History of the Peloponnesian War

but by what means soever it should fall out, it would be a great baseness to be beaten), be swayed to hazard battle against reason and not only to dishonour the state but also to cast it into extreme danger, seeing that since their late losses it hath scarce been fit with their strongest preparation, willingly, no nor urged by precedent necessity, to undertake, how then without constraint to seek out voluntary, dangers?

Therefore he commanded them with all speed to take aboard those that were wounded and their landmen and whatsoever utensils they brought with them; but to leave behind whatsoever they had taken in the territory of the enemy to the end that their galleys might be the lighter;

and to put off for Samos, and thence, when they had all their fleet together, to make out against the enemy as occasion should be offered. As Phrynichus advised this, so he put it in execution, and was esteemed a wise man, not then only, but afterwards, nor in this only, but in whatsoever else he had the ordering of.

Thus the Athenians presently in the evening, with their victory unperfect, dislodged from before Miletus. From Samos the Argives, in haste and in anger for their overthrow, went home.

The Peloponnesians, setting forth betimes in the morning from Teichiussa, put in at Miletus and stayed there one day. The next day they took with them those galleys of Chios which had formerly been chased together with Chalcideus, and meant to have returned to Teichiussa to take aboard such necessaries as they had left ashore.