Vitae philosophorum

In these epistles his heading was Welfare, as that of Epicurus was A Good Life, and that of Cleon All Joy. They comprise: one to Aristodemus, two to Archytas, four to Dionysius, one to Hermias, Erastus and Coriscus, one each to Leodamas, Dion and Perdiccas, and two to Dion’s friends. This is the division adopted by Thrasylus and some others.

Some, including Aristophanes the grammarian, arrange the dialogues arbitrarily in trilogies.

In the first trilogy they place the Republic, Timaeus and Critias; in the second the Sophist, the Statesman and Cratylus; in the third the Laws, Minos and Epinomis; in the fourth Theaetetus, Euthyphro and the Apology; in the fifth Crito, Phaedo and the Epistles. The rest follow as separate compositions in no regular order. Some critics, as has already been stated, put the Republic first, while others start with the greater Alcibiades, and others again with the Theages; some begin with the Euthyphro, others with the Clitophon; some with the Timaeus, others with the Phaedrus; others again with the Theaetetus, while many begin with the Apology. The following dialogues are acknowledged to be spurious: the Midon or Horse-breeder

Plato has employed a variety of terms in order to make his system less intelligible to the ignorant. But in a special sense he considers wisdom to be the science of those things which are objects of thought and really existent, the science which, he says, is concerned with God and the soul as separate from the body. And especially by wisdom he means philosophy, which is a yearning for divine wisdom. And in a general sense all experience is also termed by him wisdom, e.g. when he calls a craftsman wise. And he applies the same terms with very different meanings. For instance, the word φαῦλος (slight, plain) is employed by him[*](As e.g. Theaet. 147 c οἷον ἐν τῇ τοῦ πηλοῦ ἐρωτήσει φαῦλόν που καὶ ἁπλοῦν εἰπεῖν ὅτι γῇ ὑγρῷ φυραθεῖσα πηλὸς ἂν εἴη, τὸ δʼ ὅτου ἐᾶν χαίρειν. Cf. Rep. 527 d οὐ πάνυ φαῦλον ἀλλὰ χαλεπὸν πιστεῦσαι.) in the sense of ἁπλοῦς (simple, honest), just as it is applied to Heracles in the Licymnius of Euripides in the following passage[*](Nauck, T.G.F.2, Eur. 473.):

Plain (φαῦλος), unaccomplished, staunch to do great deeds, unversed in talk, with all his store of wisdom curtailed to action.

But sometimes Plato uses this same word (φαῦλος) to mean what is bad, and at other times for what is small or petty. Again, he often uses different terms to express the same thing. For instance, he calls the Idea form (εἶδος), genus (γένος), archetype (παράδειγμα), principle (ἀρχή) and cause (αἴτιον). He also uses contrary expressions for the same thing. Thus he calls the sensible thing both existent and non-existent,

The right interpretation of his dialogues includes three things: first, the meaning of every statement must be explained; next, its purpose, whether it is made for a primary reason or by way of illustration, and whether to establish his own doctrines or to refute his interlocutor; in the third place it remains to examine its truth.

And since certain critical marks are affixed to his works let us now say a word about these. The cross X is taken to indicate peculiar expressions and figures of speech, and generally any idiom of Platonic usage; the diple[*](A wedge-shaped mark >, used in early papyri to denote a fresh paragraph.) (>) calls attention to doctrines and opinions characteristic of Plato;

the dotted cross (⁜) denotes select passages and beauties of style; the dotted diple (⸖) editors’ corrections of the text; the dotted obelus (÷) passages suspected without reason; the dotted antisigma (Ͽ·) repetitions and proposals for transpositions; the ceraunium the philosophical school; the asterisk (✶) an agreement of doctrine; the obelus (-) a spurious passage. So much for the critical marks and his writings in general. As Antigonus of Carystus says in his Life of Zeno, when the writings were first edited with critical marks, their possessors charged a certain fee to anyone who wished to consult them.

The[*](Here begins the second appendix περὶ τῶν Πλάτωνι ἀρεσκόντων, §§ 67-80. It should be observed that there is absolutely no trace of Neo-Platonist tendencies. Cf. Plato, Tim. 42 e-43 a, 69 a.) doctrines he approved are these. He held

And from the centre outwards it encloses the body on all sides in a circle, and is compounded of elements, and, being divided at harmonic intervals, it forms two circles which touch one another twice; and the interior circle, being slit six times over, makes seven circles in all. And this interior circle moves by way of the diagonal to the left, and the other by way of the side to the right. Hence also the one is supreme, being a single circle, for the other interior circle was divided; the former is the circle of the Same, the latter that of the Other, whereby he means that the motion of the soul is the motion of the universe together with the revolutions of the planets.[*](Cf. Plato, Tim. 36 d-37 c.).

And the division from the centre to the circumference which is adjusted in harmony with the soul being thus determined, the soul knows that which is, and adjusts it proportionately because she has the elements proportionately disposed in herself. And when the circle of the Other revolves aright, the result is opinion; but from the regular motion of the circle of the Same comes knowledge. He set forth two universal principles, God and matter, and he calls God mind and cause; he held that matter is devoid of form and unlimited, and that composite things arise out of it[*](Cf. Plato, Tim. 50 d. e; 51 a.); and that it was once in

This substance, he says, is converted into the four elements, fire, water, air, earth, of which the world itself and all that therein is are formed. Earth alone of these elements is not subject to change, the assumed cause being the peculiarity of its constituent triangles. For he thinks that in all the other elements the figures employed are homogeneous, the scalene triangle out of which they are all put together being one and the same, whereas for earth a triangle of peculiar shape is employed; the element of fire is a pyramid, of air an octahedron, of water an icosahedron, of earth a cube. Hence earth is not transmuted into the other three elements, nor these three into earth.

