De E apud Delphos

Plutarch, in this essay on the E at Delphi, tells us that beside the well-known inscriptions at Delphi there was also a representation of the letter E, the fifth letter of the Greek alphabet. The Greek name for this letter was EI, and this diphthong, in addition to being used in Plutarch’s time as the name of E (which denotes the number five), is the Greek word for if, and also the word for the second person singular of the verb to be (thou art).

In searching for an explanation of the unexplainable it is only natural that the three meanings of EI (five, if, thou art) should be examined to see if any hypothesis based on any one of them might possibly yield a rational explanation; and these hypotheses constitute the skeleton about which is built the body of Plutarch’s essay. From it we gain some interesting delineations of character and an engaging portrayal of the way in which a philosopher acts, or reacts, when forced unwillingly to face the unknowable.

Plutarch puts forward seven possible explanations of the letter:

(1) It was dedicated by the Wise Men, as a protest against interlopers, to show that their number was actually five and not seven (EI = E, five).

(2) EI is the second vowel, the Sun is the second planet, and Apollo is identified with the sun (EI = E, the vowel).

(3) EI means if: people ask the oracle IF they shall succeed, or IF they shall do this or that (EI=if).

(4) EI is used in wishes or prayers to the god, often in the combination εἴθε or εἰ γάρ (EI = if or if only).

(5) EI, if, is an indispensable word in logic for the construction of a syllogism (EI = if).

(6) Five is a most important number in mathematics, physiology, philosophy, and music (EI = E, five).

(7) EI means thou art and is the address of the consultant to Apollo, to indicate that the god has eternal being (EI = thou art).[*](This explanation is accepted by Poulsen (Delphi, p. 149), but is open to very serious objections.)

Attempts to explain the letter have been also made in modern times by Göttling, Berickte der Sacks. Gesell. der Wiss. I. (1846-47) pp. 311 if., and by Schultz in Philologus (1866), pp. 214 if. Roscher, in Philologus (1900), pp. 21 if.; (1901), pp. 81 if.; (1902), pp. 513 if.; Hermes (1901), pp. 470 ff. (comment also by C. Robert in the same volume, p. 490), and the Philologische Wochenschrift (1922), col. 1211, maintains that EI is an imperative from εἶμι, go, addressed to the person who carne to consult the oracle, and that it means go on, continue into the temple. The value of this explanation is somewhat doubtful, since EI in this word (εἶμι) is a true diphthong, and so is not generally spelled with simple E except in the Corinthian alphabet. Although

O. Lagercrantz, in Hermes, xxxvi. (1901) pp. 411 if., interprets the E as meaning ἦ he said. To this, of course, Roscher objects and suggests that Lagercrantz might have thought also of ἦ verily. Thus all the various possibilities of interpretation have in turn been suggested, and rejected by others.

W. N. Bates, in the American Journal of Archaeology, xxix. (1925) pp. 239-246, tries to show that the E had its origin in a Minoan character E associated with (\e (as is shown by the evidence of a Cretan gem in the Metropolitan Museum of New York) and later transferred to Delphi. Since the character was not understood, it, like other things at Delphi, came to be associated with Apollo. This character has been found on the old omphalos discovered in 1913 at Delphi in the temple of Apollo.[*](It might also be recorded that J. E. Harrison, in Comptes Rendus du Congres International d’Archeologie (Athens, 1905), thinks that the E was originally three betyl stones or pillars placed on a basis and representing the three Charites! Moreover, C. Fries, in Rheinisches Museum für Philologie, lxxix. (1930) 343-344, offers as nodi explicatio the fact that in Sumerian inscriptions E means house or temple, and so may be connected with Babylonian ritual (note the Chaldean in chap. iv.)!)

Interesting are the two coins reproduced in Imhoof-Blumer and P. Gardner, A Numismatic Commentary on Pausanias, plate x. nos. xxii. and xxiii. (text, p. 119), which show the E suspended between the middle columns of the temple. Learned scholars should note that the letter represented is E, not EI: therefore

The title of the essay is included in the catalogue of Lamprias, where it appears as No. 117. It is not infrequently quoted or referred to by later writers. It has been separately edited by Bernardakis in the volume of essays in honour of Ernst Curtius, Leipzig, 1894. Of interest is also The Delphic Maxims in Literature, by Eliza Gregory Wilkins, Chicago, 1929.

