

have no trouble with my brother if neither I nor he pay attention to slanderers. But as it is - I do not know the reason - although when we suffer from sore eyes, we think it proper to turn our gaze to colours and objects which do not beat against or offend the sight,[*](Cf. 469 a, supra, and the note.) yet when we are in the midst of fault-finding and bursts of anger and suspicion toward our brothers, we enjoy the company of those who cause the disturbance and we take on from them a false colouring, when it would be wise to run away from our enemies and ill-wishers and avoid their notice, and to associate and spend our days almost entirely with relatives and intimates and friends of our brothers, visiting their wives also and frankly telling them our reasons for complaint.[*](Cf. 491 d, infra.) And yet there is a saying that brothers walking together should not let a stone come between them, and some people are troubled if a dog runs between brothers, and are afraid of many such signs, not one of which ever ruptured the concord of brothers; yet they do not perceive what they are doing when they allow snarling and slanderous men to come between them and cause them to stumble.