But the elements are not separated each into its own region of the universe, because the revolution unites their minute particles, compressing and forcing them together into the centre, at the same time as it separates the larger masses. Hence as they change their shapes, so also do they change the regions which they occupy.[*](Cf. Plato, Tim. 58 a-c.)

And there is one created universe,[*](Cf. Plato, Tim. 31 a, b; 33 a; 55 c, d; 92 c.) seeing that it is perceptible to sense, which has been made by God. And it is animate because that which is animate is better than that which is inanimate.[*](Cf. Plato, Tim. 30 b.) And this piece of workmanship is assumed to come from a cause supremely good.[*](Cf. Plato, Tim. 30 a, b; 55 c, d.) It was made one and not unlimited because the pattern from which he made it was one. And it is spherical because such is the shape of its maker.

For that maker contains the other living things, and this universe the shapes of

The universe is composed of fire, water, air and earth; of fire in order to be visible; of earth in order to be solid; of water and air in order to be proportional.[*](Cf.Tim. 31 b-33 a. It would be more correct to say in order that the bonds, the inserted terms (air and water), which unite fire to earth, may be proportional. For the best of bonds is that which makes itself and the things which it binds as complete a unity as possible; and the nature of proportion is to accomplish this most perfectly (Tim. 31 c).) For the powers represented by solids are connected by two mean proportionals in a way to secure the complete unity of the whole. And the universe was made of all the elements in order to be complete and indestructible.

Time was created as an image of eternity. And while the latter remains for ever at rest, time consists in the motion of the universe. For night and day and month and the like are all parts of time; for which reason, apart from the nature of the universe, time has no existence. But so soon as the universe is fashioned time exists.[*](Cf. Plato, Tim. 37 d-38 b.)

And the sun and moon and planets were created

And of all the gods in heaven the earth is the oldest. And it was fashioned to make night and day. And being at the centre it moves round the centre.[*](Cf. Plato, Tim. 40 b, c.) And since there are two causes, it must be affirmed, he says, that some things are due to reason and others have a necessary cause,[*](Cf. Plato, Tim. 46 d, e; 47 e; 48 a; 68 e; 69 a.) the latter being air, fire, earth and water, which are not exactly elements but rather recipients of form.[*](Cf. Plato, Tim. 49 a sqq.; 50 b-51 b; 52 a, b.) They are composed of triangles, and are resolved into triangles. The scalene triangle and the isosceles triangle are their constituent elements.[*](Cf. Plato, Tim. 53 c-55 c.)

The principles, then, and causes assumed are the two above mentioned, of which God and matter are the exemplar. Matter is of necessity formless like the other recipients of form. Of all these there is a necessary cause. For it somehow or other receives the ideas and so generates substances, and it moves because its power is not uniform, and, being in

For the two causes existed even before the world was made, as well as becoming in the third place, but they were not distinct, merely traces of them being found, and in disorder. When the world was made, they too acquired order.[*](Cf. Plato, Tim. 52 d; 53 b; 57 c; 69 b, c.) And out of all the bodies there are the universe was fashioned. He holds God, like the soul, to be incorporeal. For only thus is he exempt from change and decay. As already stated, he assumes the Ideas to be causes and principles whereby the world of natural objects is what it is.

On good and evil he would discourse to this effect. He maintained that the end to aim at is assimilation to God, that virtue is in itself sufficient for happiness, but that it needs in addition, as instruments for use, first, bodily advantages like health and strength, sound senses and the like, and, secondly, external advantages such as wealth, good birth and reputation. But the wise man will be no less happy even if he be without these things. Again, he will take part in public affairs, will marry, and will refrain from breaking the laws which have been made. And as far as circumstances allow he will legislate for his own country, unless in the extreme corruption of the people he sees that the state of affairs completely justifies his abstention.

He thinks that the gods take note of human life[*](Cf. Plato, Tim. 30 b; 44 c.) and that there are superhuman beings.[*](Cf. Plato, Tim. 40 d.) He was the first to define the notion of good as that which is bound up with

He also discoursed on the propriety of names, and indeed he was the first to frame a science for rightly asking and answering questions, having employed it himself to excess. And in the dialogues he conceived righteousness to be the law of God because it is stronger to incite men to do righteous acts, that malefactors may not be punished after death also.

Hence to some he appeared too fond of myths. These narratives he intermingles with his works in order to deter men from wickedness, by reminding them how little they know of what awaits them[*](Cf. Plato, Tim. 42 b.) after death. Such, then, are the doctrines he approved.

He used also to divide things, according to Aristotle, in the following manner.[*]( The third appendix begins here, containing the διαιρέσεις which are also attributed to Aristotle; see Rose, Aristoteles Pseudepigraphus, pp. 679 sqq., who gives a Christian recension. The original, the common source of Diogenes Laertius and the Christian writer, he refers vaguely to the Hellenistio age.) Goods are in the mind or in the body, or external. For example, justice, prudence, courage, temperance and such like are in the mind; beauty, a good constitution, health and strength in the body; while friends, the welfare of one’s country and riches are amongst external things.