Not long ago, my dear Sarapion,[*](A poet living at Athens in Plutarch’s day; see Moralia, 396 d ff. and 628 a.) I carne upon some lines, not badly done, which Dicaearchus thinks Euripides[*](Nauck, Trag. Graec. Frag., Euripides, no. 969.) addressed to Archelaüs:

1. I will not give poor gifts to one so rich,
2. Lest you should take me for a fool, or I
3. Should seem by giving to invite a gift.

It seems that our beloved Apollo finds a remedy and a solution for the problems connected with our life by the oracular responses which he gives to those who consult him; but the problems connected with our power to reason it seems that he himself launches and propounds to him who is by nature inclined to the love of knowledge, thus creating in the soul a craving[*](Cf.Moralia, 673 b.) that leads onward to the truth, as is clear in many other ways, but particularly in the dedication of the E.[*](Cf. 426 e, infra.) For the likelihood is that it was not by chance nor, as it were, by lot that this was the only letter that carne to occupy first place with the god and attained the rank of a sacred offering and something worth seeing; but it is likely that those who, in the beginning, sought after knowledge of the god either discovered some peculiar and unusual potency in it or else used it as a token with reference to some other of the matters of the highest concern, and thus adopted it.

On many other occasions when the subject had been brought up in the school I had quietly turned aside from it and passed it over, but recently I was unexpectedly discovered by my sons in an animated discussion with some strangers, whom, since they purposed to leave Delphi immediately, it was not seemly to try to divert from the subject, nor was it seemly for me to ask to be excused from the discussion, for they were altogether eager to hear something about it. I found them seats, therefore, near the temple, and I began to seek some answer myself and to put questions to them; influenced as I was by the place and the conversation itself, I remembered

That the god is no less a philosopher than a prophet Ammonius seemed to all to postulate and prove correctly, with reference to this or to that one of his several titles[*](Cf. 393 b, infra; Cornutus, chap. xxxii.; von Arnim, Stoicorum Veterum Fragmenta, i. 543 (p. 123); and Apollo in the Index thereto.); that he is the Pythian (Inquirer) for those that are beginning to learn and inquire; the Delian (Clear) and the Phanaean (Disclosing) for those to whom some part of the truth is becoming clear and is being disclosed; the Ismenian[*](Plutarch’s attempt to connect Ismenian with ἰδ-- (οἶδα) can hardly be right.) (Knowing) for those who have knowledge; and the Leschenorian (Conversationalist) when people have active enjoyment of conversation and philosophic intercourse with one another. Since, he wrent on to say, inquiry is the beginning of philosophy, and wonder and uncertainty the beginning of inquiry,[*](Cf. Plato, Theaetetus, 155 d.) it seems only natural that the greater part of what concerns the god should be concealed in riddles, and should call for some account of the wherefore and an explanation of its cause. For example, in the case of the undying fire, that pine is the only wood burned here, while laurel is used for offering incense; that two Fates have statues here,[*](Cf. Pausanias, x. 24. 4.) whereas three is everywhere the customary number; that no woman[*](Cf. Euripides, Ion, 222.) is allowed to approach the prophetic shrine; the matter of the tripod; and the other questions of this nature, when they are suggested to persons who are not altogether without mind and reason, act as a Iure and an invitation to investigate, to read, and to

When Ammonius had said this, Lamprias, my brother, said, As a matter of fact, the account that we have heard is simple and quite brief. For they say that those wise men who by some are called the Sophists were actually five in number: Chilon, Thales, Solon, Bias, and Pittacus. But when Cleobulus, the despot of the Lindians, and later Periander of Corinth, who had no part or portion in virtue or wisdom, but forcibly acquired their repute through power and friends and favours, invaded this name of the Wise Men, and sent out and circulated throughout Greece certain sentiments and sayings very similar to those famous utterances of the Wise Men, these, naturally, did not like this at all, but were loath to expose the imposture or to arouse open hatred over a question of repute, or to carry through a contest against such powerful men; they met here by themselves and, after conferring together, dedicated that one of the letters which is fifth in alphabetical order and which stands for the number five, thus testifying for themselves before the god that they were five, and renouncing and rejecting the seventh and the sixth as having no connexion with themselves. That this account is not beside the mark anyone may realize who has heard those connected with the shrine

