Pompey

Plutarch

Plutarch. Plutarch's Lives, Vol. V. Perrin, Bernadotte, translator. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press; London: William Heinemann Ltd., 1917.

After this, Lucullus withdrew from those parts, and Pompey, having distributed his whole fleet so as to guard the sea between Phoenicia and the Bosporus, himself marched against Mithridates, who had a fighting force of thirty thousand foot and two thousand horse, but did not dare to offer battle.

To begin with, the king was strongly encamped on a mountain which was difficult of assault, but abandoned it, supposing that it had no water. Pompey took possession of this very mountain, and judging by the nature of the vegetation and by the channels in the slopes that the place had springs, ordered his men to sink wells everywhere. At once, then, his camp was abundantly supplied with water, and men wondered that in all the time of his encampment there Mithridates had been ignorant of this possibility.

Next, he invested the king’s camp and walled him in. But after enduring a siege of forty-five days, Mithridates succeeded in stealing off with his most effective troops; the sick and unserviceable he killed. Then, however, Pompey overtook him near the Euphrates river, and encamped close by; and fearing lest the king should get the advantage of him by crossing the Euphrates, he put his army in battle array and led it against him at midnight.

At this time Mithridates is said to have seen a vision in his sleep, revealing what should come to pass. He dreamed that he was sailing the Pontic Sea with a fair wind, and was already in sight of the Bosporus, and was greeting pleasantly his fellow-voyagers, as a man would do in his joy over a manifest and sure deliverance; but suddenly he saw himself bereft of all his companions and tossed about on a small piece of wreckage. As he dreamed of such distress, his friends came to his couch and roused him with the news that Pompey was advancing to the attack.

He was therefore compelled to give battle in defence of his camp, and his generals led out their troops and put them in array. But when Pompey perceived their preparations to meet him, he hesitated to hazard matters in the dark, and thought it necessary merely to surround them, in order to prevent their escape, and then to attack them when it was day, since they were superior in numbers. But his oldest officers, by their entreaties and exhortations, prevailed upon him to attack at once; for it was not wholly dark, but the moon, which was setting, made it still possible to distinguish persons clearly enough; indeed, it was this circumstance that brought most harm to the king’s troops.

For the Romans came to the attack with the moon at their backs, and since her light was close to the horizon, the shadows made by their bodies were thrown far in advance and fell upon the enemy, who were thus unable to estimate correctly the distance between themselves and their foes, but supposing that they were already at close quarters, they hurled their javelins to no purpose and hit nobody.

The Romans, seeing this, charged upon them with loud cries, and when the enemy no longer ventured to stand their ground, but fled in panic fear, they cut them down, so that many more than ten thousand of them were slain, and their camp was captured. Mithridates himself, however, at the outset, cut and charged his way through the Romans with eight hundred horsemen; but the rest were soon dispersed and he was left with three companions.