Nicias

But Nicias did not want a sea fight. He said it would be great folly, when so large an armament was sailing to their aid and hurrying up fresh troops under Demosthenes, to fight the issue out with inferior forces, and those wretchedly supplied. Menander and Euthydemus, however, who had just been appointed to their offices, were moved by an ambitious rivalry with both the other generals; they longed to anticipate Demosthenes in some brilliant exploit, and to eclipse Nicias.

They therefore made much of their city’s reputation. This, they declared again and again, would be altogether ruined and dissipated if they should show fear when the Syracusans sailed out to attack them; and so they forced a decision to give battle by sea. But they were simply out-maneuvered by Ariston, the Corinthian captain, in the matter of the noon-day meal, as Thucydides relates,[*](Thuc. 7.36-41. The Syracusan crews took their meal close by their ships, and then suddenly re-embarked and attacked the Athenians, who supposed there would be no more fighting that day, and were taken unawares.) and then worsted in action, with the loss of many men. And so a great despair encompassed Nicias; he had met with disaster while in sole command, and was now again brought to grief by his colleagues.

But at this juncture Demosthenes hove in sight off the harbors,[*](About mid-summer, 413 B.C.) most resplendent in his array, and most terrifying to the enemy. He brought five thousand hoplites on seventy-three ships of war, besides javelineers and archers and slingers to no less a number than three thousand. What with the gleam of his arms and the insignia of his triremes and the multitude of his coxwains and pipers, he made a spectacular display, and one which smote the enemy with dismay.

Again, then, as was natural, fear reigned among the Syracusans. They saw before them no final release from their perils, but only useless toils and vain self-destruction.

But the joy of Nicias at the presence of this fresh force was not long lived. Nay, at the very first council of war, when Demosthenes urged an immediate attack upon the enemy, a settlement of the whole struggle by the speediest hazard, and either the capture of Syracuse or else a return home, he was in fearful amaze at such aggressive daring, and begged that nothing be done rashly or foolishly.

Delay, he said, was sure to work against the enemy; they no longer had money to spend, and their allies would no longer stand by them; let them only be really distressed by the straits they were in, and they would soon come to him again for terms, as they had done before. For not a few of the men of Syracuse were in secret communication with Nicias. They urged him to bide his time, on the ground that even now they were worn out by the war and weary of Gylippus, and that if their necessities should but increase a little, they would give over altogether.