Ammonius smiled quietly, suspecting privately that Lamprias had been indulging in a mere opinion of his own and was fabricating history and tradition regarding a matter in which he could not be held to account. Someone else among those present said that all this was similar to the nonsense which the Chaldean visitor had uttered a short time before: that there are seven vowels in the alphabet and seven stars that have an independent and unconstrained motion; that E is the second in order of the vowels from the beginning, and the sun the second planet after the moon, and that practically all the Greeks identify Apollo with the Sun.[*](Cf.Moralia, 1130 a or 381 f, supra, or 393 c, infra.) But all this, said he, has its source in slate and prate[*](An expression as obscure in the Greek as in the English. It means, apparently, idle talk. Cf. S. A. Naber, Mnemosyne, xxviii. (1900) p. 134.) and in nothing else.

Apparently Lamprias had unwittingly stirred up the persons connected with the temple against his remarks. For what he had said no one of the Delphians knew anything about; but they were used to bring forward the commonly accepted opinion which the guides give, holding it to be right that neither the appearance nor the sound of the letter has any cryptic meaning, but only its name.

For it is, as the Delphians assume, - and on this occasion Nicander, the priest, spoke for them and said, the figure and form of the consultation of the god, and it holds the

If to me it might be granted Neobulê’s hand to touch.

Surely in want of children as well.

Since I surely shall break your might

When Nicander had expounded all this, my friend Theon, whom I presume you know, asked

The god, moreover, is a prophet, and the prophetic art concerns the future that is to result from things present and past. For there is nothing of which either the origin is without cause or the foreknowledge thereof without reason; but since all present events follow in close conjunction with past events, and all future events follow in close conjunction with present events, in accordance with a regular procedure which brings them to fulfilment from beginning to end, he who understands, in consonance with Nature, how to fathom the connexions and interrelations of the causes one with another knows and can declare

What now is, and in future shall be, and has been of aforetime.[*](Homer, Il. i. 70.)

Heracles, before he had released Prometheus or had conversed with the sophists that were associated with Cheiron and Atlas, when he was young and a thorough Boeotian,[*](The Greek equivalent of Philistine. ) would do away with logical reasoning;. he ridiculed the if the first, then the second, and resolved to carry off the tripod by force[*](Cf.Moralia, 413 a, 557 c, 560 d; Pausanias, x. 13. 4; Apollodorus, Bibliotheca, ii. 6. 2 (with Frazer’s note in L.C.L. edition); Roscher, Lexikon der gr. und röm. Mythologie, i. p. 2213; Baumeister, Denkmäler des klassischen Altertums, i. p. 463 ff. The attempt of Heracles to carry off the tripod is represented on the treasury of the Siphnians in the Museum at Delphi.) and fight it out with the god over his art; since, at any rate, as he advanced in years, he also appears to have become most skilled in prophecy and in logic.

When Theon ceased, Eustrophus the Athenian, I think it was, said to us in answer, Do you see how zealously Theon defends logic, all but arraying himself in the lion’s skin? Under such conditions, we who repose in the Theory of Numbers all affairs together, natures and principles of things divine and human alike, and make this theory far above all else our guide and authority in all that is beautiful and valuable, should not be likely to hold our peace, but to offer to the god the first-fruits of our beloved mathematics, believing, as we do, that, taken by itself, E is not unlike the other letters either in power or in form or as a spoken word, but that it has come to be held in honour as the symbol of a great and sovereign number, the pempad, from which the wise

These words Eustrophus addressed to us not in jest, but for the reason that at this time I was devoting myself to mathematics with the greatest enthusiasm, although I was destined soon to pay all honour to the maxim Avoid extremes, when I had once become a member of the Academy.[*](Cf. 431 a, infra.)

