Agis and Cleomenes

For if he could have held out only two days, and continued his defensive tactics, he would not have needed to fight a battle, but the Macedonians would have gone away and he could have made his own terms with the Achaeans. But now, as I said before, his lack of resources forced him to stake the whole issue on a battle where, as Polybius says,[*](Hist. ii. 65. 2 and 7. The battle of Sellasia was fought in June of 221 B.C.) he could oppose only twenty thousand men to thirty thousand.

He showed himself an admirable general in the hour of peril, his fellow countrymen gave him spirited support, and even his mercenaries fought ill a praiseworthy manner, but he was overwhelmed by the superior character of his enemies’ armour and the weight of their heavy-armed phalanx. Phylarchus, however, says that there was treachery also, and that this was chiefly what ruined Cleomenes.

For Antigonus ordered his Illyrians and Acarnanians to go round by a secret way and envelope the other wing, which Eucleidas, the brother of Cleomenes, commanded, and then led out the rest of his forces to battle; and when Cleomenes, from his post of observation, could nowhere see the arms of the Illyrians and Acarnanians, he was afraid that Antigonus was using them for some such purpose.

He therefore called Damoteles, the commander of the secret service contingent,[*](A rural police with the special duty of watching the Helots, or slave population.) and ordered him to observe and find out how matters stood in the rear and on the flanks of his array. But Damoteles (who had previously been bribed, as we are told, by Antigonus) told him to have no concern about flanks and rear, for all was well there, but to give his attention to those who assailed him in front, and repulse them. So Cleomenes, putting faith in what he was told, advanced upon Antigonus,