I said, therefore, that Eustrophus solved the difficulty most excellently with his number. For since, I continued, every number may be classified as even or odd, and unity, by virtue of its potentiality, is common to both, for the reason that its addition makes the odd number even and the even number odd,[*](Cf. 429 a, infra.) and since twTo makes the first of the even numbers and three the first of the odd, and five is produced by the union of these numbers, very naturally five has come to be honoured as being the first number created out of the first numbers; and it has received the name of marriage[*](Cf.Moralia, 263 f, 1012 e, 1018 c, and Clement of Alexandria, Stromateis, v. chap. xiv. 93. 4 (p. 702 Potter).) because of the resemblance of the even number to the female and of the odd number to the male.[*](Cf.Moralia, 288 c-e.) For in the division of numbers into two equal factors, the even number separates completely and leaves a certain receptive opening and, as it were, a space within itself; but in the odd, when it undergoes this process, there is always left over from the division a generative middle part. Wherefore it is more generative than the other, and in combination it is always dominant and is never dominated.[*](Cf. Plutarch, Life and Poetry of Homer, 145 (Bernardakis, vol. vii. p. 416).) For in no combination of these two numbers (even and odd) is there produced from the two an even number,

There is also a sense in which it has been called Nature, since by being multiplied into itself it ends in itself again. For even as Nature receives wheat in the form of seed and puts it to its use, and creates in the interim many shapes and forms through which she carries out the process of growth to its end, but, to crown all, displays wheat again, and thus presents as her result the beginning at the end of the whole, so in like manner, while the other numbers when raised to a power end in different numbers as the result of the increase, only the numbers five and six, when multiplied by themselves, repeat themselves and preserve their identity. Thus six times six is thirty-six, and five times five is twenty-five; and furthermore, the number six does this but once, and the single instance is when it is squared; but with five this result is obtained in raising it to any power, and it has a unique characteristic, when added to

If, then, anyone ask, What has this to do with Apollo?, we shall say that it concerns not only him, but also Dionysus, whose share in Delphi is no less than that of Apollo.[*](Cf. 365 a, supra, and Lucan, v. 73-74; and for the proverb Cf.Moralia, 280 d and the note.) Now we hear the theologians affirming and reciting, sometimes in verse and sometimes in prose, that the god is deathless and eternal in his nature,[*](Cf. Clement of Alexandria, Stromateis, v. 14 (p. 711 Potter).) but, owing forsooth to some predestined design and reason, he undergoes transformations of his person, and at one time enkindles his nature into fire and makes it altogether like all else, and at another time he undergoes all sorts of changes in his form, his emotions and his powers, even as the

1. Fitting it is that the dithyramb
2. With its fitful notes should attend
3. Dionysus in revel rout.

Apollo the artists represent in paintings and sculpture as ever ageless and young, but Dionysus they depict in many guises and forms; and they attribute to Apollo in general a uniformity, orderliness, and unadulterated seriousness, but to Dionysus a certain

1. Euoe Bacchus who incites
2. Womankind, Dionysus who delights
3. ’Mid his honours fraught with frenzy,

But since the time of the cycles in these transformations is not equal, but that of the one which they call Satiety,[*](Cf. von Arnim, Stoicorum Veterum Fragmenta, ii. 616 (p. 186); Philo, De Spec. Leg. i. 208.) is longer, and that of Dearth shorter, they observe the ratio, and use the paean at their sacrifices for a large part of the year; but at the beginning of winter they awake the dithyramb and, laying to rest the paean, they use the dithyramb instead of it in their invocations of the god; for they believe that, as three is to one, so is the relation of the creation to the conflagration.

But these remarks have been extended somewhat beyond what the occasion requires. However, it is clear that men make Five an attribute of the god, which at one time of itself creates itself, like fire, and at another time out of itself creates ten, like the universe. And in music, which is especially pleasing to him, do we imagine that this number plays no part? For the main application of harmony, so far as it can be put into words, is concerned with chords. That these are five, and no more, reason convinces anyone who wishes, by perception alone without

There are many other examples of this sort of thing, said I, which I shall pass over. I shall merely adduce Plato,[*](Plato, Timaeus, 31 a.) who, in speaking about a single world, says that if there are others besides ours, and ours is not the only one, then there are five altogether and no more.[*](Cf.Moralia, 421 f, 422 f, 430 b, and 887 b.) Nevertheless, even if this world of ours is the only one ever created, as Aristotle[*](De Caelo, i. 8-9 (276 a 18).) also thinks, even ours, he says, is in a way put together through

There are some who associate the senses also, since they are of the same number, with those primal elements, observing that touch functions against something resistant, and is earthly, and that taste, through moisture in the things tasted, absorbs their qualities. Air, when it is struck, becomes voice or sound in the hearing of it. Of the two remaining senses, odour, which the sense of smell has received as its portion, since it is an exhalation and is engendered by heat, bears a resemblance to fire; and in sight, which flashes to its goal owing to its kinship with aether and light, there occurs a combination and coalescence of the two, which behaves as they do. The living being possesses no other sense, nor has the world any other nature single and uncombined; but a marvellous distribution and apportionment each to each has, as it seems, been made of the five to the five.

Therewith I checked myself and, after waiting a moment, said, What ails us, Eustrophus, that we all but passed over Homer[*](Il. xv. 187.) as if he were not the first

But the discussion must be carried further back, as Euripides[*](Nauck, Trag. Graec. Frag., Euripides, no. 970; repeated in 431 a, infra.) remarks. For those who exalt Four teach us a lesson that is not without value, that by reason of this number all solids have come into being. For since every such solid body exists through the acquisition of depth by length and breadth, and for length must be presupposed a single point assigned to unity, and length without breadth, which is called a line, is also duality, and the movement of the line breadthwise generates a plane in the third instance, and when depth is added, through the four factors the increase progresses to a solid — it is clear to everyone that four, when it has carried Nature forward to the point of completing a solid body and producing a volume that may be felt and that is resistant, has then left Nature lacking in the most important thing of all. For the inanimate thing is, to put it simply, orphaned, incomplete, and good for nothing, unless there be an animating soul to make use of it. The impulse or dispensation that creates the soul therein, a transformation brought about through five factors in all, gives to Nature its due completeness, and is as much more potent than four as the living being differs in worth from the inanimate thing.

Moreover, the symmetry and power of five, rather than that of any other number, has prevailed and has not permitted the animate to progress to unlimited classes of beings, but has produced five forms

If you should, moreover, make divisions of the soul itself to accord with Nature, the first and least clear part of it is the nutritive, second the perceptive, then the appetitive, and, next after this, the spirited; but when it had reached the power to reason, and had completed its nature, it came to rest there at the fifth element as at the highest point.[*](Cf. 429 e, infra.)

Of this number, which has so many and such great powers, the origin also is fair and lovely; not that which we have expounded, that it is composed of two and three, but that which the beginning combined with the first square produces. For the beginning of all number is one, and the first square is four[*](Cf. 429 e, infra.); and from these, as though from perfected form and matter, comes five. And if certain authorities are right, who, as we know, posit one as the first square, since it is a power of itself and its product is itself, then five, the offspring of the first two squares, does not lack a surpassing nobility of lineage.

But, said I, the most important matter I fear may embarrass our Plato when it is stated, just as he said that Anaxagoras was embarrassed by the name of the Moon, since he tried to claim as his own some very ancient opinion in regard to its illumination. Has not Plato said this in the Cratylus? [*](Plato, Cratylus, 409 a.)

Certainly, said Eustrophus, but what similarity there is I do not see.

Well, you know, of course, that in the Sophist [*](Plato, Sophist, 256 c.) he demonstrates that the supreme first principles are five: Being, Identity, Divergence, and fourth and fifth besides these, Motion and Rest.[*](Cf. 428 c, infra.) But in the Philebus [*](Plato, Philebus, 23 c.) he employs another method of division and affirms that the Infinite is one and the Definite a second, and from the combination of these all generation arises. The cause which makes them combine he posits as a fourth class; the fifth he has left for us to surmise, by which the things combined attain once more dissociation and disengagement. I infer that these are intended to be figurative expressions corresponding to those just mentioned, generation corresponding to being, the infinite to motion, the definite to rest, the combining principle to identity, and the dissociating principle to divergence. But if these last are not the same as the others, even so, considered either in that way or in this, his division into five different classes would still hold good.

Evidently someone anticipated Plato in comprehending this before he did, and for that reason dedicated to the god an E as a demonstration and symbol of the number of all the elements.

Furthermore, observing that the Good displays itself under five categories,[*](Cf. ibid. 66 a-c.) of which the first is moderation, the second due proportion, the third the mind, the fourth the sciences and arts and the true opinions that have to do with the soul, and the fifth any pleasure that is pure and unalloyed with pain, at

Bring to an end the current of song in the sixth generation.

Following upon all this that has been said to you, I continued, I shall sing one short verse[*](Ibid. no. 334; quoted again by Plutarch in Moralia, 636 d.) for Nicander and his friends, men of sagacity. On the sixth day of the new month, namely, when the prophetic priestess is conducted down to the Prytaneum, the first of your three sortitions is for five, she casting three and you casting two, each with reference to the other.[*](The Greek text is at this point somewhat uncertain.) Is not this actually so?

Yes, said Nicander, but the reason must not be told to others.

Then, said I, smiling, until such time as we become holy men, and God grants us to know the truth, this also shall be added to what may be said on behalf of the Five.

Thus, as I remember, the tale of arithmetical and of mathematical laudations of E came to an end.

Ammonius, inasmuch as he plainly held that in mathematics was contained not the least important part of philosophy, was pleased with these remarks, and said, It is not worth while to argue too precisely over these matters with the young, except to say that every one of the numbers will provide not a little for them that wish to sing its praises. What need to speak of the others? Why, the sacred Seven of

The fact is that we really have no part nor parcel in Being,[*](Cf. Philo, De Iosepho, 125 (chap. xxii.).) but everything of a mortal nature is at some stage between coming into existence and passing away,[*](Cf. Diels, Frag. der Vorsokratiker, i. 15, Anaximander, no. 9; Plato, Phaedo, 95 e; von Arnim, Stoicorum Veterum Fragmenta, ii. 594 (p. 183).) and presents only a dim and uncertain semblance and appearance of itself; and if you apply the whole force of your mind in your desire to apprehend it, it is like unto the violent grasping of water, which, by squeezing and compression, loses the handful enclosed, as it spurts through the fingers[*](Cf.Moralia, 1082 a.);

It is impossible to step twice in the same river are the words of Heracleitus,[*](Cf. Diels, Frag. der Vorsokratiker, i. p. 96, Heracleitus, no. 91. Plutarch refers to this dictum also in Moralia, 559 c.) nor is it possible to lay hold twice of any mortal substance in a permanent state; by the suddenness and swiftness of the change in it there comes dispersion and, at another time, a gathering together; or, rather, not at another time nor later, but at the same instant it both settles into its place and forsakes its place; it is coming and going.

Wherefore that which is born of it never attains unto being because of the unceasing and unstaying process of generation, which, ever bringing change, produces from the seed an embryo, then a babe, then a child, and in due course a boy, a young man, a mature man, an elderly man, an old man, causing the first generations and ages to pass away by those which succeed them. But we have a ridiculous fear of one death, we who have already died so many deaths, and still are dying! For not only is it true, as Heracleitus[*](Cf. Diels, Frag. der Vorsokratiker, i. p. 93, Heracleitus, no. 76.) used to say, that the death of heat is birth for steam, and the death of steam is birth for water, but the case is even more clearly to be seen in our own selves: the man in his prime passes away when the old man comes into existence, the young man passes away into the

What, then, really is Being? It is that which is eternal, without beginning and without end, to which no length of time brings change. For time is something that is in motion, appearing in connexion with moving matter, ever flowing, retaining nothing, a receptacle, as it were, of birth and decay, whose familiar afterwards and before, shall be and has been, when they are uttered, are of themselves a confession of Not Being. For to speak of that which has not yet occurred in terms of Being, or to say of what has already ceased to be, that it is, is silly and absurd. And as for that on which we most rely to